

# Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect

Political attitudes of Hungarian university  
and college students

Andrea Szabó (ed)



Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect – Political attitudes of Hungarian university and college students

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EXIT, VOICE, LOYALTY AND NEGLECT – POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF HUNGARIAN UNIVERSITY  
AND COLLEGE STUDENTS

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# Contents

Contents	3.
Preface	5.
The structure of the book	6.
Theoretical background as per Hirschman's <i>Exit, Voice and Political Loyalty</i>	7.
Voice versus exit	8.
Loyalty and neglect	10.
Organization: activity vs. passivity	11.
The expansion of the conceptual framework: exit, voice, and loyalty in relation to Hungarian students	12.
Exit: the international mobility and migration potential of Hungarian students	16.
Introduction	16.
Research questions	20.
Results	21.
Migration potential	23.
Settling abroad	24.
Are there students for whom studying or working abroad is a sort of conversion of capital ( the Bourdieuan sense)?	28.
Can studying abroad be seen as the first step toward moving abroad and living abroad for Hungarian students or will the students return to Hungary to work, in their opinion?	30.
Chapter conclusion	33.
System indifferents, system critics and voice	35.
Identifying with democracy	36.
What does democracy mean? The results of the qualitative survey	36.
The framework for interpretation of identifying with democracy	39.
Choice of political values and the support of democracy	40.
Social background and identifying with democracy	42.
Satisfaction with democracy	45.
The social dimension of satisfaction	47.
Voice: those who protest	49.
Organization of Hungarian university students	50.
Organization along public issues	50.
Virtual participation	56.
Political indifferents	62.
Chapter conclusion	63.
Political loyalty	66.
Introduction	66.
Social background	67.
Choice of political values	75.
Green orientation and gender aspects	85.
Chapter conclusion	88.

Exit versus voice	90.
Does exit bar voice?	91.
Exit and protest groups	92.
Research methodology	97.
Bibliography	98.
Figures and tables	103.
About the authors	106.
About the Active Youth in Hungary Research Group	106.

# Preface

Two years have passed since the publication of the study “Political Orientations, Values and Activities of Hungarian University and College Students”. This publication revealed tendencies within certain groups of young Hungarians regarding party preferences, voting participation and habits, their views and understanding of democracy, as well as aspects that have recently gotten more emphasis, such as online activism and self-organization. In the publication we analyzed the questions of whether in a democratic system a generation of new democrats could emerge, and to what extent Hungarian youth is committed to democracy as a system of rule.

The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung has commissioned this current volume of the study to further examine existing and new tendencies of Hungarian youth regarding their political choices and the reasons behind them. While previously only students who reside in the country were in the focus, the scope of this recent study has been extended to include the political involvement and attitudes of that part of the Hungarian youth who already are emigrating or are planning to soon move abroad. The title, “Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect – Political Attitudes of Hungarian University and College Students” reflects a possible alignment of the various paths of political behavior observed within this generation.

Since 2013, certain trends that were visible in the Hungarian political scene have gained even more ground. Recent developments include some new attempts for grassroots activism, a series of civil protests, and the governing FIDESZ party losing their 2/3 supermajority in parliament, but also Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announcing his program of illiberal democracy, continuing centralization in the fields of education and administration, and the far-right party Jobbik becoming even stronger. Meanwhile a large number of Hungarians, mostly youth, are leaving the country to continue their studies or to pursue a career and life abroad.

What are the attitudes of youth in Hungary towards democracy, and how active are they in politics? What are their party preferences, and how involved are they with public life? Are they planning to leave the country, and if so, do they become less or more engaged with Hungarian politics from abroad? This study explores such questions and attempts to place the findings into a theoretical framework developed for this purpose using the categories of exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect.

We would like to express our gratitude to the editor and authors of the study for their efforts and enthusiasm, and hope that the findings of this study will initiate further discussions of this issue.

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# The structure of the book

The present book focuses on the political participation of college and university students for several reasons. Firstly, university students have played an important role in revolutionary changes throughout Hungarian history (1848, 1956). Secondly, members of this age cohort are embedded both in the traditional values of their families and in the new ideas of youth organizations, and are therefore very sensitive to societal changes. Hence, this group reflects and indicates the emerging problems of the whole society at the earliest moment. Thirdly, this age cohort is most affected by globalization: the use of the English language is a requirement for their studies and there are several international scholarships increasing their mobility.

The first chapter presents a theoretical framework based on the famous book of Albert O. Hirschman entitled *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.

The second chapter examines the migration potential (*Exit*) of Hungarian students.

The third chapter examines the attitudes of the respondents towards democracy and their political participation (*Voice*).

The fourth chapter presents the political preferences of students and their relationship to Hungarian political parties (*Loyalty*).

The last chapter gives an overview of the results and answers the question whether exit truly bars the development of voice – as Albert O. Hirschman states in his classic book - or not.

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Budapest, November 2015.

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*Editor*

# Theoretical background as per Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Political Loyalty*

The study of the political market through methods associated with economics investigates how the availability of (or the lack of) benefits or the joining of certain institutions influence the behaviour and preferences of individuals. Perhaps the best known international expert on this subject is Albert O. Hirschman, who published his classic book, entitled *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, in 1970. The title of the book refers to three concepts – exit, voice, and loyalty – used by Hirschman that originate from economics but can also be interpreted in the field of political science. In his analysis, Hirschman basically formulates two conflicting options, exit and voice, which he completes with the concept of loyalty. He uses the term exit in reference to market conditions, whereas he applies the term voice to the world of politics. In both cases his aim is to show that people have several means of fulfilling their desires, validating their opinions, or expressing their dissatisfaction with a product or system. Though at the time of the publication Hirschman made a clear distinction between his two fundamental terms, he made some allowances for overlap in subsequent works. Later, in writings published in the 1990s connected to the historic events of the fall of the German Democratic Republic and German reunification, he showed even more leniency concerning the exclusivity of the two terms.

Exit, in Hirschman's interpretation, presents itself in very clear, practical solutions. Refraining from the consumption of a product or switching to another one are the most typical forms of market exit. In the case of organizations, the practical materialization of exit can be resigning. Hirschman considers non-participation in political life and refraining from participating in elections to be a solution that has extreme costs.<sup>1</sup>

When interpreting the results of our study we started with Hirschman and his aforementioned theory. The focus of our analysis, however, is grounded in political science. Therefore, instead of the original politics vs. economics dichotomy, we approach each element of this conceptual triad primarily from our own perspective, namely, the attitudes of Hungarian university and college students. Our interest is whether the options of exit, voice and loyalty prevail in the current attitudes and behaviour of students. We try to describe Hungarian students' behaviour through Hirschman's terms. Though our terminology uses his original analytical concepts, we have given them our own interpretation, adapting a theory created over 40 years ago to the Hungarian youth of the 21st century.

Both the relevant literature and empirical social science studies<sup>2</sup> have reinforced the observation that emigration or exit has increased significantly in Hungary. At the same time, it is also known from different youth studies that unlike society in general, protesting

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1. It is important to note that as an economist Hirschman primarily deals with the corporate sector and existing capitalism.

2. See [http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150811\\_migracio.html](http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150811_migracio.html) or BLASKÓ-LIGETI-SIK 2014.

the reigning powers is not alien to students.<sup>3</sup> (SZABÓ 2012). In other words, it is as if parallel processes were taking place among youth. Then we must mention those university or college students who neither leave, nor protest. Is Hirschman's third important term – loyalty – the most fitting category to describe them, or is there some other definition that better explains their behaviour?

Let us look at the three basic terms in detail.

### Voice versus exit

In Hirschman's theory, voice is a part of the correctional mechanism of politics; when members of an organization<sup>4</sup> – the citizens – express their dissatisfaction to the leaders or higher authority, or in the event of a general protest, someone must be willing to listen to their argument. Those who protest do not flee when faced with problems, but rather try to either actively solve them, or at least to raise social awareness concerning the existence of an alternative decision. (HIRSCHMAN 1995, 12; 37) According to Hirschman, voice is the direct opposite of exit. He considers voice to be a "messy" term with different degrees of exerting its effect directly. He views collective petitions, pleas to higher authorities, protests, and the mobilization of the public as actions belonging to this group. Effectiveness grows in proportion with the size of the action, but disproportionate protest can impede the achievement of goals. Voice is a process of interest articulation whose historical development is "...synonymous with the history of democratic control." (HIRSCHMAN 1970, 55)

Hirschman describes the connection between the options of voice and exit as a complex relationship. According to his axiom, when someone chooses exit, he/she loses the possibility to protest, but the reverse is not true<sup>5</sup> Voice comes to the forefront if the possibility of exit becomes limited. From this perspective, voice complements exit and is especially useful from the correctional mechanism perspective. In the political subsystem, exit is the last resort - stakeholders only resort to it when protest has been to no avail. The subsequent followers of rational choice theory – David Johnson, for example – hold exit to be equal to voice; moreover, they prove that from the perspective of personal profit, the option of exit may even be more advantageous. David Johnson questions whether the option of having a voice is an adequate mode for obtaining change in the distribution of public goods. (JOHNSON 1999, 172) Voting with one's feet strengthens the option of exit: If the public services are replaced with private ones, then in the case of politics, movement from one local government to another costs less than asserting pressure does, so the option of exit is more effective for citizens than the option of protest.

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
3. Students protested against the Hungarian Government's planned cuts in the state subsidies to finance college tuition in Budapest on 10 December 2012. More than 1 000 students rallied, blocking bridges over the Danube in freezing weather, and marched to Parliament. The protest later became a nationwide movement and students organized similar actions in different Hungarian cities over the course of several weeks.

4. The term "organization" in political economics is always interpreted broadly. In his book *The Logic of Collective Action*, Olson (1997) considers the state a large group.

5. This statement was later heavily criticised by other authors, for example, the essay of Ma (1993) on the attitudes of Chinese emigrants who upon reaching their new homes protested against the existing communist regime, helping to promote internal dissent in China.

Under certain circumstances, the correction of the operating mechanisms of the political subsystem can be reached not just through protests but by other collective action as well.<sup>6</sup> Naturally a certain type of passivity is part of collective action, so-called passive resistance, when a society gives up cooperating with the reigning power. It is a question whether simple non-action, passive agony, or the often-destructive acquiescence belong to this category. There is always a large group of any society that can not be described by any of these options. Concerning this group, Hirschman speaks of loyalty, while a critic of his (RUSBULT et al. 1982) speaks of neglect. Rusbult and his co-authors expand Hirschman's conceptual triad to include the passive-destructive version of loyalty and place this four-part concept into a 2\*2 matrix. In this system, exit and voice mean actual, de facto activity. At the same time, the former is a constructive concept while the latter is not. It is rare that exit aids the development of an organization or the strengthening of a society. According to Rusbult et al., loyalty can be seen as a passive but constructive action that yields some sort of result, while negligence is the least favourable option: Besides the fact that an indifferent citizen is passive, his/her non-action is not even constructive. They also imply that the appearance of competitive alternatives encourages consumers (in this case, the citizens) to move towards being active, while commitment strengthens constructiveness.

Figure 1.  
Exit – Voice – Loyalty – Neglect



Source: RUSBULT, et al. 1988, p. 601

6. For example, through such standard democratic methods as referendums or popular initiatives.

Hirschman also calls attention to the fact that protest has costs. Members of an organization sacrifice their time, money and energy for change to come about. In turn, this fact constantly shapes the relationship between exit, voice and loyalty. Voice is a realistic alternative if it brings an adequate result, if a significant improvement can be calculated in the position of influence or bargaining power. Voice plays an active role in the case of particularly important organizations.<sup>7</sup> After considering all these, he establishes that the alternative of exit impedes the spread of voice.

As we have noted, the results of previous empirical studies have showed the strengthening of the potential for the emigration of Hungarian youth while at the same time suggesting that compared to “adults”, their participation in protests is much more robust. (KERN–SZABÓ 2011; OROSS–SZABÓ 2014; SZABÓ–GERŐ 2015) Though Hirschman separates these two categories distinctly, we think they are not necessarily exclusive. A young person can be involved in collective action and simultaneously plan to settle abroad. Thus we can state the hypothesis that the students can protest AND entertain the thought of exit instead of protesting OR exiting. We have to note that in our research – and this is true for migration studies in general – we look at potential exit or emigration, which means a future, provisional action. The widespread position of researchers on this is that potential migration never matches the numbers of actual migration. Even amongst those determined to leave there are some who, in the end, do not take the final steps to do so. When it comes to actually making the decision to leave, they stay home.

### Loyalty and Neglect

Perhaps the least specific part of Hirschman’s theory is organizational loyalty. It is no coincidence that Rusbult et al. tried to clarify and expand this aspect.<sup>8</sup> In Hirschman’s approach, loyalty sheds light on the way voice and exit function side by side. Organizational loyalty holds exit in check and activates protest. Loyalty creates an opportunity to stop the deterioration of performance; loyal consumers can motivate a company or a system to perform better through their constructive suggestions. Loyal actors can apply constructive criticism or can increase the effectiveness of protest by raising the option of exit, forcing the leaders of the company or organization to perform even better.

The concept of boycott also appears in Hirschman’s work. This is a formula found within the confines of exit and voice and means an effective exit with the promise of re-entry. If the corrective mechanisms take effect, those who have elected to boycott will return to the organization.

The term of post-exit loyalty has become prevalent lately in the relevant literature (SANTÉE–EEKHUIS–ZHOU 2009). An expatriate can remain loyal even after effectively leaving his/her country by participating in the elections of the given country, sending money,

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7. We must note that based on Hirschman, Olson holds that voice is probably most viable where there are few actors (consumers) and they are capable of influencing the product for sale. Therefore, in the world of politics and organizations the option of voice is used more, as there are far fewer members of those organizations than those who buy the products of companies.

8. Throughout this volume we use the term “indifferent” as a synonym of “neglect”, as it better adheres to youth culture and youth behaviour.

helping those at home, or following the events of the mother-country. Thus, loyalty towards a country does not automatically cease if a citizen physically leaves his or her country of origin.

### **Organization: activity vs. passiveness**

Due to the above, we hold that the organizational networks through which the young adult integrates into society are very important. Our previous research has shown that the potential for protest of those young people who are organized into communities is significantly higher than for those who are not members of any social, civic or political community. (SZABÓ 2012, OROSS–SZABÓ 2014) In general, the relevant literature agrees that the choice between voice and exit is closely connected to the size of the different groups, as well as the action strategy chosen by them in order to obtain the inclusive collective goods. (OLSON 1997, ELSTER 1995) In small groups, members have an interest in cooperation, as the exit of one actor or refusal to participate has negative effects that can be felt by others as well. On the other hand, some members have an interest in providing the collective goods even if they have to bear the burden by themselves. This is not the case in large or latent groups, however, and thus it is not true for society either.

According to Mancur Olson, in latent groups there are three factors collectively prohibiting advocacy; at the same time, it would be in the interest of the individual members of the group (society) to take action for the public good. On the one hand, the greater the group, the smaller the total profit to the individuals aspiring to realize the interests, so the “reward” to the individual for group-oriented action is that much less adequate. (OLSON 1997, 52–53) On the other hand, the greater the group, the less each of the individuals receive from the whole of the collective goods. Therefore, the likelihood of the probability that one member of the group would individually cover the costs of the collective good decreases (unlike in small groups). Lastly, the third consideration that forces the rationally-thinking individuals of a society to be passive and to show self-restraint is that the larger the number of the group, the greater the organizational cost, and the larger the obstacle that it has to overcome in order to secure a certain amount of collective goods for itself. Therefore, in latent groups, including society, separate incentives – according to Jon Elster, coercive measures – have to be utilized that can be distinguished from the collective good in order for the rational action of the individual to be group-oriented, otherwise the collective action will be passivity and exit. The question arises: Does this mechanism take effect in the case of voice, or does something else? Do only those individuals protest for whom the event promises the attainment of goods? Is it really due to the rational attitude of citizens – if the outcome of the protest appears to be collective goods – that just a small segment of society protests?

## The expansion of the conceptual framework: exit, voice, and loyalty in relation to Hungarian students


Above we listed those analytical, ideal-typical concepts that Hirschman and his followers and critics used in connection to exit, voice and loyalty. As indicated, these definitions – exactly because of their ideal-typical nature – can not be interpreted directly in the context of 21st century Hungarian university and college students; therefore, we will adapt and interpret them. Hereinafter we would like to describe the aspects of the conceptual framework used by us, one by one. We would like to note that although we begin with Hirschman, we hold the supplements and modifications of Rusbult et al. – which were added to the original theory in 1988 – to be important as well. We examine the terms in the individual active/passive relations, as well as in the constructive/destructive relationship of the political system. Being active in this case means actual, realized activity. As our research is primarily political science and sociology-oriented and is less inspired by economics, when we analyse the constructive/destructive duo we are analysing the relationship towards the political system, to be exact, the relation to democracy. In this case the question is whether the action is constructive or destructive from the system's perspective.

1. The clearest concept is exit. In our interpretation this means (potentially) leaving the country (for the purposes of international study, working abroad, but most often to settle abroad.) As we have noted, we cannot measure actual exit, but we analyse – in accordance with international studies – potential exit, that is, our focus is directed at those who plan to leave the country and settle abroad. Exit is therefore an active (actual), nevertheless destructive term, as when it is realized its “benefit” from the perspective of Hungarian democracy is marginal. (Exit = active + destructive).
2. Voice is also a relatively “clear” term, which we read as collective action, that is, our use of the terminology tries to follow the original typology. In the wake of Hirschman, we hold that not all actions can be categorised as acts of protest, even if in theory they are directed at authority or against the past or potential decisions of authority. Our analysis uses the term voice in a narrower framework. We consider those types of action to be an expression of voice that are capable of mobilising university students, or in a broader sense, even public opinion. We do not include in this analysis those individual actions that do not come together in some sort of public collective action (e.g., donations to NGOs), or that can be defined as instruments of fulfilling individual interests. This is a pronouncedly active category, the aim of which is most often to improve the system. This is related to another aspect of the concept, its relationship to democracy. We hold that critics of the system – that is, those who, under certain situations, can accept a dictatorship in the face of democracy – also belong under the category of voice. While they clearly express their disapproval with democracy – according to our assumption – they still live in this system. Aside from this, they also voice their disapproval to varying degrees. (Voice = active + constructive).

3. We also use the term *loyalty*, but we do not mean its economic interpretation, rather, specifically *political loyalty*, which we define in two ways. A student can be loyal to a political party, in the sense that he/she is a committed voter, but a student can also be loyal to the political system in which he/she lives – in this case, democracy. That is, there are those who are loyal to parties and those who are loyal to systems. Party loyalty can be studied in the form of party preference, while system loyalty can be studied through a person's relationship towards democracy and dictatorship. (Politically loyal = passive + constructive).
  - a. In our opinion, politically loyal students are those who do not calculate their individual benefit or possible collective or individual costs, but who, the exclusion of rationality, decide on a given party for emotional reasons, that is, they become committed, loyal. This political loyalty spurs the performance of the preferred party and helps initiate correctional mechanisms, especially if the loyal voters exercise an indirect critique (generally not done in public). Of course it is a question whether politically loyal Hungarian university or college students produce any sort of (indirect) critique, or whether they fall completely in line with the party opinions, choosing plain, uncritical party loyalty over the original and, by definition, critical aspect of loyalty. We have to note, however, that those who are loyal to a party may appear amongst protesters as well. Besides voting in elections, the loyal voters of a government's opposition may express their disapproval of the government's performance by participating in collective actions, namely, by protesting. In extreme cases it can also happen that the loyal voters of the reigning governing party protest against issues that are not necessarily political in nature or that do not question their political loyalty (e.g., issue-based protests), but these count as rare exceptions to the rule.
  - b. Those loyal to the system do accept democracy as the best political system; their loyalty is basically good-natured. However, their good intentions are not paired with a particularly active citizenship.
4. Finally, special attention must be paid to indifferent students (by which we mean the category of neglect. See: Rusbult). These are students not interested in public affairs/politics during their university years, those who are politically inactive or who have difficulty understanding the world of politics. We are interested in the size of this destructive student body, but also about whether passivity and uncertainty about politics can truly be identified as indifference. We think that indifferent students are, on the one hand, inactive; on the other hand, a majority of them are critical of the system. That is, these are young adults for whom choosing between systems (between democracy and dictatorships) is far from easy. (Politically indifferent = passive + destructive).

We can place the terms used by us in the 2\*2 matrix of Rusbult et al. in the following way.

Figure 2.  
Exit – Voice – Loyalty – Neglect



Based on Rusbult etc 1988 601. p. Szabó.

In the individual chapters of this volume we analyse the relationship between exit, voice and loyalty. Ultimately we are searching for an answer to whether exit truly bars protest among university students. According to our thesis, as we have previously implied, this is not the case. Moreover, we hold that the same groups of active students protest who would most likely choose the potential option of exit. Those who are politically loyal do not protest and do not choose exit; as a devotee of either a party or a system they do not choose either of these categories. We perceive politically indifferent students to be passive actors for whom the political system holds no value; they do not devote themselves to any group, they do not show any interest in politics, and they do not vote.

Adhering to international standards,<sup>9</sup> we measure the relationship of Hungarian university/college students towards the democratic political system with the help of the following question:

“Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?

- Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government;
- Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one;
- For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime.”

9. See: Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, Doh Chull Shin. *How East Asians View Democracy*, (Columbia University Press: 2008).

Based on Szabó (SZABÓ 2013), we will call the group of students who hold that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government "system loyal" voters.

The second group in our typology is composed of those students who are characterized by a feeling of alienation from political systems, the need for distance from power, and the complete depoliticization of their private life. ("For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime.") Therefore, during the course of our investigation, we call this group "system indifferent". Their political behaviour may be based on collective historical memory according to which the regime changes that came about in Hungary appear to have been events that directly affected and threatened the lives of individuals, families and groups (ERŐS 2001).

The third group in our interpretational framework includes the answers of those students according to whom democracy can be overridden by dictatorship under certain circumstances (in 2015, 21 % held this view). As their attitude towards democracy is heavily critical, we therefore name them "system critical".

The individual chapters of the book follow this extended conceptual matrix:

- The first chapter examines exit, that is, university and college students who are considering leaving the country;
- the second is about system loyals, system criticals, political indifferents and the category of voice;
- finally, in the last larger chapter, we primarily look at party loyals.

There are two aspects to which we pay particular attention, examining them separately: one is gender, the other is green orientation. We arrived at the latter by asking respondents to choose the mentality that is closest to their values/way of thinking from among 10 different value markers. Of these 10 markers, one was very distinctive, namely, the green ( environmentalist) one, which was chosen by 13 % of respondents. Out of the 10 markers or ideological crutches, "green" came in fourth place after the "liberal/free thinking" (27 %), "supporter of order and stability" (17 %), and "European/Western-thinking" (15 %) groups.

# Exit: the international mobility and migration potential of Hungarian students

## Introduction

In the introductory, theoretical chapter of this volume, we described exit and voice with regard to two subsystems – market conditions and the world of politics<sup>10</sup> – along the lines of Albert O. Hirschman's theory. We also explained in the introduction the context in which we are examining and how we define these concepts. In this essay we interpret the trends that can be identified in connection to exit with regard to the financial situation and political attitudes of the students in our study.

Our analysis of exit includes the question of the international migration of Hungarian students participating in full-time training, which is one of the most current problems today. Different aspects and dimensions of migration can be distinguished. Our study examines the propensity for the international migration of Hungarian students in which several different countries are involved, that is, there is a "sending" state and a "host" state. (CSERESNYÉS, 1996:20) Based on the reasons for migration, we examine voluntary migration, the form of migration in which financial or related considerations (e.g., labour migration, relocating for study purposes) motivate the migrant persons (CSERESNYÉS, 1996:21). In our study we call the intention for someone to emigrate or go abroad to work "migration potential". Within this framework we would like to know the size of the group that plans to migrate within the scope of the studied population and what socio-economic factors increase and decrease the migration potential for students participating in full-time training in Hungarian higher education. (SÍK 2003:15). Peregrination, study abroad means the international mobility of migrant students enrolled in higher education abroad. The origin of the concept in Hungary goes back to the end of the 14th century (BÉKÉSI-JANKOVICS-KOSA-NYERGE, 1993). Mainly members of the nobility could make use of the possibility for peregrination in its archaic sense. During these trips they travelled the whole of Western Europe and tried to build their political networks as well, usually spending two or three years abroad. Under the "new" interpretation, this concept refers to the migration and mobility of students provided by the framework of the European Union. In both the previous and modern understanding of the concept, it is a common element that the peregrine is someone, following his/her travels, returns home to apply this knowledge in his/her mother country.

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10. Though in a secondary way, exit appears in politics as well, while voice appears in economics. Exit generally presents itself through very clear, practical solutions. Not consuming a product or switching to another one is the most typical market "exit". A practical materialization of exit in the world of organizations can be emigration (leaving a country), or in simpler cases, exiting from a party. Hirschman considers withdrawal from political life, and therefore from elections, to be a very costly solution.

Both the relevant literature, as well as empirical social science studies<sup>11</sup> have reinforced that leaving the country, or exit, has increased significantly in Hungary. Thus, we can state the hypothesis that students can protest AND entertain the thought of exit instead of protesting OR exiting. We have to note that our research – and this is true for migration studies in general – looks at potential exit or emigration, which means a future, provisional action. The widespread position of researchers concerning this is that potential migration never matches the numbers of actual migration. Even amongst those determined to leave, there are some who, in the end, do not take the final steps when it comes to making the decision, but stay home. Ultimately we are searching for an answer to whether exit truly bars protest among university students. According to our thesis – as we previously implied – this is not the case. Moreover, we hold that the same active student cohorts protest who would also most likely choose the potential option of exit. We can only answer this question, however, at the end of the volume, following the presentation of the findings for the groups of exit, voice and loyalty.

According to the data of the OECD, upon examination of the global trends of student migration the numbers of international students between 1998 and 2004 grew four times as fast as those for international migration (Table 1). Since then, the ratio has grown even more. In 2009, close to three million international students<sup>12</sup> studied worldwide (FINDLAY et al, 2010:4), while according to OECD's newest data<sup>13</sup> today there are almost 4.5 million international students studying<sup>14</sup> away from their mother country.

Table 1.  
The ten largest sending states (1975–2005).

1975		1985		1995		2005	
Country	Amount	Country	Amount	Country	Amount	Country	Amount
Iran	33021	China	42428	China	115871	China	343126
USA	29414	Iran	41083	South Korea	69736	India	123559
Greece	23363	Malaysia	40493	Japan	62324	South Korea	95885
Hong Kong	21059	Greece	34086	Germany	45432	Japan	60424
China	17201	Morocco	33094	Greece	43941	Germany	56410
UK	16866	Jordan	24285	Malaysia	41159	France	53350
Nigeria	16348	Hong Kong	23657	India	39626	Turkey	52048
Malaysia	16162	South Korea	22468	Turkey	37629	Morocco	51503
India	14805	Germany	22424	Italy	36515	Greece	49631
Canada	12664	USA	19707	Hong Kong	35141	USA	41181

Source: OECD data, based on the essay of De Wit (2008: 33–4).

11. See [http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150811\\_migracio.html](http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150811_migracio.html) or BLASKÓ–LIGETI–SIK 2014.)

12. International students are those students who continue their studies across borders. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics, OECD and Eurostat define international students as those pupils who do not have a permanent address in the country where they study and received their previous degree in another country. If the data for international students is not available for a given country then they use the data for foreign students. A foreign student is a student who is not a citizen of the given country. Foreign students therefore constitute a subcategory of international students.

13. <http://www.oecd.org/edu/eag-interim-report.htm>.

14. The event of having studied in another country can be measured with the help of two different approaches. First, the frequency of temporary study in another country can be established with the help of surveys of students who are already close to graduation or with the help of graduate surveys undertaken soon after graduation. Second, the frequency of “diploma mobility”, i.e., mobility for a whole study programme, can be established with the help of educational statistics collected internationally by UNESCO, OECD and Eurostat (TEICHLER, 2012:8).

The rise of migration amongst Hungarian students is thus, on the one hand, part of a global trend. On the other hand, the free movement and mobility of persons is one of the basic values of the European Union, and therefore the migration and peregrination of Hungarian students is a natural consequence of the European regional integration processes.

Upon examination of the 32 European countries participating in the Erasmus programme, the number of foreign students between 1999 (827,000, or 5.4 percent of all students) and 2007 (1,516,000, or 5.7 percent of all students) grew 80 percent in absolute value and 30 percent in relative value. Within this, the proportion of students from EU Member States grew from 3 percent to 3.3 percent, while that of other European countries grew from 2 percent to 3.7 percent. (TEICHLER-FERENCZ-WÄCHTER 2011). Based on the same statistics, the mobility of students within Western European states fell from 3 percent to 2.8 percent while remaining constant (1.7 percent) in Central and Eastern European countries. According to the data of UNESCO, 80 percent of European students studying abroad remained on the continent, while 20 percent of them went to another continent to study. (TEICHLER, 2012:7)

From a European perspective, three groups of mobile students can be distinguished (TEICHLER, 2012:9):

- Students from low-and middle-income countries migrate mainly to economically developed countries with tertiary education systems ensuring high standards of education.
- Students from economically developed countries attain diplomas in other economically developed countries.
- It is a characteristic trend among economically developed countries that many of their students study temporarily in other economically developed countries.

Although until recently Hungarian society stood out from among the countries of the region with respect to the weakness of its geographical mobility, by now it is the sudden acceleration of mobility that is a problem. Examining the issue from the perspective of the mobility of students participating in higher education, the proportion of foreign students within Hungarian higher education grew from 4.74 percent in 2005 to 7.7 percent by the 2012/2013 academic year (their numbers approached 18 000). The number of Hungarian students studying abroad in the 2012/2013 academic year was 9 634, growing from 3.22 percent to 4.12 percent.

Concerning international trends, we can see that the countries sending the most foreign students to Hungary are Germany, followed by neighboring countries: Slovakia, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine (that is, countries where many ethnic Hungarians live). Hungarian students study in European countries, mainly in Germany, Romania, Austria, and Slovakia. Based on this, we can say that the mobility of Hungarian students is regional in nature. Out of the top 10 global "sending nations" for international students, only Turkey shows up in the Hungarian data.

**Table 2.**  
Hungary and the top 10 countries according to a few highlighted indicators.

The most important countries sending foreign students to Hungary, 2012/2013	Most important export destinations of Hungary, 2013	Top 10 sending countries, new entrants 2012. World ranking
1. Germany	1. Germany	1. China
2. Slovakia	2. Romania	2. India
3. Romania	3. Austria	3. South Korea
4. Serbia	4. Slovakia	4. Saudi Arabia
5. Ukraine	5. Italy	5. Canada
6. Iran	6. France	6. Taiwan
7. Norway	7. UK	7. Japan
8. Israel	8. Poland	8. Vietnam
9. Nigeria	9. Czech Republic	9. Mexico
10. Turkey	10. Russia	10. Turkey

Source: Oktatási Hivatal, Higher Education statistics, Hungarian Statistical Office:  
External trade 2013, Open Doors 2012 Data, based on the essay of Berács et al. (2015: 53–4).

Examining the question in a regional breakdown, while until 2001 Hungary was at the head of the Visegrad countries concerning absolute numbers of foreign students and only Austria was ahead of it from the region, by 2012 Austria had almost doubled its absolute numbers, Poland (2001: 6659 → 2012: 23 525) had tripled them, while the Czech Republic (2001: 7750 → 2012: 39 455) and Slovakia (Slovakia 2001: 1690 → 2012: 9059) multiplied the number of foreign students by five fold, compared to Hungary's 1.5 growth (Hungary 2001: 11 242 → 2012: 17 520). (BERÁCS, 2015:54).

The most Erasmus students (616) came to Hungary from Turkey in the 2012/2013 academic year. Germany came in second, with 557 pupils, France third, with 519 students. 467 people came from Spain and 373 from Romania. In the 2012/2013 academic year, the most students from Hungary per university went to an Erasmus programme from the Budapest Corvinus University: 360 students participated in part-time training, while 136 went for internships.

**Table 3.**  
Distribution of students participating in Erasmus programmes.

Institution	Number of students travelling abroad for part-time training (2012/2013)	Number of students travelling abroad for internships (2012/2013)	Total
Budapest Corvinus University	360	136	496
Eötvös Loránd University	417	59	476
Budapest University of Technology and Economics	286	96	382
University of Pécs	289	70	359
University of Szeged	249	80	329
University of Debrecen	157	90	247

We are therefore witnessing a growth of student mobility in Hungarian higher education that is connected to a global trend. Growing mobility, however, has been behind the global and European trends in the past years. The extent of mobility is not primarily decided by global trends, but by European and even more specifically, by regional effects, as well as by domestic, policy-related changes affecting higher education.

Below we analyse in detail how Hungarian students view their opportunities to study, work and settle abroad in their own words. Regarding the results of our study, it is important to mention in advance that while official statistics typically underestimate the extent of migration, forecasts relying mainly on survey methods consistently overestimate it. The reason for this is simply that a greater amount of respondents plan to work abroad (or usually would just like to, or are dreaming of a "better life") than actually realize such plans in the future. (SIMONOVITS, 2014:253).

### Research questions

1. What is the migration potential in Hungary among the population we studied?
2. Are there students for whom studying abroad is a sort of conversion of capital (in the Bourdieuan sense?)<sup>15</sup>
3. Can studying abroad be seen as the first step to moving and later settling abroad for Hungarian students, or (in their opinion) will the students return to Hungary to work? (Interviews)

15. Bourdieu's theory tries to describe the principles upon which the different types of capital (e.g., cultural, social) mutually transform into one another. Bourdieu stresses that certain types of capital can be converted into each other under certain conditions. In this context, he thinks that along the lines of the law of the conservation of energy that prevails in nature, social energy can be conserved as well: Seemingly useless exertions of energy, such as performing free favours in order to retain social capital, are in fact rational. When applying for a job, for example, social capital or language skills can be converted into economic capital.

## Results

What is the migration potential in Hungary among the population we studied?

As the first step of our analysis, we study students studying abroad. According to the 2015 spring survey, 11 percent of Hungarian college students said that during their studies so far they have studied abroad at one point or another. (It is worth mentioning that compared to the last student survey of our research group in 2013, it seems that the proportion of students who have studied abroad has not grown, but rather has decreased, from 15 percent in 2013).<sup>16</sup> This can mean either through an Erasmus Programme – thus a programme of four to six months' duration – or the completion of an entire course of study abroad. The proportion of studies abroad among those who are permanent residents of Budapest is 17 percent, while in the case of all other students it is below average.

The higher the level of training sought, the more students go abroad for studies. In the case of undergraduate courses this is just 9 percent, while in the case of PhD students it is 50 percent.

It is interesting to examine Study abroad by institutions. We would like to stress that the number of respondents is too low to be able to look at each Hungarian institution and faculty, but we can identify certain trends. For example, among the students of the Budapest Corvinus University, the number of students who had already studied abroad was especially high, but certain faculties of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, as well as ELTE and the University of Szeged, also stand out in this area. Semmelweis University's Faculty of General Medicine should be highlighted as well, where more than a quarter of the respondents had studied abroad. Of the state colleges it is worth mentioning the Budapest Business School, while of the church-run institutions, Pázmány Péter Catholic University should be singled out.

There is a strong correlation between language skills and studying abroad. The higher level of language knowledge a student has, the more likely it is that he/she has already studied abroad. Among those who have at least one advanced-level language exam, the proportion of those who have studied abroad reaches 24 percent.

A linear relationship can be traced based on the educational attainment of students' fathers as well. The essence of the relationship is that it is primarily those students who have been able to study abroad who were in a more favourable position from the outset, that is, those whose father or stepfather had higher levels of education. The proportion of students who studied abroad from the group of those whose father had a university degree was 17 percent, in contrast with those whose father had achieved a maximum of vocational training, where it was 5 percent. The students could further increase the initial advantage they had amassed prior to entering these institutions by studying abroad.

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16. For details of the 2013 survey see Szabó (2014:13–17).

**Table 4.**  
**Have you studied abroad?<sup>17</sup>**

University	17
College	14
Secondary grammar school	11
Vocational secondary school	7
Maximum vocational training	5
Mean	11

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015.

Statistically, gender aspects do not apply in this case, as there is no meaningful difference between the two sexes. Similar observations can be made regarding the other aspect we highlighted, namely, those who claim to be green; 11 per cent indicated that he/she had studied abroad before, which is in accordance with the sample mean. We have to note, however, that the ratio of students that have studied abroad within the groups who labelled themselves as European/ Western-oriented and liberal is far above average (24 percent and 23 percent). Of course, we cannot know whether their ideological orientation is Western or they are liberal because they have studied abroad and they have experience with the Western world or owing to other reasons; nevertheless, without a doubt, the factor is doubled within these categories.

Concerning study abroad, 18 percent of students currently attending Hungarian colleges or universities plan to continue their studies abroad in the near future for a longer period of time. It is important to emphasize that we asked not about programmes that last a few months (e.g., Erasmus) but about courses that last one or more years. PhD students said they wished to study abroad for lengthier periods of time at the highest rate (32 percent), while the smallest proportion was among the group of Master's students (6 percent).

17. Within the framework of the Bologna Process, the gradual transition from a dual system awarding college-level (főiskolai oklevél) and university-level (egyetemi oklevél) degrees to a higher education system based on three consecutive cycles started in 2004 in Hungary. At present pre-Bologna and Bologna-type programmes run parallel. For more information, see: <http://www.nefmi.gov.hu/english/the-hungarian-higher/the-pre-bologna-system>

## Migration potential

*Finding a job will become a more and more serious problem at home – there are no jobs that require degrees for the many young adults who have studied in higher education. Instead there are more and more jobs that utilize semiskilled workers. (András, Berlin)<sup>18</sup>*

One of the most interesting questions of the study is how Hungarian university and college students relate to employment in the future. Do they really want to use the knowledge acquired back home in their mother country, or does their individual and social investment pay off abroad? We examined the topic on three levels: short-term employment (of a few weeks or months, including commuting), and long-term employment (few years). This will be completed by migration, i.e., settling abroad, in the next chapter.

According to the report by Tárki that we have already quoted, men and young adults “play” with the idea of migration more than the average person does.<sup>19</sup> The data of the Active Youth in Hungary research group reaffirm and support the results of our earlier surveys on this topic, namely, that the data foreshadow a pronouncedly pessimistic scenario: Compared to 2013, migration potential has not decreased but instead seems to have grown. Close to two-thirds of Hungarian university and college students taking part in full-time training are “playing with the idea” of going abroad to work for a few weeks or months. Like previous foreign employment, planned short-term employment does not relate to traditional socio-demographic and socio-cultural variables either. Basically, regardless of family background, gender, identity, values, or political preference, more than 0.6 percent of Hungarian university or college students would like to work abroad for a few weeks or months.

This data refers to a professedly temporary intent, which (should it be realized) both the student who has gained experience abroad and the state can benefit from upon the student’s return. The situation is different with permanent employment, where the likelihood of return is more doubtful: 52 per cent of university and college students plan long-term employment (meaning of several years), 10 percentage points less than the potential for short-term employment (of a few months). It is interesting that the rate of undecided students increases in this case (from four to seven per cent).

In the case of potential for long-term employment, significant differences can be found between student groups. The two classic fault-lines in higher education, the socio-cultural background of families and geographical location, have a meaningful effect on whether the student would like to go abroad for several years to work. Gender is not relevant in this case either.

18. These interviews have been translated from Hungarian to English; though they have been translated to represent the interviewees’ words as closely as possible, because of the nature of translation, they are not exact.

19. The proportion of those wishing to emigrate in April of 2015 is higher than ever before, according to the April survey by TÁRKI. Source: [http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150511\\_migracio.html](http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150511_migracio.html). Last retrieved: May 15, 2015.

The highest proportion of students who plan long-term employment abroad are those with permanent addresses in Budapest (close to two-thirds of them), while among students living in villages this proportion is 49 percent. The values recorded for young adults living in smaller cities are still under the sample mean, whereas the potential rises to 56 percent of young adults living in city with county rights<sup>20</sup>.

Concerning the educational attainment of parents, we received opposite results than we expected. In the group of first-generation college students, the ratio of those planning long-term employment abroad are significantly higher than those with at least one parent with a degree, and is even higher compared to those where both parents have a degree.

Another important factor connected to projected long-term employment abroad is ideological affiliation. The foreign employment of European/Western, liberal and green-thinking students differs significantly from that of youth with strong national or Christian Democrat/religious sentiments. While the previous group would prefer to work abroad for longer periods, the latter would rather not.

### Settling abroad

The last question dealt with the topic of whether the student plans to settle abroad. It is obvious that this is the most clear-cut form of separation from one's home; this is the classic example of exit in the sense of Hirschman. If someone settles permanently in a given country, establishes himself or herself there, and starts a family, it is the least likely that he/she will return again to make use of his/her gained knowledge and work experience in Hungary.<sup>21</sup>

In the 2013 survey of our research group, seven per cent of university and college students participating in full-time training said they plan to settle abroad for certain, while a further 25 per cent said they were likely to do so. Two years ago a third of the students planned to migrate. In 2015, the proportion of those who were "entertaining" the idea of migration further increased. Currently, 37 per cent of them say that they are planning on settling abroad. It is not unfounded to say that survey testing of migration is just a "mood indicator", as it is obvious that one cannot make inferences concerning actual actions from survey responses.<sup>22</sup> In order to expose how serious the intentions behind the responses indicating "wanderlust" are, we posed a separate question concerning what sort of preparations the respondent has made for living abroad.

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20. A town with county rights (or urban county, Hungarian: megyei jogú város) is a level of administrative subdivision in Hungary which can be considered as a city in some English-speaking countries. All county seats and localities with more than 50,000 inhabitants are given this status by the Hungarian Parliament and the President.

21. It is worth noting here that, according to the critics of exit-theory, we can speak of post-exit loyalty as well; that is, even after effectively leaving a country, there is still a possibility for a citizen to support it.

22. [http://index.hu/gazdasag/penzbeszel/2013/02/27/mi\\_igaz\\_a\\_kivandorlasi\\_parabol](http://index.hu/gazdasag/penzbeszel/2013/02/27/mi_igaz_a_kivandorlasi_parabol)

**Table 5.**  
**What sort of preparations have you made in order to achieve your plans abroad?**  
**Percentage of mentions (several options could be marked).**

Preparation	Percent
No preparation (aside from learning a language)	46
Other	5
Choosing a foreign university	6
Applying for work abroad	8
Applying for a scholarship abroad	8
Searching for lodgement	13
Collecting information about foreign universities	18
Collecting information about foreign scholarship possibilities	21
Collecting information about working abroad	32

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015.

Even these answers have to be treated with some scepticism, though, as we do not know whether the preparations will yield permanent or temporary residence abroad. We can assume, however, that a significant part of the students are serious about their plans: Over half of the respondents made preparations other than language study. Even the time-consuming collection of information refers to the seriousness of the decision, but the real indicator that there are quite a few people who will almost certainly leave Hungary in the near future is the rate of those who marked "looking for a place to live" or "applying for a course".

Our data and previous studies<sup>23</sup> indicate that foreign work or study experience often encourages students to stay abroad permanently. A significantly higher proportion of those who have already had experience living abroad chose that they would like to settle abroad.

23. <http://www.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/b337.pdf>

**Table 6.**  
**Groups that would like to settle abroad in a higher proportion than the average.**  
**(percentages)**

Name of group	Percent
Complete sample	41.5
Left-wing parties	46
Permanent residence in Budapest	47
Not part of any social organization	47
Speaks English at an advanced level	48
„Employment opportunities are unfavourable“	48
LMP-voter	48
Worked abroad previously	49
Positions to the left on the left-right scale	49
„Media cannot criticize government freely“	49
Studies natural sciences	50
Studies economics	52
Studied abroad previously	52
„Does not feel that his/her future is secure“	52
Dissatisfied with the workings of democracy	52
Defines as liberal	52
„Elections are not free and fair“	52
Will certainly refrain from voting	54
Defines as European, Western	58

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015.

We can see that the highest rate for those who would like to settle abroad was amongst those who categorized themselves as liberal, left-wing, and especially European, as well as those who are dissatisfied with the current system and feel that there is a democratic deficit in the possibility to criticize and dismiss the government. It can be argued in their case that we can speak of exit as an act of protest, that is, some sort of desperation or last resort, as indicated by Hirschman. At the same time, it would be a mistake to think that these are mostly the voters of opposition parties: In the case of LMP<sup>24</sup> voters, and especially among the ranks of left-wing students, the migration potential was just a few percentage points higher than among the overall population. Moreover, it is exactly those who are sure to refrain from voting that make up one of the groups reporting the greatest “wanderlust”.

24. LMP [Politics Can Be Different] is a green Hungarian political party. Founded in 2009, it was one of four parties to win seats in the National Assembly in the 2010 parliamentary election; currently it has five MPs in Parliament.

We can see a characteristic difference among the students who vote for the governing party, Fidesz:<sup>25</sup> only 29 per cent of them imagine that they will have a permanent career abroad, while in this regard Jobbik voters are in the middle, with 37 percent. The lower propensity to emigrate among students supporting Fidesz may be in connection to the fact that they are more confident about their future and see their career perspectives much more optimistically in Hungary. Logically, those who consider their employment opportunities to be unfavourable and see their future as uncertain were substantially more likely to indicate their intention to leave. The likelihood of migration was also much higher for those students who speak English at an advanced level (and/or know another language), as well as for those studying economy or natural sciences (this was not higher, however, among medical students).

Finally, we examined the reasons behind emigration. Above all, the reason for migration is financial: It is easier to make a living, the living standards are higher, and much more money can be saved. Compared to this, all other motivations such as adventure, more job opportunities, and the fact that there is family abroad, or even the appreciation of expertise, are much less significant. It is interesting that in our university study two years ago almost every fifth respondent planning to emigrate mentioned professional experience as their motivation, but in 2015 financial motivations came to the forefront as well.

*I feel that they are making it impossible for me to live normally. The middle class is disappearing. I feel that is where I belong – or rather that is where I could belong, I have a normal degree with which I could get a good job and have a normal pay. It's just that the conditions are such that despite working, despite trying to make the conditions for this possible, it is impossible.*  
(Éva, Basel)

Table 7. "Why would you like to live abroad?"  
Percentage of answers in 2013 and 2015.

	2013	2015
Financial reasons, salary, savings	37	51
More, better work options	14	16
For fun, adventure	13	11
My expertise is appreciated more abroad	3	5
Because of my boyfriend/girlfriend, family	34	4
To gain professional experience	19	3

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

25. Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union - is the governing conservative party that held an absolute two-thirds majority in Parliament from 2010 until 2014. Currently it is the biggest Hungarian party with 114 MPs in Parliament.

Those who firmly state that they would never settle outside of Hungary basically mention two reasons. On the one hand, family is mentioned (parents, boyfriend/girlfriend), but patriotic sentiments are even more important: "I like living here/I am Hungarian/this is my home/I belong here/Hungary is my home". This explanation is especially high among the groups of Fidesz–KDNP and Jobbik<sup>26</sup> voting university and college students. We can also see from the 2015 data that there are very few who would stay home for a practical reason, such as career prospects. (Two years ago there were somewhat more people who mentioned that the professional possibilities abroad were less favourable, that they did not want to give up their life at home, or that they were simply just not brave enough to emigrate – however, because of the low number of open-ended questions asked two years ago, we do not hold this change to be significant.)

Are there students for whom studying or working abroad is a sort of conversion of capital (in the Bourdieuan sense)?

*Out of 10 people from my primary school in Miskolc only three live at home. The rest live in Germany, England, and Scotland. They do not have a degree; they left after finishing secondary education. From secondary school the proportion is smaller because after graduation everyone got a degree, but 20 % of them live abroad. Of my university classmates, 30 % left. In my profession, those leave who are from Budapest or who come from a better family background – they wish to go abroad more. Those who came to Budapest from out of town and their parents don't have a degree are generally content with the pay they get.*  
(Éva, Basel)


Social privileges and disadvantages can be clearly seen in the area of Study abroad. Those students who plan to study abroad for a longer period of time at a higher proportion than the average possess significant cultural and financial capital owing to their families and enjoy greater personal advantages as well. Just to mention the two most characteristic data, 27 per cent of students who have permanent residence in Budapest plan to study abroad (as we have shown, the rate of those who already have foreign experiences is already higher in this group) while for those living in other villages this is 11 per cent. Almost exactly the same can be described according to the educational attainment of fathers: 14 per cent of the children of those who have maximum vocational training plan to study abroad, while for the children of fathers with a degree this is 24 per cent. The inherited privileges accumulate and become further advantages in the job market.

Looking at the question from the aspect of migration potential, the educational attainment of students' fathers seems to confirm capital conversion, as it is the only "hard" factor that has a meaningful affect on foreign employment.

26. Jobbik: Movement for a Better Hungary, commonly known as Jobbik, is a Hungarian radical nationalist, far-right political party enjoying large (10 – 20 %) voter support. It has 24 seats in the Parliament. The party has been criticized for its anti-Roma rhetoric and its support of the illegal Hungarian Guard.

The distribution of the answers shows a characteristic U-curve, that is, the children of fathers with the lowest and highest levels of educational attainment have been abroad to work. In our opinion, this means that there are different motivations during foreign employment for students coming from socially more advantageous positions compared to those from less advantageous ones. In the former category the most important motivation could presumably be adventure or willingness to try something new, while in the latter category financial constraints, for example, raising money for tuition, could be the most important motivation.

Figure 3.  
Worked abroad? Based on the educational attainment of the father  
where we do not know that of the mother. (percentage)



Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

We tried to validate the results of long-term foreign migration – presented above with descriptive statistical methods – through a multivariate methodology. We created a binary logistic regression model and examined what factors affect the intention to settle abroad the most. We included all variables which according to our current and previous descriptive statistical experiences could influence migration potential. The model is significant and relatively explanatory. (Nagelkerke  $R^2=0.214$ ). The outcome, however, is quite interesting and does not necessarily support the above data.

Based on the following table, there are five factors within the nearly 30-variable model that significantly affect ( $p \leq 0.05$ ) settling abroad and three factors that show ( $p \leq 0.1$ ) significance. We can see that the explanatory variables with lower significance levels are those which significantly increase the probability of migration potential, that is, liberal-Western and green mentality.

Gender increases the odds of migration in a statistically significant way as well, though not as much: It is as if the migration potential of men were higher than that of women. It is important to mention that age, permanent residence in a village, or satisfaction with democracy does not increase but rather decreases the likelihood of migration.

**Table 8.**  
Binary logistic regression model for settling abroad permanently.

	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Gender (0=female, 1=male)	.557	.015	1.746
Age (constant)	-.115	.037	.892
Perception of possibilities for employment (1–5)	-.258	.021	.772
How satisfied with democracy? (1–5)	-.606	.000	.545
Lives in a village (0=no, 1=yes)	-.699	.013	.497
Considers green label acceptable (0=no, 1=yes)	.913	.093	2.491
Considers liberal, Western label acceptable (0=no, 1=yes)	.831	.090	2.296
Position on left-right scale (1–7, where 1= left, 7= right)	-.193	.076	.824
Constant	4.110	0.008	60.920

-2 Log likelihood=525.985<sup>a</sup>; Cox & Snell R Square=0.159; Nagelkerke R Square=0.214

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015.

In this case, the capital conversion of Bourdieu prevails very slightly. The data show much more an ideology- driven exit that depends very much on the given situation. Those plan to exit who are dissatisfied with their current situation and can identify with European or Western ideas. It seems that inherited socio-cultural privileges do not play a role in permanent residence abroad. At the same time, it is worth calling attention to the fact that in Hungary, the liberal-Western, green, and leftist orientations can be tied to well-defined social groups.

**Can studying abroad be seen as the first step toward moving abroad and living abroad for Hungarian students, or will the students return to Hungary to work, in their opinion?**

Within the framework of the Active Youth in Hungary research during the first half of 2015 we conducted a series of interviews with students studying in the most frequent destinations for migration (BLASKÓ–LIGETI–SIK, 2014:367): Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, the Benelux countries, and Switzerland. In addition to the aforementioned geographical aspects it was an also important factor in the selection process that we survey students studying in both the areas of natural and social sciences.

Based on the interviews, one of the primary motivations for studying abroad is language learning and getting to know another educational system:

*"My primary motivation was to learn English; the other was to write my thesis. The big difference in education here is that during the exams they want to know what a person knows and how he/she uses that knowledge. The structure of classes is completely different, here one period is two hours long but there are two 15 minute breaks during the period. Within the break there is time to ask questions, time for student-teacher interaction. Teamwork is very important, in every class there is a task that has to be solved collectively by the group, and the students receive a grade for the project as well." (András, Nijmegen)*

It also became clear from the interviews that the students who consciously want to work abroad see their studies abroad as a long-term investment:

*"I came so that I would have not just a Hungarian, but a Hungarian-German degree in the field that interests me. Studying was my main motivation; therefore I consider professional development a priority in my work as well. Furthermore, I can continue to go to university for free here, while in Hungary I already studied for 12 semesters, therefore I would have to pay." (András, Berlin)*

*"I decided to apply for a course here last year. I did not primarily come to study, but so I could find a position here in London. Of course, everybody said it would be impossible, but I thought the path would lead through getting a degree. That way I would learn what the professional background in which I would work is like here, and then I would start the profession again from scratch." (Dóra, London)*

Besides this, the most self-aware students work in addition to their studies, which makes finding a job easier later on:

*"Because I worked here during secondary school the official administration was easier for me, for example, I already had a tax number and because of my previous experience it was easier for me to find a job. Even so, I had to start my profession from the basics - first I did data input, then I handled the archives, finally, because I already had experience here, they hired me for my current job." (András, Berlin)*

The respondents gave very sceptical answers to the question of whether they would return home if they could have a position that matched their qualifications there.

- Financial aspects were present in all interviews; perhaps the most characteristic one was the comment of a student who has a secondary-school teacher degree:

*"If I started teaching at home, the 130 000 HUF<sup>27</sup> that I would make is not enough for anything, while here even working in a fast-food chain my prospects are such that from the money set aside I can go on holiday anywhere in the summer, for example (...) [so] this is why I would like to live abroad permanently."*  
(Róbert, Zürich)

- For others, the prospect of professional development was attractive, for which they were ready to give up their job back home:

*"In comparison: I left having an office and an assistant back home, I was making net 350 000 HUF. At the time I was 23 years old and I didn't know which way to go there, because the profession I had worked in had become jaded. (...) I thought that at 25 I'm still young enough to start over again. (...) Back home I said in vain that task I had been given was too much work but nobody paid attention. They could not hire new people because the primary austerity measures affected the employees. If someone left they didn't hire a replacement. This is how a four-person team became two people. Everything doubled - the responsibility, the authority - just not the pay. Here, I can build a team around me in a completely flexible way and we can discuss everything with the management. Their approach is that in order to have success, first you have to develop human resources. You have to hire good people; then your success depends on their good ideas. In Hungary this is not a concern - just solve things for as little money as possible. (Dóra, London)*

- The interviews confirmed the observations emerging from the survey data that the reasons favouring returning to Hungary were mainly personal reasons:

*"The only reason I would go home is my boyfriend. If he were here, I would stay, but he has work at home and his salary is good - he has an open-ended contract. There is no position back home for which I could apply - even if there were, they would only invite applications because it is mandatory, but they would already have decided in advance who would win it."* (Éva, Basel)

27. As of this writing the exchange rate is 1 EURO to 310 HUF.

Based on the interviews, the primary motivation of those who are studying abroad is to learn a language and get to know another educational system, and those who consciously want to work abroad see their foreign studies as a sort of long-term investment. Returning to Hungary is mostly hampered by financial aspects, while the reasons that favour returning are mainly personal ones.

### Chapter conclusion

With respect to student residence abroad our study found that, according to the 2015 spring survey, 11 per cent of Hungarian college or university students said they studied abroad at one point or another during their studies so far. Compared to 2013, it seems that the proportion of students studying abroad has not grown but has decreased (from 15 per cent in 2013). While the proportion of study abroad peregrination among those who are permanent residents of Budapest is 17 per cent, the proportion is below average in the case of students who come from elsewhere in Hungary; 18 per cent of university or college students plan to study abroad in the near future for a longer period (for a one-year course or for a course lasting several years). The highest proportion of students who would like to study abroad for longer periods of time are PhD students (32 per cent) while Master's students would like to in the smallest proportion (6 per cent).

Concerning migration, compared to 2013 migration potential has not decreased, but rather increased. Close to two-thirds of Hungarian full-time university and college students are "entertaining" the idea of working abroad for a few weeks or months. Basically regardless of family background, gender, identity, values or political preferences, more than 0.6 percent of Hungarian university and college students would like to work abroad for a few weeks or months.

More than half (52 per cent) of university or college students plan long-term employment abroad (lasting a few years). Students with a permanent address in Budapest plan on long-term employment in the highest proportion (close to two-thirds), while the proportion of students living in other villages with such plans is 49 per cent. Concerning educational attainment, the proportion of those planning long-term employment who are first-generation college students is significantly higher than for those who have at least one parent with a degree. In terms of ideology, European/Western, liberal and green-thinking youth are the ones who would most like to work abroad for longer periods.

The most important part of our analysis is the intention to settle abroad, which, based on Albert O. Hirschman, we have named exit. According to the data in our 2013 study, seven per cent of students planned to settle abroad for sure and another 25 per cent said they were likely to. In 2015, the proportion of those who were considering migration further increased: 37 per cent said they are planning to settle abroad. The likelihood of migration is much higher among those who speak English at an advanced level (and/or know another language), as well as among those who study economic or natural sciences.

Concerning the causes of emigration, we can see from the 2015 data that very few people would stay at home for practical reasons, such as career prospects. The motivation for migration is above all financial: It is easier to make a living abroad, the standard of living is higher abroad, and much more money can be set aside.

We can see that the highest proportion of those who would like to settle abroad was amongst those who categorized themselves as liberal, left-wing, and especially European, those who are dissatisfied with the current system, and those who feel there is a democratic deficit in the possibility to criticize and dismiss the Hungarian Government. It can be argued in their case that we can speak of exit as an act of protest, that is, some sort of desperation or last resort as described by Hirschman. At the same time, it is exactly those who would certainly refrain from voting that also make up one of the groups with the greatest "wanderlust". Concerning whether the exit potential of those who protest is truly the highest, or whether exit is truly a "last resort" impeding the development of protest, owing to the complexity of the question we will give an answer in the final chapter of our essay after we have presented those who have chosen either exit, political protest or political loyalty.

# System indifferent, system critics and voice

In the following chapter, with the help of our empirical research, we attempt to answer the question of how Hungarian university and college students relate to the democratic political system. We study this relationship through two main aspects: On the one hand we analyse the question of identification with the democratic political system, presenting the results of satisfaction with the conduct of the democratic regime, and on the other hand we study the potential for protest among students. During the course of the study we use the conceptual framework already described in the introduction, that is, our own typology based on Hirschman's theoretical concept (HIRSCHMAN 1995) and Rusbult's theoretical model (RUSBULT 1988). In this chapter we write about those who are politically indifferent (system indifferent), system critics, those who choose the option of voice, and those loyal to the system.

According to the 2011/2012 and 2013 results of the Active Youth in Hungary research, within the sphere of Hungarian university and college students, those who primarily preferred democracy as the best political system were the relative majority (39 and 42 percent stated this respectively). Relative majority means, however, that the democratic political system does not have unequivocal support. This is indicated by the fact that in 2011, 33 percent of university and college students said that for people like them it did not matter what sort of political system there is, and 28 per cent said that in certain situations a dictatorship could be acceptable. This did not change significantly in 2013 either: Close to two-thirds (29 per cent) of Hungarian youth still holds an indifferent, sceptical stand concerning the political system, while dictatorship continues to remain an alternative for 23 per cent of them. The results of the 2015 Active Youth in Hungary survey show a slight shift in a positive direction regarding the issue. The proportion of pro-democracy students among university and college students has grown to 47 per cent, while the proportion of those who could possibly accept a dictatorship decreased to 21 per cent. On the other hand, the proportion of those who are sceptical toward the political system has not changed. Almost one-third (32 per cent) of them continue to say that it is essentially all the same to them what type of political regime is in power.

Between 2013 and 2015, public offline activity of Hungarian university and college students stagnated and even seems to have decreased somewhat. Meanwhile, the frequency of online participation has changed in a substantial way. Beyond the analysis of students' relationship toward democracy, in this chapter we seek an answer to what characterizes the students studying in Hungarian higher education who actively protest. We examine the five forms<sup>28</sup> of participation within the dimension of "direct democratic" participation

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28. Out of the following activities, have you participated in/done any?

1. Collecting signatures;
2. Signing political statements, initiatives, petitions;
3. Demonstrations, protests;
4. Spontaneous protests, marches;
5. ...Deliberately did not buy/boycotted a certain product;

(SZABÓ, 2013:32), six further questions,<sup>29</sup> and also online “virtual” participation (SZABÓ, 2013:32–33) connected to public issues and social problems. We also identify those students who opt out of all forms of participation.

### Identifying with democracy

*“I think the basis of democracy is that everyone has a say.” (Dóra)*

### What does democracy mean? The results of the qualitative survey

We try to outline the relationship of Hungarian university and college students toward democracy not just from the results of our quantitative survey, but also from the insights of a qualitative study as well. During the qualitative study we conducted 55 interviews with university and college students<sup>30</sup> in order to receive an answer to the question of what they mean when they think about the concept of democracy through their interpretations of it.<sup>31</sup> Our qualitative analysis stands somewhat apart from Hirschman’s concept; at the same time, we think that in order to map the relationship of students towards the democratic system, it could be relevant to know what content or meaning students attribute to democratic order.

During the content analysis of the interviews, we do not portray the separate groups of interpretations according to the normative, theoretical dimension of the concept of democracy. One reason for this is that even today there is no consensus within political science over the normative content of democracy. Researchers may easily feel that they get lost among competing interpretations (GUTTMAN 1994). It is also difficult to harmonize the normative dimension and the content of the replies, because the concept of democracy is not just descriptive, but prescriptive as well (SARTORI, 1999). We also rejected the idea of a typology based on theoretical interpretations because the complexity and elaboration of the conceptual images of the respondents concerning the content of democracy cannot be made to correspond with such separate theoretical approaches. As a result, we interpret the different groups we received as “lifeworlds”, content that has trickled down to the level of everyday thinking.

29. Out of the following activities, have you participated in/done any?

1. Shared events, images, videos, posts reflecting your opinion concerning public issues, social problems on social media;
2. Commented on blogs, social media in connection to public issues, social problems;
3. “Liked” posts on blogs or social media relating to public issues, social problems;
4. ... Blogged in connection to public issues, social topics;
5. ... Voted on the net on a question relating to public issues, society;
6. ... Posted topics connected to public issues, social problems.

30. The interviews were conducted after the second month following the end of the quantitative survey (July 2015). The interviews were carried out face-to-face in the form of structured interviews.

31. The question posed to the students was the following: “In your own words, how would you define what democracy is?”

This means we grouped the replies concerning the content of democracy on the basis of the nature of the reply or the approach to the reply. Our results show which aspects of the separate normative, theoretical approaches are embraced by different groups as the content of democracy.

During the analysis of the qualitative data, we were able to identify five distinct groups of interpretations (see Table 9). The different interpretations are distributed equally among the respondents. On the one hand this means that the ideas of university and college students about democracy are very heterogeneous, and on the other hand shows we cannot observe a single approach that dominates their way of thinking about democracy.

During the analysis, the following groups of interpretations came about based on the students' answers:

- Legal approach (18 %): This group consists of those interpretations that approach democracy from the direction of rule of law. Concerning the content of democracy, the students belonging to this group primarily emphasize the importance of equality before the law in theory and practice, as well as the importance of all votes being worth the same. Aside from the elements mentioned, for certain respondents it was a high priority to voice the principle of equal opportunities for all, which besides the legal aspect of democracy includes the social aspect as well.

**Table 9.**  
Student answers that are characteristic of different interpretations.  
(What does democracy mean to you?)

Legal	Majoritarian	Leadership	Opinion-based	Freedom-based
"A system where there is equality, namely, equality before the law"	"The will of the people prevails, their freedom is secured"	"People elect the politicians, who have to keep in mind the interests of the people"	"Everyone has an opinion and everyone's opinion counts"	"A system where every person has the possibility to attain their personal freedom"
"Everyone has equal rights"	"The goals of a community are defined based on what the majority of the community would like"	"When people can choose their own leaders and they can enforce their will through them"	"Everyone has a say in which way the country should go and what aspects should prevail"	"Democracy means I can shape my fate and I am responsible for it"
"Equality and the maintenance of law and order"	"The will of the majority of the people should prevail"	"The people choose a person who conveys and carries out their will"	"Everyone has a say in the final decision"	"When someone has free will and basically acts according to their own intentions in accordance with certain rules"

- Majoritarian approach (23 %): The two main motifs of this group are the realization of the will of the people and that the will of the majority should prevail. The two elements are closely linked to each other, as in the interpretation of the respondents, the will of the people can be equated to that of the majority, and therefore in reality it means the same thing as the will of the majority. The main idea of this approach is that the leadership and direction of the democratic political community has to be carried out through the application of majoritarianism. Thus, democracy is none other than the rule of majority.
- Leadership approach (20 %): The respondents belonging to this approach define democracy through the leader-led dichotomy, in other words, the principle of representation. The common trait of these interpretations is that they imagine the realization of the people's will in a democracy with the cooperation of representatives, elected political leaders. According to isinterpretation, the role of the voter is to elect the representatives with his/her vote, who will then have to take into consideration the opinions of the voters during the course of the direction of the political system.
- Opinion-based approach (21 %): The manifestations of the respondents emphasize the deliberative nature of democracy. According to their definition, the meaning of democracy is the ability to voice opinion and for opinions to be taken into account during the political decision-making process in equal measure. Based on the answers received, in a democratic order every citizen has a say in public affairs and the possibility is provided for each and every citizen to freely voice his or her opinion in public debates.
- Freedom-based approach (18 %): This notion approaches the content of democracy from the side of the individual, who is at the centre of the conceptual interpretation. According to the opinions belonging to this group, democracy is primarily about the personal liberties of individuals, the freedom to shape individual destinies. Besides acknowledging the institution of personal liberty, the respondents also see its limitations, which primarily means adherence to the rights and obligations pertaining to individuals.

Upon examination of the qualitative data we could identify five approaches defining the content of democracy from different perspectives. It is important to mention that only those students are included in the above-mentioned groups who were able to define democracy contentwise. This means we not only have to call attention to the fact that a vast majority of respondents was able to formulate the meaning of democracy in their own words. A significant group of all respondents, close to a third of the students (29 per cent, 16 people), was not able to give an answer that could be analysed, or simply refrained from replying ("I do not know", "I do not wish to answer") so a significant number of those asked could not comment on the issue in a meaningful way.

## The framework for the interpretation of identifying with democracy

During the study we were interested in what support of the democratic political system was like within the sphere of Hungarian university and college students and how they identified with it. Accordingly, we interpreted the results primarily in relation to whether the respondents prefer or reject democracy.

As mentioned in the introduction, in line with international standards,<sup>32</sup> we measured the relationship of Hungarian university and college students towards the democratic political system with this question:

“Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?”

1. Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government;
2. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to democratic one;
3. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime.”

Based on Szabó, (SZABÓ 2013) in our typology we called the group of students who said that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government “system loyal” voters. As we have previously indicated, the members of this group are the relative majority among those university and college students who have taken a stance. In 2015, close to 47 per cent of the respondents chose this statement. According to our typology, their relation to the political system is characterized by a constructive, passive, supportive attitude toward a system realized solely in connection to a political regime based on democratic norms and values. According to our hypothesis, the loyalty of system loyal students is not associated with active citizenship.

The second group is made up of those students who are characterized by a feeling of alienation from the political system, the need for distance from power, and the complete depoliticization of their private life. (“For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime.”) During the course of our investigation we call this group “system indifferent”. Their political behaviour may be based on collective historical memory, according to which the regime changes that have come about in Hungary appeared as events that directly affected and threatened the lives of individuals, families and groups (ERÖS 2001). Based on the concepts of Hirschman used in our theoretical framework, this group has a passive relationship toward the political system; they will be those who have a destructive effect with regard to it. Concerning the dimension of political participation in our typology, the system indifferents can be equated with the politically indifferent community.

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32. Source: Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, Doh Chull Shin: *How East Asians View Democracy*. (Columbia University Press: 2008).

The third group in our interpretational framework contains the answers of those students according to whom democracy can be overridden by dictatorship under certain circumstances (in 2015, 21 % held this view). As their attitude towards democracy is heavily critical, we name them "system critical". We also have to emphasize that according to our theoretical framework, the system critical category can be characterized by an active attitude and they have a constructive effect on the political system. According to our hypothesis, both the active and the constructive effect in the case of system criticals is also represented in relation to political participation; therefore, this group is likely to be characterized by protest.

It is important to note that the names of the different groups should be interpreted in connection with their relationship towards the democratic political system. As we have already mentioned, these names represent our typology's train of thought, which is based on Hirschman.

### Choice of political values and support for democracy

In this subsection we would like to connect the question of students' choice of political values with the system loyal, system indifferent and system critical relationships. We wish to know where the students belonging to the different groups place themselves along the ideological spectrum (left-right; liberal-conservative; moderate-radical) and which political values they consider most characteristic of themselves.

First it is worth examining how students place themselves along the left-right axis. It is clear from the table that compared to the other two groups, system loyals place themselves most to the left, while we can also see that the further right the respondent places him/herself, the more likely he or she will belong to the group of system criticals (4.7).

**Table 10.**  
Positions of the groups along ideological scales. (averages)

	left-right (1-7)	liberal-conservative (1-7)	moderate-radical (1-7)
System loyal	4.1	3.5	3.2
System indifferent	4.3	3.9	3.7
System critical	4.7	4.1	4.2
Sample average	4.3	3.7	3.6

In the case of all three correlations sig=0.000; eta: 0.178; eta: 0.168; eta: 0.282

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

According to the liberal–conservative scale, the system loyal (3.5) respondents are the most liberal, while the system criticals (4.1) are the most conservative. Similar to the left-right division, system indifferenters are situated between the two groups in this case as well.

The moderate-radical division follows these trends as well, as the system loyals (3.2) can be considered the most moderate, while the system criticals (4.2) the most radical. As before, the system indifferenters continue to occupy the position in between - their results are the closest to the average. We think that on the left-right, the liberal-conservative, and the moderate-radical scales, the positions of the different groups of respondents are explicitly consistent with the stands they have taken based on their relationship toward the political system.

Concerning their choices of political values, we asked students to select an idea that was closest to their way of thinking from the options we listed. After analysing the students' relationships towards the democratic political system, Table 11 shows which groups they belong to based on their political identification.

It is clear from the results that among those who consider themselves to be liberal, free-thinking and European, the system loyal relationship is dominant: 56 per cent of liberal, free-thinking students and 62 per cent of European, Western-thinking students are loyal to the basic values of the democratic political system and 67 per cent of those who consider themselves Christian Democrats and religious are also system loyal. We can therefore draw the conclusion that these three political theories typify system loyal respondents the most.

**Table 11.**  
Prevalence of political ideas. (percentages)<sup>33</sup>

	System loyal	System indifferent	System critical
Liberal, free-thinking	56	26	18
European/Western	62	26	12
Christian Democrat, religious	67	24	9
Conservative, traditionalist	36	35	29
Strong national sentiments	26	38	36
Order and stability	34	33	33
Green, environmentalist	40	47	13

Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>: 85.640; sig: 0.000. Cramer V: 0.236.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

33. Due to the low number of items, left-wing radicals (N=7) and Social Democrats (N=20) have not been included in the analysis.

Amongst those with strong national sentiments and those identifying with the green, environmentalist mentality, the relative majority belonged to the camp of system indifferentes; 38 per cent of those with strong national sentiments and 47 per cent of those with a green, environmentalist mentality belong to the group of sceptics. The data are interesting because while those with strong national sentiments are dispersed relatively equally among the different groups (within the system loyals, their ratio is smaller compared to the two other groups), a strong duality can be seen among students with a green, environmentalist mentality. As we have indicated, a relative majority of them (47 per cent) strengthens the camp of system criticals, but a significant proportion (40 per cent) consider themselves to belong to the group of system loyals. As a result, we have to say that the system loyal and system sceptical mentalities are both characteristic of green, environmentalist youth.

Those students ended up in the system critical group who mostly identified as someone with strong national sentiments (36 per cent belong to this group) or as conservative traditionalists (29 per cent of them are system critical). Furthermore, the ideals of order and stability are important for criticals (33 per cent consider themselves to be system critical). Despite the fact that the above-mentioned political theories typify system criticals the most, we cannot say that any political view would predestine someone to belong to any group (as we saw in the case of system loyals and system criticals); therefore, there is no political idea that is highly specific to system criticals alone.

### **Social background and identifying with democracy**

In the following we examine what socio-demographic characteristics define the groups, divided according to the answers given by the university and college students. When describing the characteristics of separate groups we used only those variables that caused significant differences.<sup>34</sup>

It can be said in relation to the system loyal respondents that a majority of women (52 per cent) belong to this group compared to 43 per cent of men. That is, concerning gender, women are more likely to become system loyals. Permanent address also reveals a clear correlation: Residents of metropolitan areas (the capital and city with county rights) are the most loyal to the democratic system. The political attainment of the student's father/stepfather also fundamentally determines the relationship of youth to the political system: The higher the level of education for the father, the greater the chance that the student will be system loyal.

The level of interest in public issues and politics also influences which group the student belongs to. Upon analysis of the results we can see a linear correlation according to which the proportion of system loyal students (55 per cent) is the highest among those who showed the most interest in public issues and politics. Family discussions concerning public issues also influence students' attitudes.

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34. The Pearson's Chi-square showed a significant deviation in the case of gender, permanent residence, educational attainment of the father, public interest, political interest, and family discussions about public life.

The system loyal relation is the highest (55 per cent) among those university and college students who regularly talk about public issues at home with their family. The constructive relationship in their case concerning interest in politics/public issues and family discussions can be detected easily, as these factors show they are involved in the life of the political system. Within the camp of system criticals, concerning gender, the proportion of men is significantly higher. While only 15 per cent of women could be found in this group, 28 per cent of men identified themselves as belonging to the camp of system criticals. Concerning permanent address, the proportion of those students is highest within the group of system criticals that lives in villages (29 per cent).

Table 12.  
Socio-demographic characteristics of groups. (percentages)

		System loyal	System indifferent	System critical
Gender	Male	43	29	28
	Female	52	33	15
Permanent residence	Budapest	56	24	20
	City with county rights	49	33	18
	Other city	42	40	18
	Village	41	30	29
Father's educational attainment	Up to eight years of primary education, vocational school	36	39	25
	Secondary vocational school, technical institute	43	36	21
	Secondary grammar school	44	36	20
	College	61	26	13
	University, PhD	54	24	22
Interest in public life	1	16	42	42
	2	35	42	23
	3	42	39	19
	4	53	28	19
	5	55	17	28
Political interest	1	29	48	23
	2	44	40	16
	3	50	29	21
	4	61	16	23
	5	55	12	33
Family discussions	Regularly	55	22	23
	Occasionally	46	34	20
	Never	31	40	29

Gender: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>: 18.540; sig: 0.000; Cramer V: 0.153. /

Permanent residence: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>: 21.069; sig: 0.002. Cramer V: 0.116.

Father's educational attainment: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>: 28.864; sig: 0.004 ; Cramer V:0.136.

Political interest: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>: 67.462 ; sig: 0.000 ; Cramer V:0.206.

Interest in public life: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>: 36.839 ; sig: 0.000 ; Cramer V:0.153.

Family discussions: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>: 16.842 ; sig: 0.002 ; Cramer V:0.103.

Method: Cross-tabs. Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Upon analysis of the educational attainment of the father/stepfather, we can say that among the group of criticals, the ratio of paternal lineage to college and university degrees is the lowest (13 and 22 per cent respectively). Upon examination of the question of interest in politics and public life, we can see that in this sense, the camp of system criticals can in no way be seen as homogenous: 42 per cent of those who are most disinterested in public issues identify as belonging to this group, while 28 per cent of those who are most interested in public issues also identify as belonging to this group. When examining political interest, the lowest proportion of those that show low interest can be found within this group, and 33 per cent of those most interested are from the group of system criticals. Based on this, we can say that in this sense, the group of criticals can be characterized by a dichotomy: Typically those who are disinterested in questions of politics and public issues can be found in this group, just as students with a high level of interest in politics and public life can. This means that their influence on the political system is dual as well: While we consider those who are interested in political and public issues constructive, we describe those who are characterised by indifference towards politics and public life as destructive. In the case of system criticals, the frequency of family discussions does not affect membership in the group in a significant way.

Within the group of system indifferent respondents there is no significant divergence regarding the proportion of men and women; 29 per cent of men and 33 per cent of women belong to this category of respondents. Within the group of sceptics, concerning permanent address, the rural small and mid-size cities predominate, while concerning the educational attainment of fathers, the rate of those whose father has the lowest level of education is the highest in the case of the system indifferents (39 per cent).

Upon examination of their public and political interests, it can be said that this group of respondents is the most indifferent toward this issue. Those who are not interested in public issues at all (42 per cent) can be found in the highest proportion among the group of indifferents, together with those that are completely uninterested in politics (48 per cent). Also the smallest proportion of those who show an especially high interest towards both the worlds of politics and public life are in this group as well.

With regard to family discussions about questions of public life, we can say that 40 per cent of those students who said that during discussions at home public issues are never brought up belong to the group of system criticals. Therefore we find it likely that, in the sense of Hirschman, the system indifferents will be characterized by a passive and destructive approach.

## Satisfaction with democracy

During our study we not only wanted to know to what extent students can identify with the idea of democracy, but also to what extent they are satisfied with the workings of the democratic system, as their attitudes fundamentally affect their position within the constructive/destructive relationship toward the system. According to the results of our 2015 study, 26 per cent of Hungarian university and college students are not satisfied at all, while 41 per cent are not very satisfied with the workings of Hungarian democracy. On the other hand, within the group of satisfied students, the proportion of those who are more or less satisfied are 30 per cent, while only three per cent said they are fully satisfied with the workings of the Hungarian democratic system.

The results show that the support of university and college students for the political system – be it special or diffuse (or possibly both) – is especially low.<sup>35</sup> We presume that low support for the system has a destructive effect, while a high level of support for the system results in a constructive character. We see the basis of this starting point in the fact that while low levels of support may have a destabilizing effect on the political system and can therefore have a destructive effect, a high level of support stabilizes the political system and can therefore be interpreted as a constructive attitude.

It is worth examining the relationship between system identification and participation. Below we will show in more detail the different dimensions of activity, namely, who protests and how. Here we merely present the data on online and offline protesters, as well as the relationship between the three categories.

**Table 13.**  
Offline protest and relationship to the system. (percentages)

		System loyal	System indifferent	System critical	Total
Offline protest	Passive offline	49	35	16	100
	Protests offline	46	29	25	100
Total		47	32	21	100

Pearson Chi-Square: 9.579a; Sig: 0.008; Phi/Cramer V: 0.110.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

35. Within the topic of satisfaction with democracy at least five theoretical approaches can be distinguished in the political science debate:

1. Satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of the reigning government (DALTON 1999, MERKL 1988);
2. Satisfaction with democracy as an indicator of support for the political system (EASTON 1965; FUCHS-GUIDOROSSO-SVENSSON 1995);
3. Satisfaction with democracy as a cumulative indicator (CLARKE-DUTT-KORNBERG 1993);
4. The theory of acceptable duality (DOGAN 1997; LAGOS 1997);
5. The theory of unacceptable duality (ROSE-MISHLER-HAERPFER 1998).

It is common within these separate theories, however, that they interpret the dimension of satisfaction as equivalent to the dimension of support; therefore, the more satisfied the respondent is with the workings of democracy, the greater the extent to which he/she supports the system and vice versa. Of these different theoretical approaches, in the case of Hungarian university and college students, we can best accept the position that interprets satisfaction as a special form of support, with the difference that special support is based not only on government output, but on identifying with different parties, which also plays an important role.

As we can see in the above table, system criticals are somewhat overrepresented among those protesting offline: In the sample, their weight is 21 per cent, while among offline protesters it is 25 per cent. However, system indifferenters and system loyals represent a higher proportion than the sample mean among the group of passive students. In the case of online protest activity our premise can be similarly verified, adding that the system indifferenters appear among the group of online passives with even more weight.

**Table 14.**  
**Online protest and relationship to the system. (percentages)**

		System loyal	System indifferent	System critical	Total
Online protest	Passive offline	48	35	15	100
	Protests offline	47	29	25	100
Total		47	32	21	100

Pearson Chi-Square:11.685; Sig: 0.003; Phi/Cramer’s V: 0.122.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Thus, system criticals have relatively large weight among offline and online protesters as well, while system indifferenters rather “strengthen” the passive side. System criticals seem to have some sort of voice, but it is by no means exceptionally high.

In the following we present what factors lie behind satisfaction and dissatisfaction. On the one hand, we show the political dimension of satisfaction with the workings of Hungarian democracy, while on the other hand we wish to analyse the possible financial aspects of satisfaction. During the analysis of the political dimension we follow the three group categories, while during the analysis of the financial aspects we would like to know how subjective assessment of the financial situation and the perspectives of students concerning the future, as well as their opinions on future employment, affect their satisfaction with Hungarian democracy.

**Satisfaction within the sphere of system loyals, system indifferenters, and system criticals**

We begin the analysis of the dimension of satisfaction with the groups of respondents previously described. According to Hirschman, as well as to our typology, the system loyal group should be characterized by a constructive nature, which in this case means satisfaction with democracy, and therefore a high level of support for it.

The system indifferent group, on the other hand, has to be destructive, which in this case means they will be specifically dissatisfied with the workings of democracy and therefore support for the democratic order will be low within their sphere. Based on the typology presented in the introduction, the system criticals are also characterized by a constructive nature, but it can easily be that their activity is due precisely to their dissatisfaction; therefore, in their case, satisfaction with democracy does not necessarily have to appear.

At the same time, the results of research are that our theoretical expectations do not necessarily correspond to reality. First of all, it should be underlined that there are no significant differences between the ways the groups think. They are very similar in their dissatisfaction.

Our theoretical premise does not hold its ground in the case of system loyals, as they are no more satisfied than their counterparts. Also, we cannot say, in the case of system indifferents, that they would be more dissatisfied than others; moreover, the highest proportion of more or less satisfied students is in the group of indifferents. In the case of system criticals, dissatisfaction does not contradict our premise; their constructive nature depends on what approach they take to the active/passive relationship, that is, whether those belonging to the category of voice do actually protest. After reviewing the results, for the time being it seems that in the case of system loyals, system indifferents, and system criticals, dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy does not have sufficient explanatory value, as the replies received from the students show a pronouncedly inconsistent result.

### The social dimension of satisfaction

Here we present our findings on satisfaction with the workings of democracy as viewed through the financial situations and future prospects of students. Our premise is that the socio-economic situation of university students has an impact on their assessment of their satisfaction with democracy.

Of the variables examined, we can speak of significant divergence ( $p \leq 0.05$ ) when it comes to the subjective evaluation of students' financial situations and their perception of future prospects. Though our data set contains the subjective perceptions of possibilities for employment among university and college students, there is no significant difference with respect to this among the students who evaluate their levels of satisfaction differently.

**Table 15.**  
**The proportion of social dimension elements within the groups**  
**of satisfaction levels. (percentages)**

		I'm not satisfied at all	I'm not really satisfied	I'm more or less satisfied	I'm completely satisfied
Subjective financial situation	I do not have financial worries	28	34	33	5
	I make ends meet by budgeting well	23	44	31	2
	I can just make ends meet from my salary	28	44	24	4
	I have financial problems every month, I live in deprivation	60	38	2	0
View of the future	Not at all certain	48	35	17	-
	2	38	46	14	2
	3	24	45	25	3
	4	21	41	35	3
	Very certain	33	31	31	5

Subjective financial situation: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>: 22.913; sig: 0.028; Cramer V:0.098.

View of the future: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>: 32.321, sig: 0.001. Cramer V: 0.116.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

According to the subjective financial situation results, those students are the most dissatisfied with the workings of democracy who are forced to live among the most difficult financial circumstances: 50 per cent of those students getting by from one month to the other or living in deprivation are not at all satisfied, while 38 per cent of them are not really satisfied with the workings of the Hungarian democratic order. The students living in the worst financial circumstances are the most critical, but this does not mean that university and college students with good financial situations are satisfied. Despite the fact that approximately a third of the students who "have no financial worries" (33 per cent) and who "make ends meet by budgeting well" (31 per cent) are more or less satisfied with the workings of democracy, a vast majority of them (62 and 67 per cent, respectively) nevertheless strengthen the camp of those who are dissatisfied. The relevant difference is that while the majority of those who live in difficult financial circumstances are not at all satisfied, in the case of those living in good financial circumstances, the same is true for only that smaller part of such students who are dissatisfied. This means that good financial circumstances can only moderate dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy but will not have a more substantial effect on it. It is also noteworthy that the weight of those who are completely satisfied with the workings of democracy in all financial groups is irrelevant.

We are in a somewhat easier situation concerning the students' views of the future, as we can see a linear relationship that is relatively easy to interpret. The results show that those students who see their future as more certain can be found in a smaller proportion among the completely dissatisfied group and in greater numbers among those university and college students who are more or less satisfied. We also have to highlight that, similar to the financial situation, a secure future is only able to alleviate dissatisfaction with democracy, as 64 per cent of those who see their future as most certain are also dissatisfied with the workings of the democratic order. It is an interesting point that a third of those who see their future as the most stable belong to the group of most dissatisfied students. Without drawing far-reaching conclusions that cannot be confirmed by our results, we presume that this group may be characterized by heightened financial and social expectations; therefore, their disappointment regarding the performance of democracy appears to a greater extent.

As we mentioned before, based students' assessments we cannot speak of a significant effect of employment possibilities here. However, it is definitely worth mentioning that 41 per cent of those university and college students who gave the most negative assessment concerning the topic of employment possibilities are not at all satisfied with the workings of democracy.

To summarize, the financial dimension of satisfaction with democracy is defined to the greatest extent by the financial situation of students and their outlook for the future. Those university and college students are the most dissatisfied who live in the most difficult financial circumstances and see their future as the most uncertain. It is also important to highlight that though those students who live in better financial circumstances and have more certain futures are more satisfied with the performance of democracy, nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of them still belong to the group of unsatisfied students.

### **Voice: those who protest**

As we have described in the theoretical introduction, based on Hirschman's theory and concepts, we hold those to belong in the category of voice who do not flee when faced with problems, but rather try to either actively solve them or at least to raise social awareness concerning the existence of an alternative decision. We consider collective petitions, pleas to higher authorities, protests and the mobilization of the public as actions belonging to the category of voice. (HIRSCHMAN 1995, 12; 37). In the following, using the data of the Active Youth in Hungary Research Group examining the five forms of participation in the dimension of "direct democratic" participation (SZABÓ, 2013:32), as well as six further questions and "virtual" participation (SZABÓ, 2013:32–33) connected to online, public and social problems, we seek answers to what characterizes those students participating in Hungarian higher education who actively protest.

## Organization of Hungarian university students

As we have alluded to in our previous studies, the activity of Hungarian university and college students concerning public matters is somewhat higher than the previous large-scale youth studies indicated (SZABÓ–ROSS 2014). This activity, however, is very limited with respect to political organization and is aimed much more at leisure activities. In 2015, as was the case two years ago, sports clubs were the key element of the organizational networks of youth, which it would be an exaggeration to classify as political in nature. The second most popular form of organization is professional, scientific organizations, to which almost every fifth student is connected. This is followed by cultural groups, organizations for the preservation of heritage, artistic groups, church groups and religious communities. Compared to 2013, the rate of involvement in environmentalist groups has grown, and the proportion of those related to local student bodies (HÖK)<sup>36</sup> rose above 10 per cent. All other organization – all in all we listed 12 types of organizational forms – was less relevant; two per cent of university or college students are involved with a youth organization of a political party or with a political party itself.

## Organization according to public issues

If we just examine the types of organizations relating to public life (eight types)<sup>37</sup> the level of student organization is much lower, as 60 per cent of Hungarian university or college students have absolutely no connection with such public or political organizations. A quarter of them are connected to such an organization and a tenth of them are connected to two organizations dealing with issues concerning the public (the index of average membership in organizations related to public life=0.59, where 0 is no organizational connection and 8 means someone is involved in all forms of organization).

Organization of students according to public issues – like the above-mentioned connections – is less related to traditional socio-cultural and socio-demographic factors, but depends on ideological orientation to a great extent. The average organization of Christian Democrat, religious youth is the highest (1.32 index points), followed by those who identify as green/environmentalists (0.84 index points). The level of organization of no other group exceeds the average value. In line with their values and ideological attitudes, those who identify as rather right-wing and ideologically conservative – and therefore are Fidesz voters – are more organized than average. There is no significant difference in this sense between opposition voters and those situated on the moderate-radical axis.

36. HÖK (the National Union of Hungarian Students) represents approximately 400 000 students around the country. It has a right to express its opinion and to make proposals about any questions concerning higher education. The historical predecessor to HÖK was MEFESZ, which played an active role in the Revolution of 1956 when Hungarians revolted against communist oppression. HÖK completes national-level tasks regarding higher education and youth policy that cannot be carried out at the institutional or regional levels. The National Union of Hungarian Students has a local student union (HÖK) in every higher education institution in Hungary.

37. These are: The HÖK; other student organizations; church organizations/ religious communities; human rights movement or organization; youth organization of a political party; ecological/ environmentalist organization; and other organizations dealing with public affairs that are not parties.

If we examine this through a binary logistic model,<sup>38</sup> we can find the most important factors affecting such organization. It can be seen from the table below that in the case of religious, churchgoer students, the likelihood of someone having some form of organization is 8.44 times greater. In this context, the likelihood of organization among those who identify with the value labels of Christian Democrat/religious/conservative is significantly higher as well. We can also see, however, that there is another ideological label that has strong influence on connection to such organizations, and that is green orientation. According to the data, the likelihood of organization is 6.19 times greater for youth accepting green values. Our 2015 survey therefore confirmed our earlier belief (OROSS-SZABÓ 2014) that religious education in Hungary is a community-building force present in choice of values (Christian Democrat, conservative) and in increased social engagement. We can also confirm the results of the first wave of our research (KEIL 2012) that there are organized students interested in public life on the progressive side as well, not just among conservatives, who most identify with the "green" label.

Organization is associated with being open to social problems, and we can also see from the following data set that, at the same time, the likelihood of organization among youth who are satisfied with democracy, who are system indifferent and who are participating in university or college level training is smaller. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to presume that these data indicate organization is related to some sort of general dissatisfaction. Of the different study areas, those in the legal and technical sciences showed negative values within the following Table<sup>39</sup>.

**Table 16.**  
Binary logistic regression model of organization

	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Churchgoing religious (dummy)	2.134	.000	8.45
Green (dummy)	1.822	.003	6.19
Christian Democratic/ conservative/ religious (dummy)	1.834	.004	6.26
Openness to social problems (1–5)	.295	.007	1.34
Legal studies (dummy)	-1.648	.022	.19
System indifferent (dummy)	-.570	.036	.57
Holding a Bachelor's degree (dummy)	-1.189	.050	.30
Satisfied with democracy (dummy)	-.235	.061	.79
Technical studies (dummy)	-.684	.091	.51

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

38. The statistics of the model: Nagelkerke R Square: 0.282; -2 Log likelihood: 776.993; Cox & Snell R Square: 0.208.

39. We have to mention, however, that in the case of technical students, the level of significance exceeded the level of  $p \leq 0.05$  but did not reach  $p \leq 0.1$ .

In his now-classic study, Albert O. Hirschman primarily called collective forms of action voice. In our research we look at 14 offline and six online forms of participation, but some of these do not correspond to Hirschman's use of the concept, for example because they are not collective actions, or because they are activities connected much more to elections than to protest. Therefore in our detailed analysis we look at five direct democratic and six online forms of activity under the analysis of voice.

As we indicated in the introduction, those who protest do not flee when faced with problems, but rather try to either actively solve them or at least to raise social awareness concerning the existence of an alternative decision. (HIRSCHMAN 1995, 12; 37) According to Hirschman, voice is a concept that has different levels, and has a direct effect. He views collective petitions, pleas to higher authorities, protests and the mobilization of the public as actions of voice. In our opinion, this all clearly indicates the so-called repertoire of collective action that we considered direct democratic participation in our earlier studies (SZABÓ–ROSS 2012; ROSS–SZABÓ 2014; SZABÓ 2014). Hirschman describes forms of participation which, on the one hand, indicate especially strong involvement and on the other hand are capable of mobilising society, or in this case, student citizens. We think it is not by chance that he uses the term voice to describe protests instead of the term "demonstration".

Thus, in this subsection, by voice we mean those who participate in collective, direct democratic actions such as collecting signatures for a petition (27 %), signing petitions, referendum initiatives (29 %), participating in legal demonstrations (20 %), spontaneous protests, marches (9 %), as well as intentional boycotts (20 %). We analyse those who participate in online actions in a separate subsection.

The following table shows the proportion of protests (in the sense of Hirschman) in 2013 and 2015. Within two years, significant changes happened concerning the five repertoire types examined. The voice of Hungarian university and college students became more subdued and moderate as the proportion of those who do not engage in any form of activity increased significantly (from 34 % to 41 %). In 2015, 59 per cent of students can be seen as belonging to the category of voice. The proportion of those who participated in three or more protests also decreased significantly and we can therefore speak of a double decrease: Fewer students participated in less protests according to the 2015 studies (average participation index 2013: 1.4 index points; 2015: 1.0 index points).

**Table 17.**  
**Collective (offline) participation among Hungarian university  
 and college students between 2013 and 2015. (percentages)**

	2013	2015
No participation	34	41
One	27	30
Two	19	18
3 or more	20	11
	100	100

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

We are in the lucky position that, parallel to the study of the Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, a sociological survey representative of the whole of Hungarian society was carried out that examined participation – including direct democratic participation<sup>40</sup> – with a similar methodology. We have at our disposal some comparative data we can use to interpret the extent of Hungarian university and college students’ collective participation.

From the study of Andrea Szabó and Márton Gerő, we can see that 5 per cent of the Hungarian population above 18 (without university and college students in the sample) signed letters of protest or petitions in traditional or web formats (SZABÓ–GERŐ 2015), two per cent participated in legal protests and three per cent deliberately boycotted or did not buy certain products. The 2015 Active Youth in Hungary Research found the activity of students’ magnitudes higher than the potential for protest among the total population of the country. Despite the fact that their activity has significantly decreased over two years, university and college students are one of the most active, if not the most active, strata in Hungary.

Who are we talking about, though? How can the higher education groups that protest be defined? Can we confirm the theoretical hypothesis in our introduction, based mainly on Olson, according to which organization and connection to different social groups strengthens political activity?

Involvement in different forms of collective action is independent of gender or type of permanent address. That is, male and female students, those who live in Budapest, and those living outside of the capital participate to the same extent. The socio-cultural background of the student’s family and its financial situation does not have significant relevance either. The extent of protest among students attending institutions maintained by different organizations is different, however.

40. The OTKA K 108836 study titled *Integrációs és dezintegrációs folyamatok a magyar társadalomban* (Integrational and disintegrational processes in Hungarian society). Director of Research: Kovách Imre, Dsc. For detailed results of the study, see: (SZABÓ–GERŐ 2015).

More than one-fifth of students at state-financed big universities protest (62 %) while only one-third of students attending private colleges and universities do (34 %). It is worth indicating that among the students of church universities who are the most organized, the frequency of collective action is below average (49 %).

The data indicate that those students protest who are open to social problems and issues and are interested in events taking place outside of their lifeworld. 81 per cent of those who are very interested in social problems and half of those who are not interested at all can be seen as belonging to the category of voice, and similar proportions can be seen concerning those interested in (party)politics (79 % vs. 53 %).

Several signs indicate the oppositional nature of participation in collective action. Those students who do not see their as future certain at all, or who see it as uncertain, protest more frequently than the average; 82 per cent of those who placed themselves on the liberal side within the liberal-conservative scale indicated participation in at least one type of collective action, while among those who stood in the middle, this proportion was around 54 per cent. The position on the moderate-radical scale indicates a similar phenomenon, as 80 per cent of radicals, 53 per cent of those in the middle, and 65 per cent of those on the moderate side protested at one time or another. Significant correlations cannot be found, however, between these separate value and ideological labels.

We tested the factors affecting the extent of participation in collective action, with an emphasis on connection to organizations dealing with public issues, through a binary regressive model as well. In our model, the combination of the previously-mentioned five forms of participation were dependant variables (0 did not participate in anything, 1 did in at least one collective activity), while the set of independent variables embraced those questions we examined previously (socio-demographic and socio-cultural background, specific university/college questions, political/ideological orientation, and of course, connection to organizations dealing with public issues).

Based on the following binary logistic regression<sup>41</sup> the greatest effect on protest is the connection to organizations dealing with public issues: The likelihood of someone protesting is close to twice as high if he/she is connected to an organization. Therefore, those students who are socially integrated show much higher activity than those who are not connected to civil actors. Based on this, it is not surprising that the protest potential is stronger for those students who are interested in politics, as interest and openness are necessary for participation. In the sense of Hirschman, a smaller group of students can be considered as belonging to the category of voice, those whose public activity closely follows other dimensions of social integration.

The data also show that there is some sort of opposition charge to protest potential. The likelihood of collective action is lower among those who are satisfied with the current performance of democracy. At the same time, the odds of participatory activity among the system critical groups are 1.806. It is worth examining this last aspect in detail.

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41. Nagelkerke R Square: 0.166; -2 Log likelihood: 858.808; Cox & Snell R Square: 0.123.

**Table 18.**  
The binary logistic regression model of protest.

	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Is publicly organized (dummy)	.678	.000	1.971
System critical (dummy)	.591	.024	1.806
Interested in politics (1–5)	.199	.030	1.220
Satisfied with democracy (dummy)	-.312	.008	.732
Does not know which party to vote for (dummy)	-1.100	.031	.333

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

We described in the introduction that in our opinion, system critical (those who could accept dictatorship under certain circumstances instead of democracy) also belong to the category of voice. While they clearly express their disapproval of democracy (according to our assumption) they still live in such a system, and therefore they also voice their disapproval to varying degrees. From the logistic regression model above, we can see that the so-called system criticals make up an important group of those who protest. What about the system criticals and system loyals, though?

We examined their relation to voice and democracy through a two-dimensional cross-tabulation analysis. As the following table indicates, the attitudes of system criticals are truly different than that of students belonging to the other two categories, as close to seven-tenths of them report some form of activity. The most passive (as expected) are the system indifferent, but the activity of system loyals is also below average. However, those students who can accept that “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to democratic one” (according to our presumption) generally voice their displeasure. This definitely indicates an attitude toward democracy that is actively dismissive.

**Table 19.**  
Protest and relationship to the system. (percentages)

		System loyal	System indifferent	System critical	Total
Offline collective protest	Dos not protest	43	46	31	41
	Protests'	57	54	69	59
Total		100	100	100	100

Pearson Chi-Square: 9.579; Sig: 0.008; Phi/Cramer V: 0.110.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

## Virtual participation

There is no consensus in the literature as to what constitutes online participation. Some social scientists believe that online participation is not an individual branch of participation but is no more than a technically new solution for traditional and collective forms of participation (BAKKER-DE VREESE, 2011). This contrasts with perceptions according to which virtual participation is qualitatively different, as it opens up a gate for participation (for youth in particular) that no other form can replace (POLAT, 2005; STANLEY-WEARE 2004, 506, BAEK-WOJCIESZAK-DELLI-CARPINI 2010). Virtual participation, according to this approach, is an option that is able to involve groups that have never mobilised before.

There have been several attempts at a more detailed study of online participation in Hungary. According to earlier studies of youth online political activity, groups are able to take advantage of the political potential of the web that are already committed and active. The study found that the information stratification of Hungarian society follows patterns of traditional demographic stratification. Social groups traditionally seen as privileged apparently completely overlap with the web elite (see HÁRI 2010, 104, SZABÓ-ROSS 2012, ROSS-SZABÓ 2014). At the same time, the 2015 survey of Active Youth made possible a more detailed analysis of this form of participation than ever before.

The essence of the questions and problems posed here can be summarized in whether online participation actually means a new type of participation. Do different, formerly not mobilised groups truly appear through this form of political participation?


We listed six forms of online participation in the survey (one more than two years before). The respondent had to say whether he/she had participated in one or another form of participation before. All six forms were pronouncedly described to make it clear they were not just about posting or "liking" in general, but that the respondent should associate the form specifically with social problems:

- blogged: "blogged in connection with public issues/social topics";
- posted: "posted topics connected to public issues/social problems";
- commented: "commented on blogs/social media in connection with public issues/social topics";
- voted: "voted on the net on a question relating to public issues/society";
- shared: "shared events, images, videos, posts reflecting your opinion concerning public issues/social problems on social media";
- liked: "liked posts on blogs or social media relating to public issues/social problems".

Based on the 2015 data, the form most frequently reported was the action of "liking" something, with 47 per cent, while 32 per cent of respondents replied "yes" to the question of "voted on the net on a question relating to public issues/ society", 24 per cent of respondents commented on a public issue topic, and 23 per cent posted text with content relating to public issues.

The proportion of those writing a public issues-themed blog proved to be the least frequently reported among the categories (4 %). In 2015 the proportion of those not involved in online participation was 38 per cent.

Figure 4.  
Online participation in 2015. ("Yes" answer, percentages)



Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2013 and 2015 (own calculations).

The two main questions of the subcategory are a) whether online participation truly makes it possible to involve new groups and b) what can be associated with students' intention to participate virtually? In order to answer the first question, we chose three socio-demographic variables, three variables connected to living circumstances, and two ideological variables and examined whether the same groups would be found in higher proportions among both offline and online participants. We restricted offline participation, according to Hirschman's categories, to collective participation. If there is a substantive change and the universe of online and offline protesters changes, then we can say that new groups might be integrated through online participation.<sup>42</sup> As the proportion of online participation is three per cent higher than that of collective participation, we considered such change substantive if it reached or surpassed twice that, i.e., six per cent. In addition, it is worth exploring whether, in the case of the given question, there is a significant difference between the separate categories of replies.

42. Offline collective and online participation came about in the table based on 5-5 forms of participation.

Table 20.  
The comparison of collective offline and online activity. (percentages)

	Collective, offline (based on five forms of participation)	Online (based on five forms of participation)	Difference compared to offline
At least one form	59	62	+3
<b>Gender</b>			
Male	59	67 a	+8**
Female	59	59	0
<b>Educational attainment of parent</b>			
Neither parent has a diploma	63a	61	-2
At least one parent has a diploma	56	64	+8**
<b>Type of permanent residence</b>			
Budapest	58	60	+2
City with county rights	58	61	+3
Other city	62	65	+3
Village	58	64	+6**
<b>Maintainer of the institution</b>			
State university	62 a	62	0
State college	54	65	+9**
Foundation-run/private institution	34	58	+24*
Church institution	48	61	+13*
<b>Educational level</b>			
Bachelor	57	62	+5
Master	64	58	-6*
Undivided	65	67	+2
<b>Field of training</b>			
Agricultural	59	81	+22***
Agrarian	59	67	+8**
Liberal arts	59	58	-1
Economics	47	57	+10*
IT	71	77	+6***
Law	51	60	+9*
Engineering	66	66	0
Medicine	63	65	+2

	Collective, offline (based on five forms of participation)	Online (based on five forms of participation)	Difference compared to offline
<b>Agrees with?</b>			
System loyal	57 a	62 a	+5
System indifferent	54	56	+2
System critical	69	73	+4
<b>Acceptance of political values</b>			
Liberal, free thinking	58	61	+3
European, Western	64	68	+4
Christian Democrat, religious	65	61	-4
Conservative, traditionalist	43	64	+21*
Left-wing	50	81	+31***
Strong national sentiments	61	70	+19***
Believes in order and stability	58	58	0
Green, environmentalist	58	60	+2

**Note:**

Green color: The Pearson-Chi-Square probe showed significant correlation within the given variable.

Italics: higher than average participation.

\*: the change causes below average or average online activity.

\*\* : the change causes online activity somewhat above the average.

\*\*\*: the change causes online activity significantly above average.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Certain categories in the above table seem to indicate that there are university/college subgroups who even though they operate under strong constraints nevertheless show a higher likelihood of speaking out online than of getting involved in the direct democratic field. We can see that compared to average online participation and also compared to offline participation, online participation is stronger among:

- men
- students studying liberal arts
- law students
- agriculture students
- leftist students
- students with strong national sentiments.

The rest of the seemingly significant differences do not comply with several conditions. Generally we are speaking of groups who produce lower levels of participation compared to the average online or offline participation and even so, the growth still does not reach a level that is significantly above average. To better illustrate this: The 10 % higher online activity of IT students is all in vain if it does not even come close to average online activity. Similarly, online participation of students attending foundation-funded and/or private institutions increases by 24 % but at the same time is still below the level of average online participation.

Overall, it seems as if we could record statistically relevant changes in the case of a few smaller groups; however, the problem of the number of items may arise (precisely because the groups are so small) and therefore even in these cases, the results should be treated with caution. Moreover, for example among liberal arts students, but especially in the case of lawyers, we can speak of an already- active layer of students for whom the online space could mean not so much an increase of democratism as an extension of collective participation into new fields.

We examined the last question connected with online participation (i.e., to what can we attribute students' intention to participate online) through a binary regression model. Our dependant variable is online participation, while the set of independent variables fully covers the group of questions used in the case of collective action. We are, therefore, speaking of a very wide set of variables that includes (aside from socio-demographic and socio-cultural factors) ideological orientation and participation in public life as well. As the following table indicates, there is a significant overlap among the explanatory variables of collective participation and online participation. In this case as well, organization increases the likelihood of online participation the most, while political interest effects online participation in the same way (to almost the same extent) as we have seen in the case of collective action. Strictly keeping to the  $P \leq 0.05$  level of significance, one more variable has a meaningful effect, namely, if the student belongs to the camp of undecided voters (does not know which party he/she would vote for if parliamentary elections were held now), but this factor has a negative effect.<sup>43</sup> At the same time it is worth mentioning three ideological factors whose effects are not significant but that nevertheless clearly have an effect on online participation in one direction or another. If someone is critical of the democratic system, then the likelihood of them having virtual participation is more than one and a half times greater than if they were not critical. In the case of those favouring order and Christian Democrat/religious students (among whom there are many Fidesz voters) the likelihood of participation significantly decreases.

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43. Nagelkerke R Square: 0.181; -2 Log likelihood: 815.567; Cox & Snell R Square: 0.132.

**Table 21.**  
The binary logistic regression model of online protest.

	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Is publicly organised (dummy)	.684	.001	1.981
Interested in politics	.292	.002	1.339
Does not know	-1.512	.007	.220
Does not answer	-1.089	.064	.337
Will certainly refrain from voting	-1.122	.065	.325
System critical	.502	.067	1.652
Accepts the label of order	-1.045	.075	.352
Christian-democratic, conservative, religious	-1.057	.087	.347

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 ( own calculations).

Just as we did in the case of collective participation, we examined the relation of online protesters to the system. The two data sets show the same mechanisms: System indifferenters are the most passive, while system criticals stand out with respect to online protest activity. Our assumption according to which system critical activity is coupled with activity while system indifference is paired with passivity seems to be justified in this case as well. In turn, system loyals are situated somewhere in between the two. In certain places and times they have a voice, but this is far from what we experience among those who hold dictatorship to be acceptable under certain circumstances.

**Table 22.**  
Online protest and the relationship towards the system. (percentages)

		System loyal	System indifferent	System critical	Total
Online protest	Online passive	38	43	27	37
	Protests' online	62	57	73	63
Total		100	100	100	100

Pearson Chi-Square:11.685; Sig:0.003; Phi/Cramer's V: 0,122.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

All in all, the important result of the study is that it became apparent that without a general openness toward society and politics, as well as social integration, the development of any sort of participation within the sphere of Hungarian university and college students is very difficult. The shrinking voice of protest compared to 2013 among Hungarian university students, however, seems to show a more anti-government (oppositional) character.

### Political indifferentents

The results of large-scale Hungarian empirical studies show low levels of political interest among youth, as well as low levels of trust in political institutions (GAZSÓ–SZABÓ, 2002; GAZSÓ–LAKI, 2004; BAUER–SZABÓ, 2005; KERN–SZABÓ, 2011, OROSS 2013). It has also been confirmed among Hungarian students that forms of political participation are changing (OROSS–SZABÓ, 2014) and the proportion of forms of direct participation is especially high among students. In our earlier study (SZABÓ, 2013:64–65) we summed up the most important results within the frameworks of a model that included the questions, problems and topics studied within this volume. We identified the group of students that are indifferent to politics in that model and found that this group made up the largest group of students (42 %). This group did not have a single, well-defined, characteristic trait, but was characterized by several less-pronounced properties. Of these, the most important was the system sceptical attitude (that is, those unconcerned about which system they live in) as well as those who could not decide whether they would vote if a parliamentary election were held at that time. These studies, however, drew conclusions concerning political passivity from the propensity to participate in elections. While in our earlier studies we followed this method (KÁLÓCZI, 2014) concerning students enrolled in Hungarian higher education, in our current study we break with this tradition in order to re-evaluate the earlier data, conclusions and ideas.

In order to interpret political participation along the widest possible political spectrum, we studied 20 forms of participation in 2015, taking into consideration the survey conducted by an international study (ROTHENBÜHLER–EHLER–KISSAU, 2012). Based on the 2015 data, in our current analysis we formulated statements about those students who are completely passive by collectively analysing all replies to questions dealing with participation. We perceive those who are politically indifferent as passive actors for whom the political system does not hold any value; they are not committed, they do not show interest in politics, and they do not vote. In the following subsection we try to find out who the students are that are characterised by complete political passivity.

Starting from the 2015 data, besides the previously mentioned 20 extended offline and online forms of participation, the proportions shown in Table 23 can be seen concerning political participation.

**Table 23.**  
Comparison of offline collective and online activity. (percentages)

	percentages
No participation	7
Only online participation	4
Only offline participation	30
Offline and online participation	59
Total	100

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Within the sphere of students studied by us, in 2015, seven percent of those polled did not participate in any of the 20 listed forms of participation and therefore did not make even the slightest effort to become involved. There is a clear correlation between interest in social, public and political issues and participation: The lower the level of interest for a given student, the higher the likelihood that he/she will stay out of any form of participation. Ten per cent of those who are not at all interested in social or public issues did not participate in anything, while this proportion was 12 per cent among those who were not interested in politics.

Of the ideological orientations, concerning the left/right ranking, the proportion of passive students among right-wing voters is significantly smaller than among those who identified as leftist. While 22 per cent of those who clearly identified as belonging to the left can be seen as passive, this is just 9 per cent among the ranks of the right. Beyond this, a significant correlation could be seen among those who identified as moderate or radical, however, the proportion of passives was almost equal (6 and 5 per cent). No correlation can be detected among green identity and the proportion of passives. Based on the received results, no significant difference could be seen in the case of gender among indifferents.

### Chapter conclusion

Concerning the period between 2011 and 2015, the proportion of those preferring democracy grew somewhat within the sphere of Hungarian university and college students, while the number of those who could accept an authoritarian political regime decreased. By contrast, a group of respondents who are pronouncedly sceptical and indifferent concerning all political systems seems to be becoming a permanent fixture. During the analysis of the qualitative data collected during the course of the study we could identify five groups of interpretations. Members of the legal approach (18 %) approached democracy from the rule of law aspect, primarily emphasizing the importance of equality before the law in theory and practice, as well as the importance of all votes being equal.

According to the interpretation of the majoritarian approach (28 %), democracy is the realization of the people's will and when the will of the majority prevails. Members of the leadership approach (20 %) define democracy through the leader-led dichotomy, in other words, the principle of representation. According to this interpretation, the role of the voter is to elect representatives who will have to take into consideration voter opinions during the course of directing the political system. Members of the opinion-based approach (21 %) stress the deliberative nature of democracy.

According to their definition, the meaning of democracy is the ability to voice opinions and have opinions taken into account in equal measure in the political decision-making process. Finally, the liberty-based approach (18 %) looks at the content of democracy from the perspective of the individual. For them, democracy is primarily about the personal liberties of individuals and the freedom to shape individual destinies. At the same time, they acknowledge its limitations as well, which primarily means adherence to the rights and obligations pertaining to individuals. It is important to note concerning the received responses that close to a third (29 %) of those students who were interviewed for the series were not capable of giving a reply that could be analysed contentwise or simply refused to provide an answer. That is, a significant part of those asked could not comment on the issue in a meaningful way, which is a good indicator of the existing democratic deficit within Hungarian society. Besides defining the content of democracy, the levels of identification with democracy also provided interesting results. Those students belong most to the group of those preferring democracy who identified as rather left-wing, moderate, and liberal, as well as those who characterized themselves through mainly liberal, free-thinking, Western/European political ideas.

The financial dimension of satisfaction with democracy was defined to the greatest extent by the financial circumstances of the students and their views concerning the future. Those university or college students are the most dissatisfied who live among the worst financial circumstances and who see their future as the most uncertain. It is also important to stress that those students who are better off financially and have a more certain view of their future are more satisfied with the performance of the Hungarian democratic order; nevertheless, even so, an overwhelming majority of them belong to the group of those that are dissatisfied. At the same time, the political dimension of satisfaction is not relevant. There is no significant difference between those groups of students who relate differently to the democratic system in this sense, which means that they are dissatisfied with the workings of Hungarian democracy to a very similar extent.

The public activity of Hungarian university and college students are somewhat higher than the earlier large-sample youth studies indicated (SZABÓ–ROSS 2014). This activity, however, is very limited with respect to political organization; it is aimed much more at leisure activities. In 2015, as was the case two years ago, sports clubs were the key element of youth organizational networks. The second most popular form of organization is professional, scientific organizations, followed by cultural groups, organizations for the preservation of heritage, artistic groups, church groups and religious communities. Compared to 2013, the rate of involvement in environmentalist groups grew, and the proportion of those connected to local student bodies (HÖK) surpassed 10 per cent. All other organizations (all in all we listed 12 types of organizational forms) were less relevant.

Between 2013 and 2015, the offline activity of Hungarian university and colleges students concerning public issues stagnated and even decreased slightly. This is especially true for multiple participations (three or more). At the same time, while the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013 was a special period of student movements (protests against the planned change of the law concerning higher education) the year 2014/2015 was less strong in this sense, especially in light of the fact that in 2014 three major, national elections were held in Hungary. This – in line with Hungarian traditions – highly constricted the potential for protest.

Following the concepts of Hirschman, we covered separately in our study those protesters who had so-called repertoires for collective action. Our study found that involvement in separate forms of collective action is independent of gender or type of permanent address. Socio-cultural background and financial circumstances did not have significant relevance either. The extent of protest among students attending institutions maintained by different organizations is different, however. More than two-tenths of students of - financed big universities protest (62 %) while only one-third of students attending private colleges and universities do (34 %). The data indicate that those students protest who are open to social problems and issues and are interested in the events taking place outside of their lifeworld.

Based on the results of the study, we can ascertain that online participation actually makes it possible to involve new groups, as there are university and college subgroups which, though with strong constraints, nevertheless show higher likelihoods of speaking out online than getting involved in the direct democratic field. We can see that compared to average online participation and also compared to offline participation, online participation is stronger according to gender (among men); according to field of study (among students studying liberal arts, law and agriculture); and from the perspective of ideological orientation (among leftist students and those with strong national sentiments). Our study found that basically the same factors influence online and offline collective participation, namely, a general openness toward both politics and society. Also, without social integration, the development of any form of participation is very difficult within the sphere of university and college students.

Within the sphere of students studied by us in 2015, seven per cent of those polled did not participate in any of the 20 listed forms of participation, which means they did not make even the slightest effort to become involved.

# Political loyalty

## Introduction

In this chapter we look at how Hirschman's theory of exit/voice/loyalty is reflected in the political preferences of students. What sentiments and attitudes can be deduced from the choices of the generation? According to the terminology outlined in the introduction, those who are able to choose a party are considered loyal,<sup>44</sup> however, based on earlier studies, we can presume that voting for opposition (left-wing) and anti-elite (Jobbik and LMP) parties may be one form of protest. The question is what the differences are between these opposition students who from one perspective are loyal but from another can be considered as belonging to the category of voice. What are the characteristics of those students who remained loyal to the governing party? What can we say about the students who are indifferent (in the sense of Hirschman), those who are dissatisfied with both the government and all the other parties, and whose passivity is also expressed by the fact that they cannot name a favourite party? What determines whether a young university student acquires a constructive or destructive attitude in the first years of being able to vote and which party he/she starts to orient toward?

In the 2011–2012 and 2013 Active Youth study (SZABÓ 2012 and SZABÓ 2014) the party preferences of university and college students showed a very balanced picture: There was only a few percentage points' difference between Jobbik,<sup>45</sup> Fidesz<sup>46</sup> and LMP<sup>47</sup> (as well as Együtt and PM<sup>48</sup> in the 2013 study). A majority of students chose from amongst those parties. The support for the left was significantly below that for the two right-wing parties in both earlier waves of the study, though there was significant support in 2011 and in 2013 for LMP and Együtt-PM respectively. By 2015, the situation had changed substantially: LMP can no longer be seen as a part of the left; those who consider themselves left-wing (MSZP,<sup>49</sup> DK,<sup>50</sup> Együtt – PM) altogether only have eight percent of student support, while Fidesz has 12 per cent, LMP 14 per cent and Jobbik 20 per cent of popularity.

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44. Political loyalty in its classical sense – repeated election of a party several times in a row – could only be measured with a panel study. Here, in line with the introduction, we consider party voters loyal as well.

45. Jobbik: Movement for a Better Hungary, commonly known as Jobbik, is a Hungarian radical nationalist, far-right political party enjoying large (10-20 %) voter support. As of this writing it holds 24 seats in the Parliament. The party has been criticized for its anti-Roma rhetoric and its support of the illegal Hungarian Guard.

46. Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union is the governing conservative party that held an absolute two-thirds majority in Parliament from 2010 until 2014. Currently it is the biggest Hungarian party, with 114 MPs in Parliament.

47. LMP [Politics Can Be Different] is a green Hungarian political party. Founded in 2009, it was one of four parties to win seats in the National Assembly in the 2010 parliamentary election; currently it has five MPs in Parliament.

48. Együtt 2014 [Together 2014] is a completely new centrist liberal party that has three parliamentary representatives and was founded by a fairly popular former Prime Minister, Gordon Bajnai. The PM Party (Párbeszéd Magyarorszáért - Dialogue for Hungary) was formerly a branch of the LMP (a green party), which split over whether to ally with the Socialists and Együtt 2014 in an electoral battle against Fidesz. As of this writing PM holds one parliamentary seat in Parliament.

49. The Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungarian: Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) is a social democratic political party in Hungary. MSZP lost the 2010 elections (won by Fidesz with a 2/3 majority). As of this writing it has 29 seats in Parliament. Currently they are the biggest opposition party in Hungary. However, MSZP has low support among young people. This finding has held true since the regime change, and over time the disproportionate age composition of the party has become an increasingly serious problem for it. Only 15 % of MSZP voters are under 30 years old, 43 % are over 60 years old, and the average age of the membership is 55.9 years (BIRÓ-NAGY 2012, 203).

50. The Democratic Coalition (Hungarian: Demokratikus Koalíció), abbreviated to DK, is a center-left political party in Hungary led by former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. Founded in 2010 as a group within the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the party split from the MSZP on 22 October 2011 and became a separate party. It has five MPs in the National Assembly.

What did not change is the proportion of undecided voters: Even in the latest wave of research, somewhat more than 40 per cent could not or did not want to choose a party.

Besides the questions posed in the introduction, we try to explore the reasons for the power shift through statistical analysis of the different parties and uncertain voters. In the first part of the chapter, we discuss the socio-demographic variables (age, gender, university programme, financial situation, etc.) and continue the analysis with data concerning the social life, value preferences and ideology of students, then look at the questions directly related to parties. In the final part of the empirical analysis, the bivariate correlations used up until then will be complemented by a multivariate analysis. We will also examine the aspects of green orientation and gender separately.

### **Social background**

During the course of the analysis we will look at the supporters of left-wing parties collectively. The reason for this is that the item numbers of MSZP, DK, Együtt and PM are too low to examine on their own. The joint candidacy of the four parties in the 2014 elections and their politics since then does not justify considering them as individual blocs. Besides presenting the students sympathising with the left-wing, Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP – as in 2013 (KALÓCZI 2014) – we look at undecided students separately, many of whom reject all parties as a show of protest. The complete sample consists of 800 students, of whom 65 (8.1 per cent) are left-wing voters, 98 (12 per cent) belong to the camp of Fidesz, supporters of LMP number 116 (14.5 per cent), those of Jobbik number 159 (20 per cent), and uncertain voters number 362 (45 per cent). Item numbers are only shown if appropriate; most of the data cover percentages. We also took care to only list demographic or value groups with significant item numbers; therefore, the margin of error remains below 6 – 7 %. First we looked at demographic variables, which showed significant effect on the party choice of students in our previous studies as well.

**Table 24.**  
**Support for parties based on gender, age, permanent residence,**  
**religion and financial situation. (percentages)**

		Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided
Gender	Male	7	12	23	13	45
	Female	9	12	17	16	46
Age	Above 21	8	11	17	17	48
	18–21	8	14	25	12	41
Permanent residence	Budapest	13	11	9	16	51
	City with county rights	6	13	19	18	44
	Other city	8	12	25	10	46
	Village	7	12	28	14	39
Religion	I am religious, I follow the teachings of the church	1	37	21	9	31
	I am religious in my own way	7	10	21	15	46
	I cannot tell whether I am religious or not	6	15	15	14	50
	I am not religious	10	8	18	16	49
	I am an atheist	19	5	22	17	36
Financial situation	I do not have financial worries	10	16	19	16	40
	I make ends meet by budgeting well	7	12	18	14	49
	I can just make ends meet	11	11	24	15	40
<b>Total</b>		<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>45</b>

Note: in the category of financial situation, the number of items for the options of “I have financial problems from month to month” and “I live in deprivation” were too low to analyse.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

As among the total population, and also in the earlier student samples (FÉLIX–GREGOR 2014), Jobbik continues to be overrepresented among men, while LMP and the left-wing parties performed above average among women. The age group breakdown also resembles the previous results: Once again, Jobbik gained outstanding support among those 22 and younger. It is therefore worth re-examining the formerly- confirmed hypothesis according to which the radical party can have a strong attraction for teenagers with more free time and fewer obligations, primarily through far-right subculture and its strong symbolism (RÓNA–SÖRÉS 2012).

Though less spectacular than the support for Jobbik, the support for Fidesz among the youngest age group is nevertheless considerably higher, while voters 22 and older tend to support LMP. There is no dramatic change according to place of residence either; left-wing parties only have considerable support among students living in the capital, while Jobbik is more popular in the rural areas. Religion shows the most robust effect of all demographic variables on Fidesz: The party is very strong among churchgoer/religious students but very weak among those who are not religious. The left-wing parties and LMP show a more moderate reflection of this, while in the case of Jobbik we did not find a strong correlation. According to the breakdown by financial circumstances, however, it is the support for LMP and the left that shows a balanced tendency, while Jobbik is somewhat more popular among the circle of poorer students and Fidesz among better-off students.

Except for Fidesz, the above results show similar tendencies to the samples representative of the total population. According to nationwide studies, the majority of the governing party's supporters come from small towns, are middle-aged, are members of the middle class or are less well-off, and are religious. Only the latter could be seen among the group of university and college students.

**Table 25.**  
Support for parties according to parental educational attainment. (percentages)

		Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided
Father's educational attainment	Vocational or elementary	5	10	26	12	47
	Secondary leaving certificate	7	15	22	16	40
	Diploma	11	14	13	16	46
Educational attainment of parents combined	Both parents have maximum vocational training	4	10	27	13	46
	One vocational, other secondary	8	13	19	17	44
	Both secondary or one vocational, other diploma	7	10	23	13	48
	One diploma, other secondary	13	17	25	13	33
	Both parents have diploma	11	15	11	17	47
<b>Total</b>		8	13	20	14	45

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

We can find several developments concerning the breakdown of the educational attainment of parents compared to the 2013 tendencies. The left-wing camp is more concentrated than ever among the children of parents with higher educational attainment (BÍRÓ NAGY 2014), while there is only a slight difference here among the groups for LMP and Fidesz. Jobbik, however, outdid everyone once again among the group of first-generation college students (from families with elementary or vocational education - for two years earlier see: RÓNA-REICH 2014). The radical party is almost three times as popular among those students where the highest educational attainment of both parents is maximum a vocational education than it is among those where both the mother and father have a diploma.

**Table 26.**  
Party support according to fields of study. (percentages)

	Item numbers of the field in the sample	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided
Agrarian	37	3	16	19	16	46
Liberal arts	78	5	18	22	18	37
Health sciences (not doctor)	36	6	3	31	14	47
Economics	144	11	10	17	14	49
IT	50	8	4	26	12	50
Law	34	15	12	15	12	47
Engineer	157	6	10	26	13	45
Arts	26	4	8	12	12	65
Medical	65	14	22	22	11	32
Pedagogical	46	7	9	24	9	52
Social sciences	41	10	12	7	24	46
Natural sciences	57	9	18	11	23	40
<b>Total</b>		8	13	20	14	45

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

We did not find strong correlations concerning education level (BA, MA, and PhD), or form of financing and funding of the institution (church, state, private)<sup>51</sup>, but there are significant differences among the patterns of party popularity according to courses. We have to be cautious concerning numbers in the case of programmes with fewer numbers of students, however.

51. Except for the overrepresentation of Fidesz among the students enrolled in church-funded institutions; however, this is not surprising given their levels of support among religious students.

It can be said that the left has above-average support here compared to the support it receives among the students of those five-year undivided courses that are exempt from the Bachelor-Master division (law and medicine), while Fidesz receives support among medical students, liberal arts students, and those studying natural sciences, Jobbik receives support among students participating in IT and technical training, and LMP receives support among social science students and those studying natural sciences. These correlations do not necessarily arise from the nature of the course or the mentality of the education for the given course: The overrepresentation of men within Jobbik is reflected in the fact that technical and IT students (in typically male dominated fields) support the party to a great extent. In the case of LMP, which builds on green, alternative, anti-globalisation movements (see *Critical Mass generation* by SZABÓ 2011, 2014) it is somewhat evident that students studying natural and social sciences sympathise with them, as there are lots of young people within the subculture with similar interests. Among the party elite there are several sociologists, economists, biologists, and experts dealing with environmental science (this was especially true before the party split). Perhaps it is no accident either that the students of the traditionally most “conservative” courses (law and medicine) orient in an above-average way towards the older parties (Fidesz and the left).

All in all, the socio-demographic character of Fidesz’s voters remained constant compared to the previous survey (KMETTY 2014). MSZP and DK sympathizers two years ago who were more rural and not so well-off were complemented by the privileged voter base of Együtt-PM – nevertheless, the left-wing camp became much smaller than it was in 2013 (BÍRÓ-NAGY 2014). It seems as LMP could diversify its voter base compared to our previous studies through its growth (KEIL 2012), and it also seems in the case of Jobbik that their catch-all, “people’s party” strategy has resulted in a similar tendency. Support for Jobbik increased somewhat among the groups of students studying in Western Hungarian universities, among women, among the religious, and among wealthier, older students as well, although it did not lose its original character.

## Social activity and media consumption

In this part we examine what sort of social-public activity the young supporters of parties show, their knowledge of foreign languages, and from which media channels they receive their information. These variables are less frequent in sociological analyses.

Table 27.

Command of language, organizational connection, and online/ offline activity within the camps of the separate parties. (average points)

	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided	Complete sample
Command of language	4.40	4.02	3.43	4.28	4.00	3.96
Organizational connection	1.49	1.58	1.18	1.33	1.17	1.27
Offline activity	3.42	3.04	3.22	2.93	2.52	2.85
Online activity	1.91	1.60	1.77	2.08	1.34	1.61

Note: In the case of each language we gave the following points: 0=does not speak, 1=basic, 2=intermediate, 4=advanced. This is a summary of the five languages we asked about.

Organizational connection: We asked about connection to 12 types of organizations.

Those respondents received a maximum of 12 points who were members of all 12.

On average, students are members of slightly more than one organization.

See the descriptions of the specific types in the survey.

Offline and online activity: We gave 14 offline and 6 online activities. The averaged points show on average how many activities the voters of each party participate in. See the descriptions of the specific types in the survey.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Concerning language skills, there is only one significant difference: Jobbik voters self-report knowing fewer languages or speaking the languages they do know at a lower level than others. It seems realistic that the less-privileged situations and family backgrounds of Jobbik supporters might be behind this, but it is more likely that the difference is due to its supporters' low average age. In the multivariate analysis the language variable was no longer significant once we controlled for age. Radical students were somewhat behind in number of connections to social organizations, especially compared to Fidesz and left voters. In our earlier study we identified that a more isolated social position (which could also be linked to their overrepresentation among teenagers) was one of the drivers leading to orientation towards Jobbik (RÓNA-SÖRÉS 2012). At the same time, Jobbik supporters showed above-average rates of online (commenting, sharing on Facebook, etc.) and offline (demonstrations, petitions, etc.) public-political activity, which is not surprising knowing the virulent web and grassroots background of the party.

The increased activity of the left could be due to a decrease in members, presuming that the most faithful members have stood by them. An interesting characteristic of LMP sympathisers is that they are the most active on the net, while in “real” (offline) participation they are the least active. There are no significant differences here between the parties, but there was 2–3 tenths of a difference between the average points on scales of 12, 14, and 6. The indifferents (neglect) – the group made up of uncertain – were, as a matter of course, significantly lower. We can see significant differences in several cases; on a scale of five, Fidesz was 4–5 tenths higher than the full sample average.

Table 28.

Presumed career perspective among party supporters (average points)  
 (View of the future: 1=not at all certain; 5=very certain; possibility for employment: 1=very unfavourable, 5=very favourable)

	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided	Complete sample
How certain do you see your future, how secure do you feel concerning your future?	3.43	3.81	3.49	3.36	3.42	3.47
According to your experiences how are the possibilities for employment in and around where you live with the degree and qualification that you will have?	3.05	3.58	3.01	3.07	3.13	3.15

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Similar to the 2013 study, once again, Fidesz voters saw their career perspectives much more favourably and are more confident concerning their futures. We continue to see two plausible reasons for this: It is possible that pro-government youth “see the world through rose-coloured glasses” (based upon their sources of information), but it also seems realistic that they turn to Fidesz because they are satisfied. The values of the supporters of the other parties are almost exactly the same: They all see their possibilities as mediocre.

**Table 29.**  
**Frequency of media consumption among party supporters average points, scale of 3**  
**(1=regularly; 2=occasionally; 3=never)**

	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided	Complete sample
Index.hu	1.58	1.96	1.93	1.72	1.86	1.84
Origo.hu	1.94	2.2	2.16	2.24	2.16	2.16
444.hu	2.12	2.53	2.45	2.14	2.4	2.37
Kuruc.info	2.85	2.87	2.47	2.85	2.84	2.77
Facebook	1.71	1.57	1.64	1.66	1.62	1.63
Commercial TV	2.03	2.05	2.03	2.29	2.24	2.17
Public TV	2.63	2.1	2.34	2.56	2.5	2.44
Public radio	2.6	2.33	2.53	2.53	2.61	2.55
Commercial radio	2.38	2.17	2.31	2.53	2.42	2.38
Dailies	2.52	2.45	2.56	2.53	2.63	2.57

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

One of the most important conclusions that can be drawn from Table 29 is the extent to which Facebook dominates the habits of political orientation among university and college students: 52 per cent collect political information regularly through Facebook,, 34 per cent occasionally do so, while only 14 per cent said they never do so. This is how we arrived at the 1.63 average, which shows that Facebook is more influential than any other media channel, including the most-read online portal, Index. In a 2013 Ipsos<sup>52</sup> youth study, even TV and web portals were somewhat ahead of the already popular Facebook as sources for political information. This means either the social media site has advanced over the past two years, or its use is more frequent among university and college students, or both. This phenomenon already explains many reasons for Jobbik's high support, which receives the most "likes" among university and college students on Facebook out of all the parties and youth organizations. We can also clearly see the dominance of Internet sources compared to television, and especially to radio and daily newspapers.

The prevalence and limits of party-based media consumption can be seen from the table as well. Left-wing supporters read 444 more, Jobbik supporters read kuruc.info, while Fidesz supporters are the most frequent consumers of public media. We can also see that novoting bloc informs itself one-sidedly: Both Index and Origo are more popular sources for all three political parties than the previously mentioned "party" media are.

52. <http://ipsos.hu/hu/news/leginkabb-a-tevebol-tajekozodnak-a-fiatalok>.

The Jobbik camp's dilution might be behind the fact that the highly hostile to Jobbik 444.hu and the explicitly Jobbik-friendly kuruc.info are almost equally frequently accessed by them. Aside from the infamous kuruc.info portal, left-wing students look at all sources on the net more than the average student does, which further strengthens the hypothesis that the most loyal supporters have stayed with the party. In the case of LMP, the situation is the other way around: Scores closer to the average characterize a wider, diverse audience for them.

### Choice of political values

In this sub-category we examine the relationship between party preference and choice of political values. First we look at self-placement along the left-right, liberal-conservative, and moderate-radical scale.

**Table 30.**  
The distribution of the left–right scale among party supporters. (percentages)

	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided	Complete sample
1 – left	9	1	1	3	2	2
2	25	2	1	14	2	6
3	31	5	5	17	9	11
4	25	23	24	49	62	45
5	8	35	30	14	16	20
6	3	27	26	3	7	12
7 – right		7	13	1	2	4
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Concerning the left-right scale, there are no surprising tendencies in the case of left-wing and Fidesz supporters: The majority of the former placed themselves to the left, the latter to the right, and the extremities were rather unpopular amongst them as well. In effect, the division of Jobbik voters was to be expected also; perhaps here what is worth mentioning is that even in their case, choosing the extreme right value was not too frequent, and every fourth student voting for the radical party chose the mean. It follows from LMP's self-definition that the mean value (4) was the most popular among those who prefer the green party, and at the same time they chose the left-wing value almost twice as much (34 per cent) than the right-wing value (18 per cent).

This is not necessarily a party-political manifestation; nevertheless it makes the hypothesis probable that some students who became disillusioned with the left – and especially with Együtt-PM – turned to LMP. In other words, left-wing students are relatively divided among LMP and left-wing parties. The green party took many of them away from MSZP, DK, Együtt and PM.

**Table 31.**  
Distribution of the liberal–conservative scale among party supporters. (percentages)

	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided	Complete sample
1 – liberal	12	–	3	14	4	6
2	31	11	10	25	15	16
3	12	9	10	25	16	15
4	29	36	39	25	49	40
5	9	20	18	10	10	13
6	6	18	11	1	5	7
7 – conservative	–	6	8	–	2	3
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

The next table is also interesting primarily because of the new parties. Most left-wing youth are liberal and most pro-government students are conservative (though the rate of those who mentioned the mean among them was also high). Given the origins of Fidesz, this may seem strange, but it is not to those who have followed their anti-liberal rhetoric over the past decades. It goes completely against the self-image of Jobbik, however, that among its student supporters only 37 per cent consider themselves conservative, 39 per cent place themselves in the middle, while 23 per cent position themselves on the liberal side! We called attention to this inconsistency already in 2012; at that time our explanation was that young people’s views are not yet mature and many are unaware of what these indicators mean. Voting for Jobbik is not done for ideological reasons therefore, but for habitual, organizational, or simply protest ones (RÓNA–SÖRÉS 2012). Most likely this has not changed, but according to a new interpretation it could also show Jobbik moving in the direction of a people’s party. In the case of LMP, once again, the data demonstrate that the left-wing/liberal element is much stronger among the party’s voter base than the conservative/right-wing one is (at least on the university level).

As the term liberal does not appear at all in the self-identification of the green party, we see a significant amount of inconsistency here as well between the party elite's choice and the masses' choice. The complete sample data show also that university students are divided if they have to choose between these two terms: Despite Churchill's famous saying, liberals are a minority compared to those who choose the mean value, but conservative values were chosen frequently as well. Naturally, uncertainty or aversion to labels can be behind this as well.

**Table 32.**  
Distribution of the moderate–radical scale among party supporters. (percentages)

	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided	Complete sample
1 – moderate	15	10	2	10	9	8
2	26	18	7	27	13	16
3	19	24	14	25	15	18
4	34	34	39	29	46	40
5	5	12	17	7	10	11
6	2	2	13	–	5	5
7 – radical	–	–	8	3	1	3
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculation).

The moderate-radical scale is the only one that herds the left-wing, pro-government and LMP supporters all into one place. The supporters of Jobbik actually do not stand out that much from this grouping either: Even among their followers the mean (39 per cent) is somewhat more popular than the radical side (38 per cent) and 23 per cent consider themselves moderate. This also indicates a camp that is moving in the direction of a people's party. In any case, the idea that being young goes hand-in-hand with being radical has proved to be completely false: Only 19 per cent of respondents considered themselves radical. We can see clearly from tables 7, 8, and 9 that uncertain voters did not contradict themselves in these choices either: The popularity of the mean value (4) within their circle matches their indifferent, disinterested, averse mentality. In the following table, respondents had to choose one label from the options listed.

Table 33.  
Party support based on political labels. (percentages)

	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided	A given label's frequency in the sample
Liberal, freethinking	14	8	8	25	45	27
European/Western	12	10	10	17	52	15
Conservative, traditionalist	2	29	26	3	40	7
Strong national sentiments	2	9	52	5	33	9
Order and stability	2	9	31	10	48	16
Green, environmentalist	5	2	24	20	50	13
Religious, believer	2	32	17	13	36	7
Complete sample	8	12	20	15	44	100

Note: the question was the following: "The following political ideas can be characteristic of how people think. Choose the one that is closest to your mentality!"

The Christian Democrat, left-wing, radical and Social Democrat labels were only mentioned by 1-3 per cent of the respondents; therefore we did not include them in the Table

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations)

The first thing we can learn from Table 33 is that there is a strong but far from deterministic correlation between identifying with political indicators and party choice. A majority of students were "consistent" in their two preferences, but a substantial number were absolutely not: Many would vote for a party that does not propagate – or is even hostile to – the ideological values they chose. It can be seen as the left-wing parties' complete failure that only 12–14 per cent of liberal and Western-oriented students would vote for them (who comprise 42 per cent of the sample). Even support for Fidesz and Jobbik is almost the same among this group; LMP, however is significantly more popular among them.

The relatively high number of uncertain students indicates the left-wing parties' crisis as well: They should be as successful among this group as the right-wing parties are in the strong national sentiments, conservative or religious camps. What might cause Fidesz a headache, however, is that most members of the quite large group who prefer order chose Jobbik, not the governing party. LMP can be disappointed because a larger portion of green-oriented youth chose the radical party than chose LMP. This is the success of Jobbik and its catch-all strategy. It is also easy to see how diverse the camps of Jobbik and LMP are: Aside from a few exceptions, they received votes from all groups.

In the following section we asked respondents to express their relationship towards democracy and dictatorship. The supporters of all opposition parties were dissatisfied with the current workings of democracy; only pro-government voters spoke more favourably of it. This definitely underscores that, from a certain perspective (relationship towards the system) pro-government students can be considered loyal to the system while opposition voters belong to the category of voice (according to Hirschman). The data in Table 34 show that choices between democracy and dictatorship are even more telling.

**Table 34.**  
Perception of the democratic political system and of dictatorship  
by party support (percentages)

	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided	Total
System loyal	62	55	33	65	43	47
System indifferent	23	24	37	21	37	32
System critical	15	21	30	15	21	21
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Like our earlier studies, unconditional supporters of democracy are a relative but not absolute majority this year as well (their proportion grew somewhat). Broken down by parties, only Jobbik voters show a different picture: Proportions of pro-democracy students are much lower within their circle and are divided almost in equal proportions among the three options. We cannot provide a new answer for this compared to what we have given for the earlier waves of research: Jobbik has expressed its scepticism towards democracy repeatedly, thereby conditioning its voters to accept criticism and/or indifference toward it. We would like to stress, however (also based on our previous studies) that these answers do not necessarily represent clear-cut preferences, but could represent emotions and disappointment. Many express their disappointment with the current system in this way without thinking about what the alternative of a dictatorship would mean.

This could also be a form of voice in the sense of Hirschman. In our survey, similar to previous waves of research, we included statements measuring authoritarianism (based on the F-scale of Adorno), social responsibility, leader cult, pro-order and anti-'Gypsy' sentiments.

**Table 35.**  
Average points of agreement with political statements by party supporters - scale of 5  
(1=does not agree at all; 5=agrees completely)

	Left	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	Undecided	Complete sample
"Children have to learn that obedience and respect for authority are most important."	2.92	3.86	3.72	3.06	3.38	3.42
"People should take responsibility for themselves instead of the State."	3.35	3.56	3.4	3.59	3.44	3.46
"The country needs strong leaders, not political programmes."	2.58	3.06	3.55	2.82	3.01	3.06
"Most impoverished people are responsible for their own impoverishment."	2.22	2.62	2.57	2.19	2.34	2.39
"Increased rigour is necessary for public order protection: Order is more important than criminals' rights."	3.31	3.71	3.92	3.37	3.54	3.59
"Men's job is to make money; the wife should deal with the children and the household."	1.77	2.45	2.3	1.78	2.08	2.1
"Propensity for crime is in the 'Gypsies' blood."	2.65	2.83	3.55	2.07	2.60	2.74
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

We found few surprising elements in the average points among left-wing respondents. Similar to previous results, they rejected a strong leader and emphatically stood by women's emancipation. Concerning anti-'Gypsy' and pro-order sentiments, these were not alien to left-wing students, as it is logical as well that they view the impoverished as victims. The only thing that can be seen as uncommon is that they chose values close to the mean for the second statement, even though the left-wing ideology calls for an increased state role. It is striking that, aside from two statements, LMP supporters' views hardly differ from left supporters' views. The more empathetic approach toward Roma comes from the party's message; however, the moderate level for personality cult rejection does not come from the party's message, which shows the party's diversity. The high conformity level is one of the many signs that among university students LMP has taken voters mainly from the left.

There is also a high level of similarity between the Fidesz and Jobbik averages: pro-order sentiments, the fact that they blame the impoverished to a greater extent for their impoverishment, and the fact that they would restrict women to a traditional role to a greater degree is characteristic for both parties. (Naturally, we interpret this divergence compared to the average, as most right-wing respondents reject statements blaming the poor and restricting women.) Jobbik supporters believe much more in the need for a strong leader and in the propensity for crime among Roma people than do pro-government supporters. Compared to previous results, the only change in their case is that they blame the less fortunate to a higher extent than the average; we did not experience this two years ago.

The last question concerning parties was what comes to mind for the respondents about the parties. We did not give options; here the students could free-associate (the questions were open-ended).

Table 36.

How well parties are known and associations made in connection with them (percentages)

	Fidesz	Jobbik	MSZP	LMP	DK	Együtt	PM
I don't know them	5	5	12	17	34	36	55
Can't think of anything	9	14	10	11	17	17	17
Knows them, answer could not be evaluated	87	82	78	72	50	47	29
Positive mentions	they want to do good, acceptable, normal	Patriot, national, order	-	Honest, balanced	Willingness to compromise, freedom	Have a chance, encouraging, possibility	Youthful, faithful to their views
Negative mentions	They steal, dictatorship, discredited	Extremist, racist (23 mentions compared to 41 two years ago)	Discredited, commies, "the past eight years"	Not serious, no chance, hippies/homosexuals/smoke weed	Discredited, not credible, commies, the Öszöd speech	No direction, uncertain, powerless	powerless

The first thing that can be observed is how well the parties are known: We subtracted the frequency (first line) of the "I don't know them" replies and those who had no association with the given party (second line) and this is how we arrived at the rate for those answers that could be evaluated (third line), which is an indicator of how well the parties are known among university and college students. (Naturally there is no perfect indicator for this.) We can see from the data that the four parties that have parliamentary fractions stand out in this case, as even LMP is known by three-quarters of the students. At the same time, the left-wing parties face a significant challenge; the names of former prime ministers' parties are unknown by half of the students (DK and Együtt, Gyucsány's and Bajnai's parties).

We can also learn from the associations that, for Együtt and PM, the main risk is not antipathy but that they are seen as "powerless", "insignificant", and therefore negligible. For DK and especially for MSZP the real problem is not that they were seen as "yesterday's news" and not credible in most students' eyes, but that even their own voters did not seem enthusiastic about them. Only some of their voters could mention a truly positive association in connection with them. This, if not to the same extent, is also an existing phenomenon for Fidesz as well. It is not the negative comments that could be expected that pose a challenge for them, but the fact that many supporters gave positive answers from which it seems that even they are not really satisfied with the government but do not see a better alternative ("they want to do good", "acceptable"). It also raises doubts concerning the long term loyalty of LMP's supporters that the most frequent positive mentions do not resonate with the party's policies, but with the fact that it is not corrupt and did not form an alliance with either the left or the right. The party's main advantage is that they have a clean record. This is another proof of voice. At the same time (and in the case of LMP as well), there is also the risk of becoming like Együtt and PM: Many think that they are not serious and do not stand a chance. With Jobbik, though, both the negative and the positive mentions show a form of success. The positive ones show enthusiasm and identification with the main messages of the party ("order" and "patriotism"), but what is new is the decrease in negative comments. In 2013, 41 per cent of respondents associated comments such as "racist", "Nazi", "fascist", "aggressive", and "extremist" with the radical party; by 2015, only 23 per cent associated Jobbik with such descriptors. We already had several indirect proofs of Jobbik's catch-all strategy ("cuteness campaign") and its success, but this is the best example of this phenomenon to date. Aside from protest motivations, the motivations of political loyalty, or at least enthusiasm (which can indicate loyalty) were most prevalent for Jobbik.

In the concluding part of our analysis we ran logistic regression models: This is a multivariate statistical method that shows to what extent each separate explanatory variable affects the dependent variable (having controlled for the interactions of the other variables). The dependent variable in the four models was voting for each of the four political forces, and all the variables used in the chapter were included as independent variables in the models. We only listed significant explanatory variables in the Table These are those which, when all other factors remain unchanged, have the greatest effect on party preferences.

**Table 37.**  
**Logistic regression analysis of party supporters.**  
**Voting for the given party is the dependent variable.**

	Jobbik		LMP		Fidesz		Left	
Nagelkerke R2	0.424		0.31		0.485		0.419	
Significant variables and odds ratios (Exp Beta)	Parents' educational attainment	0.828	Green label	14.71	Green label	0.091	Christian Democrat, conservative, religious label	0.1
	Under 21	1.662	Foreign studies	0.402	Employment	1.598	Pro-order label	0.039
	Left-right	1.788	Left-right	0.75	Left-right	1.47	Green label	0.197
	Moderate-radical	1.264	Liberal-conservative	0.707	Moderate-radical	0.725	Parents' educational attainment	1.299
	Satisfaction with democracy	0.55	Democracy vs. Dictatorship	0.679	Satisfaction with democracy	4.524	Currently employed	1.694
	Kuruc.info	0.36	Origo	1.654	Kuruc.info	2.435	Left-right	0.396
	Commercial TV	0.64	Roma and crime	0.64	Facebook	0.626	Satisfaction with democracy	0.506
	Roma and crime	1.472			Public TV	0.527	Commercial TV	0.508
							Public TV	2.275

Dependent variable: Vote for a particular party.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

An odds ratio above 1 increases the likelihood of a respondent voting for a party and an odds ratio less than 1 decreases the likelihood of a respondent voting for a party. Concerning parental educational attainment, the higher value means a higher degree of education; therefore, Jobbik's value below 1 means that the party is more popular among parents with lower levels of education. Concerning the under-21 variable, the higher value means that the respondent is under 21 years old and support for the party is higher amongst them. Concerning the left-right, liberal-conservative, moderate-radical scale, the higher level tended toward the right, the conservative and the radical: One unit move to the right on a scale of seven raises the odds of voting for Jobbik 1.788 times. Concerning satisfaction with democracy, since the higher value means satisfaction, Jobbik supporters are more dissatisfied than average. Concerning media consumption, the higher value means more regular consumption; therefore, the below 1 odds ratio shows that the given channel increases the odds of party support, while the odds ratio above 1 decreases it. Jobbik supporters use kuruc.info and public television news more frequently than others.

Concerning the statement that "crime is in 'Gypsies' blood" the higher value means agreement; therefore, a positive answer here increases the odds of voting for Jobbik. Concerning political labels, the above 1 number increases the odds of voting for a party and the below 1 number decreases it. For foreign study, the smaller number means that the student has such experience; therefore, LMP performed better among those who had studied abroad.

The Nagelkerke  $R^2$  values of the first line mean to what extent the whole model explains the standard deviation of voting for a party. The values seem strong enough within the political sociological standards, aside from those for LMP, which counts as only a medium-strength model. The support for LMP can only be 31 per cent explained according to the variables used in this analysis. Identifying with the green label has the most robust effect: Green students are almost 15 times more likely to vote for the party than others. Aside from this, the rest of the variables once again underline the party's left-wing nature: The student voters of LMP are more likely than average to be liberal, left-wing, those who reject the statement that "crime is in the blood of Roma people", and those who prefer democracy to dictatorship. Their main source of information is Origo.

The variables appearing at Jobbik corroborate the results gained from earlier studies. According to their results, the appeal of Jobbik is predominantly not in its policy initiatives or ideology, but in its subculture (reading kuruc.info, under 21-year-olds), in its protest-nature (dissatisfaction with the current workings of democracy), and in habitual, community-based identification with the party (radicalism, right-wing). Aside from being pro-order, it is based on condemning Roma people and affects not so much those who are impoverished, but rather first-generation college students. The shift towards becoming a people's party is also shown by the fact that their supporters frequently watch the commercial media news which give relatively small airtime to the party compared to its size.

The model fit best with Fidesz, and the main reason for this is that pro-government students are much more satisfied with the workings of democracy than other students and (perhaps in relation to this) see their prospects for employment more positively than other students. As a result of their satisfaction, the loyals category fits them best. Besides rejecting the green and radical labels, they naturally place themselves to the right. Their avoidance of kuruc.info and their above-average consumption of public television are not surprising; what is surprising, however, is that they use Facebook the most.

Among the left-wing parties' followers there is a high chance we will find students who are better- situated (parents with diplomas, students currently employed). Besides this, they are more dissatisfied with democracy, watch public television less frequently and watch commercial news more. It is not surprising that they place themselves to the left and that an overwhelming majority of them reject pro-order and conservative labels. What is somewhat surprising is that they reject the green label as well.

## Green orientation and gender aspects

In the final part of our analysis we look at two highlighted aspects of our essays: The relationship between green orientation, gender and students' political views and public/political activities.

Concerning preference for the green political label, we can mainly say that there is only a very modest relationship with the variables that appeared in our survey: Our logistic regression model could only explain 13 per cent of the standard deviation. The most significant result is exactly this lack of pronounced correlations. The only strong correlation was that women were 2.2 times as likely to choose this political identity. Aside from this, those students who were less interested in politics, saw their possibilities for employment as favourable, reject authoritarianism and pro-order ideology are accept green orientation somewhat more, but these effects are rather weak as well. The remaining variables concerning demographics, attitudes and public activities do not have a significant relationship with the choice of the green label.

**Table 38.**  
Determinants of choosing the green political label (logistic regression analysis)

		Identifying as green	
Nagelkerke R2		0.134	
Significant variables and odds ratios (Exp Beta)	Female	2.193	
	Employment	0.740	
	Political interest	0.784	
	Authoritarianism	0.757	
	Pro-order	1.416	

A higher than 1 odds ratio increases the odds that the respondent will identify with the green label, while smaller than 1 will decrease the likelihood. Concerning employment, a higher value meant unfavourable possibilities. Therefore, those students were more likely to identify with the green label who saw their employment possibilities as favourable. Concerning interest in politics, the higher value means more intensive interest, so greens were more likely to come from those less interested in politics. Authoritarianism means agreement with the statement that "Children must learn that obedience and respect for authority is the most important." Pro-order means agreement with the statement that: "Increased rigour is needed for the protection of public safety:

Order is more important than the criminals' rights."

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Just as we do not have a characteristically different green political profile, there is no specific female political preference either. We could see earlier as well that women chose LMP and the green label at above average rates and chose Jobbik in smaller proportions. More women are dedicated (51 per cent) to democracy as a political system than men (43 per cent), women rather reject the leader cult and pro-order mentality, and naturally support women's emancipation more. Further differences are more modest political interest among women and less regular news consumption, which is paired with a minimally lower propensity to vote and lower online/offline political activity.

**Table 39.**  
Significant differences between the experiences and opinions of men and women  
(percentages within the individual genders)

	Male	Female
Studied abroad previously	9	13
Agrees: democracy is superior to all other political systems	43	51
Agrees: The country needs strong leaders, not political programmes	37	31
Agrees: Increased rigour is necessary for the protection of public order: Order is more important than criminals' rights	59	53
Agrees: It is a man's job to make money; the wife should deal with the children and the household	17	9
Will certainly refrain from voting	48	45

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

**Table 40.**  
**Command of language, possibilities for employment, political interest, organizational connections and online/offline activity according to gender**

	Male	Female
Command of language	3.8	4.1
How certain do you see your future? (1=not certain at all; 5=very certain)	3.57	3.38
What are the possibilities for employment? (1=very unfavourable; 5=very favourable)	3.25	3.05
Political interest (1=not at all; 5=very interested)	2.85	2.58
Organizational connections	1.3	1.3
Offline activity	3	2.7
Online activity	1.8	1.5
left (1) – right (7)	4.41	4.18
liberal (1) – conservative (7)	3.79	3.65
moderate (1) –radical (7)	3.67	3.43

Note: language: In the case of each language we gave the following points 0=does not speak, 1=basic, 2=intermediate, 4=advanced. This is our summary for the five languages we asked about.

Organizational connection: We asked about connections to 12 types of organizations. Those respondents received the maximum of 12 points who were members of all 12. On average, students are members of slightly more than one organization.

See the descriptions of the specific types in the survey.

Offline and online activity: We gave 14 offline and 6 online activities. The average points show how many activities the voters for each party participate in on average.

See the descriptions in the survey.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

Compared to male students, women are slightly more left-wing, liberal and moderate; however, the difference can be seen much more in the fact that they chose the mean value (4) on the 1-7 scale in a higher proportion, which indicates uncertainty or even aversion towards the question. It is an interesting result that young women see their possibilities for employment more pessimistically than men their age do and are less confident concerning their future, even though a greater proportion speak languages and have more experience abroad than men do.

## Chapter conclusion

Compared to the studies two and four years ago, we were enriched with several new insights concerning party choices by university and college students. First we have to state that the formerly strong protest mood – voice – has become more dominant, and this significantly contributed to the increased support for Jobbik and LMP. Besides the movements and subcultures behind the two parties (the *kuruc.info* and Critical Mass generations) the primary reason these parties were able to reach so many youth is because they are seen as fresh - they haven't been in government before. In the countryside, Jobbik also collected many protest votes, while in larger cities those votes went to LMP.

Habitual, emotional, community-identity motivations explain the attraction of these two new parties much more than ideological-policy reasons. On the one hand, we saw for questions concerning policy and value preferences that LMP's audience is hardly different from the left-wing parties' audience, while Jobbik's is barely distinguishable from the Fidesz audience. On the other hand, in many cases we could find significant inconsistencies between a party's self-definition and ideology their voters's ideologies. Among Jobbik supporters, many self-identified as liberal, green, moderate, or uncertain students (who therefore placed themselves in the middle of the different scales). Most Jobbik supporters do not inform themselves from *kuruc.info*, but rather from Facebook and public television news. LMP's student support base is mostly liberal, Western, and left-wing, even though the party elite does not propagate these ideas at all. The positive associations concerning the party mainly had to do with the party's clean record rather than its ideology.

The socio-demographic background of Jobbik and LMP reveals diversity as well: The only group among which LMP could not take root was religious students, whereas Jobbik did worse than average among women and older students with higher levels of training, but did manage to improve its positions even in those groups. Jobbik's catch-all strategy and its success is most visible in the decrease of negative associations with it (Nazi, fascist, aggressive, etc.).

As was the case two years ago, in 2015 Fidesz did the best among religious, relatively well-off, privileged students who were optimistic about their careers. Naturally, they are the least dissatisfied with the system, although it is definitely a warning sign for the governing party that many who had a positive association with it said the party was "better than nothing": Therefore, while Fidesz voters are loyal to both the party and the government, there can be doubts about the durability and relentlessness of their loyalty. It is also a sign of concern for the government that the majority of pro-order students and those with strong national sentiments have been taken away from them by Jobbik. At the same time, it would be a mistake to think the "Tusványos generation" is passive: Generally they have the most organizational membership, they inform themselves the most from Facebook, and their virtual (comments, shares) and actual (demonstrations, petitions) political activity does not lag behind other parties, which is somewhat surprising given that these are primarily opposition participation genres. All in all, Fidesz followers displayed balanced, "omnivorous" media consumption and a similar extent of activity.

Recent political developments have led to a dramatic retreat by the left among university and college students. Most indicators showed that only the most loyal supporters stayed with the parties; they disappeared almost completely from among rural students, first-generation college students, and poorer students. The fact that many university students would be open to the values they represent also shows their spectacular failure. There are many left-wing, liberal, Western, anti-authoritarian, progressive university and college students, and many turned to LMP or even to Jobbik, but most are not able to choose a party at the moment. The quick rise and fall of Együtt-PM shows that university and college students are open to new parties. With sufficient resources and visibility it is possible to gain their sympathies. Primarily, this is not an ideological question, as the radical right wing Jobbik could become successful the same way that the Bajnai-run formation representing its antithesis has, or LMP, which was once again near the "top" after 2011, could become successful as well. It seems, however, that it is only possible to retain youth voters if the party keeps an equal distance from the parties youth voters are bored and fed up with, namely, Fidesz and MSZP.

# Exit versus Voice

On behalf of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, our research group has examined in detail the potential for exit and voice among Hungarian university and college students, as well as what characterizes the world of political loyalists and political indifferentists (based on the theoretical framework of Albert O. Hirschman and his critics and followers). Practical testing of theory is exceptional within the international literature, and the testing phase that includes a longitudinal element in the analysis is especially unique. Of the questions and hypotheses described in the introduction, we have answered almost all of them in the separate subsections of this volume. However, the most important hypothesis could not be tested or addressed within the subsections, as first we had to review our own concepts and present what the most important processes are that we have found.

In contrast with Hirschman, our main hypothesis is that students can protest and entertain the thought of exit at the same time, instead of either protesting or exiting. Ultimately we are searching for an answer to whether exit truly bars protest among university students as Hirschman states in his classic work, *Exit, Voice, Loyalty*. According to our thesis this is not so. The same layers protest that would be most likely to choose the potential option of exit. Political loyalists, however, do not exit and only protest in certain, well-defined cases. As party or system supporters they cannot be placed in any of the main categories. We considered political indifferentists to be such passive actors for whom politics has no value - they do not vote and are destructive, which presumably presents itself in their low potential for exit as well. In this concluding chapter, therefore, we are not just mechanically summarizing our results, we are testing our main hypothesis.

We gave an exact description of all four terms used by us in the introduction. As a reminder, exit, according to our interpretation (and in line with the international migration literature) is actually, permanently leaving the country. Voice (as with Hirschman) is collective, direct, democratic action capable of addressing students. We examined online and offline protest separately.

The 2013 and 2015 university and college surveys by our research group are both equally suitable for testing the above theses. We decided to present and compare the results reflecting on the main problem for both years, while the detailed analysis is done in reference to the year 2015.

### Does exit bar voice?

We can test the hypothesis of whether exit truly bars the development of voice – as Albert O. Hirschman states in his classic 1970 study – through relatively simple methods. In our series of studies we asked university students in 2013 and 2015 whether they plan to study abroad. Besides this, each year we created the variable of collective action by using the same group of variables. In 2013 and 2015, those who chose the option of exit, that is, the proportion of those who planned to settle abroad permanently, was 35 and 42 per cent respectively. Those who chose voice (collective actives)<sup>53</sup> constituted 66 per cent in 2013, and in the spring of 2015, 59 . We can see from the data that the proportion of those who protested was significantly higher than those who chose exit.

At the same time, no connection could be shown in a statistical sense between exit and voice. We could also say that exit and voice are independent of each other, and this is true for both years examined. This finding is supported by the result of the correlation analysis<sup>54</sup> carried out between the two groups, shown in the following Table<sup>55</sup>. Therefore, it is possible to protest without someone thinking about the possibility of exit and vice versa - the potential for exit is not correlated to the potential for protest. The answer to our main question is, therefore, that while exit does not prohibit voice, it is also not conducive to it. These processes are possible to discuss as happening in parallel.

**Table 41.**  
The statistical relationship between those who exit and those who protest

	2013	2015
Pearson Correlation	-0.039	-0.039
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.177	0.300

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2013 and 2015 (own calculations).

Following the results summarized above, it is worth examining the data in detail as well. We only carried out a detailed analysis concerning those choosing exit and voice on the 2015 data, as the basic correlation between exit and voice is the same in both years.

53. For reasons of simplicity we only included offline activity in our analysis.

54. It should be noted that other statistical processes, e.g. Pearsons Chi-Square probe, result in similar outcomes as well.


55. In a statistical sense it is absolutely unique for two independent so-called cross-sectional studies to have exactly the same correlation between two variables.

## Exit and protest groups

Based on the relationship between exit and protest, four groups can be identified. The first group is made up of those who protest and exit, which make up a quarter of Hungarian university and college students. Besides planning to leave the country and settle permanently in another country, members of this group let their voice be heard in different (offline) collective forms of protest (they sign petitions, demonstrate, boycott, etc.). The other clear-cut group is those who do not protest and do not wish to exit. They are almost as numerous as members of the first group (23 per cent). Close to half of Hungarian university and college students are made up of layers where the relation between exit and protest does not show up as one being considered the alternative of the other.

The 36 per cent of Hungarian students who protest but do not think of exit are a more complex (mixed) group, while the remaining 17 per cent is the opposite of this, i.e., passive, but with potential for exit. Now we will look at the groups in further detail.

Figure 5.  
Groups of voice and exit. (percentages)



Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2013 and 2015 (own calculations).

Most traditional socio-demographic dimensions do not explain inclusion in these separate groups, i.e., the dimensions of gender (it is worth noting that among women there are somewhat more who do not exit and do not protest), permanent address (there are more non-exit, non-protest students within villages), fathers' educational attainment or view of the future and perceived future employment. Subjective perceptions of financial circumstances, however, are significant. According to our data, those students who are in a better financial situation can be found at above average rates in the "mixed" group, while those who are in a worse financial situation can be found more in the non-exit, non-protest groups. Members of the group that exit and protest are overrepresented among students who basically "make ends meet by budgeting well".

Institution type also seems to be an important aspect. Students at church-funded institutions are highly overrepresented among the non-exit, non-protest group, but students at private institutions can be found in higher than the average proportions among those who exit but do not protest. Most students in Hungarian higher education attend state universities, these students seem to strengthen the groups of voice, be they exit or non-exit in nature. Last but not least, state-funded colleges (as opposed to state-funded universities) strengthen the group of those who chose to exit.

Based on the logic of the previous chapters, it is worth examining the relationship of the groups that exit and protest towards the democratic system<sup>56</sup> and the political parties, as both factors play a significant role in the description of indifferents and loyals. Our analysis found the surprising result that, in itself, the relationship towards democracy and dictatorship (that is system loyalty, system indifference and system critique) did not influence the positions of exit and voice. The two dimensions are independent of one another. Perhaps it is safe to make the observation that among the group of students who do not exit but protest, system criticals have an above-average proportion.

As opposed to attitudes toward democracy, the two dimensions of positions along the ideological spectrum have a strong correlation with the groups that chose to exit or protest. Based on the ideological position measured on a 1-7 scale, it seems that those who exit and protest are the most left-wing and most liberal, while the non-exiting but protesting groups represent the other extremity and are the most right-wing and conservative. Students' positions on the moderate-radical scale, however, surprisingly did not affect belonging to the groups of exit and voice. The groups that exit but do not protest basically follow the sample average, while the non-exit, non-protest groups move slightly to the right of the sample.

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56. The students can be placed in three categories: system loyals, those who accept democracy as the best political system; system indifferents, for whom all political systems are the same; and finally, system criticals, who can accept dictatorship instead of democracy under certain conditions.

Table 42.  
Distribution of those who exit and protest (average values)

Groups that exit and protest	left–right (1–7)	liberal–conservative (1–7)	moderate–radical (1–7)*
Do not exit, do not protest	4.4	3.9	3.4
Do not exit but protest	4.5	4.0	3.7
Exit but do not protest	4.3	3.6	3.5
Exit and protest	4.0	3.3	3.4
Total	4.3	3.7	3.5

left–right:  $F=6.258$ ,  $Sig=0.000$ ,  $\eta^2=0.163$ . / liberal–conservative:  $F=7.993$ ,  $Sig=0.000$ ,  $\eta^2=0.183$ .

\* moderate–radical:  $F=2.246$ ,  $Sig=0.082$ ,  $\eta^2=0.098$ . Non-significant correlation.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

What does the above-described relationship mean? It seems that since an identical, consistent ideology connects the layers created by those who exit and/or protest, there might be a specific behaviour or mentality behind them. If we examine the groups based on political value labels, we can get closer to characterizing these layers. The following statistically significant data set shows that value choices behind exit/protest are like a model:

1. For European/Western and liberal youth (who are rather centre-left oriented) support for exit is clear; at the same time, both groups appear among those who protest and those who do not. In their case, exit and voice can be complementary. Consistent with ideological attitudes and value choice, a small number of left-wing voters are strongly overrepresented (this is highest among them) within the exit and protest groups, 32 % versus the 24 % of the sample average.

In this case, the hypothesis we formulated in the introduction seems to be true, namely, that the actively protesting layers can also be layers that are actively thinking about potential exit.

2. Those with strong national sentiments who are conservative and religious make up the opposite extremity. Perhaps their potential for protest is low due to their principles; however, certain sub-groups here may protest. When this happens depends (according to them) mainly on their party loyalty. The right-wing conservative, Christian youth tend to be Fidesz voters; therefore, their potential for protest is related to special issues, to the actions of certain members of the civil network connected to Fidesz, or to earlier topics. Fidesz voters are significantly overrepresented among non-exit students: 28 per cent of them are non-exit and non-protest, but a further 43 per cent have participated in a collective protest at one time or another. Students with strong national sentiments, as well as pro-order youth, tend to vote for the radical opposition Jobbik party; therefore, their potential for protest seems to be higher. It is no accident that many Jobbik voters, 43 per cent, do not exit, but protest, that is, they do not want to leave the country because they identify as patriots, but have a voice and are an active layer.

In this case, we hold our statement to be valid concerning political loyals – political loyals do not leave the country and only protest in certain well-defined cases. We can see, however, that in the case of political loyals we have to make an important distinction, as political affiliation (more precisely, the government-opposition conceptual duo) intersects these clear categories. This is especially important to note concerning left and right-wing opposition. Those supporting left-wing opposition parties belong to the first category, while right-wing opposition voters can be found in the second category.

3. The students who identify with green, environmentalist values are basically divided equally; therefore, their characteristics are not completely clear and are difficult to define. At the same time, LMP voters strengthen the exit camp, be they those who exit and protest, or who exit but do not protest.

**Table 43.**  
Distribution of those who exit and protest based on value labels  
(percentages among those who could give an answer)

	liberal, freethinking	European/ Western	Christian Democrat, religious	Conservative, traditionalist	Strong nationalist sentiments	Order and stability	Green
Non exit, non protest	22	8	11	13	11	16	13
Non exit, protest	21	12	16	6	11	18	13
Exit but do not protest	32	18	5	7	5	15	15
Exit and protest	34	21	4	4	5	15	14
Total	26	14	10	8	9	16	14

Pearson Chi-Square: 59.880; sig: 0.000. Cramer V: 0.169.

Source: Active Youth in Hungary Research Group, 2015 (own calculations).

The above analysis did not take into consideration one aspect: The group that we considered politically indifferent who we presumed did not commit themselves, were not interested, do not vote, are destructive, and who we presumed to appear at a low level for potential exit. Within the four categories of voice and exit, indifferents appear (naturally) in just two groups: In the non-exit, non-protest group, and the exit, but non-protest group. The distribution of these two groups is interesting, however: 51 per cent of indifferents do not exit and do not protest, while 49 per cent exit despite protesting. That is, the assumption that formulated indifferents as completely destructive was not completely accurate. Some indifferents can choose exit, while at the same time these groups visibly do not wish to participate in the forming the political system.

The study does not end with this volume. Due to the migrant crisis there is a marked increase in prejudice within the region, and – perhaps it is not an exaggeration – within Europe as a whole. It seems that partially for this reason, authoritarianism seems to be gaining in appreciation again in society. The political processes seem to be shifting in the authoritarian direction. It would be worth examining the roots of these processes that concern socialization. It may be a decisive step for this to take our cross-sectional studies to a higher level and make an attempt to start a new student panel study.

# Research methodology

This research has applied qualitative and quantitative methods of empirical social science research to this question. We did 10 in-depth interviews with Hungarian students linked to higher education studying abroad (at Austrian, German, Swiss and British campuses). The purpose was to investigate what they think of democracy and politics and what their motives are for studying abroad. Qualitative techniques were used to provide a more in-depth exploration of the relationships discovered. The interviews lasted 50 minutes on average.

In July 2015 we also did 55 in-depth interviews with Hungarian university and college students with order to receive answer to the question of what they think about the concept of democracy.

Examinations of new issues and problems were also built into the second stage of our analysis within these interviews and focus group discussions. For example, during the empirical stage, student emigration and the permissive attitudes of youth towards dictatorship were closely examined.

In April 2015 an empirical survey was conducted utilizing a sample of **800 students**. All **people** were asked to answer questions via **face-to-face interviews**. The face-to-face interviews took place in 35 institutions across Hungary. The aspects and considerations of weighting were:

- The composition of the institution's faculty;
- The distribution of men and women within the faculty;
- The distribution of the levels of training within the institution and the faculty (university-college, BA, MA, undivided training, PhD).

The margin of error for the 800 person sample is  $\pm 3.5$  percentage points (with a 95 % confidence interval) in the course of examin in the submanifolds; however, the margin of error could be even higher.

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# Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Exit – Voice – Loyalty – Neglect	11.
Figure 2. Exit – Voice – Loyalty – Neglect	16.
Figure 3. Worked abroad? Based on father’s educational attainment where we do not know mother (percent)	32.
Figure 4. Online participation in 2015 (“Yes” answer, percentages)	61.
Figure 5. Groups of voice and exit (percentages)	97.
Table 1. The ten largest sending states (1975–2005)	20.
Table 2. Hungary and the top 10 countries according to a few highlighted indicators	22.
Table 3. Distribution of students participating in Erasmus-programmes	23.
Table 4. Have you studied abroad?	25.
Table 5. What sort of preparations have you made in order to achieve your plans abroad? Percentage of mentions. Several options could be marked	28.
Table 6. Groups that would like to settle abroad in a higher proportion than the average. Percentages.	29.
Table 7. “Why would you like to live abroad?” Percentage of answers in 2013 and 2015	30.
Table 8. Binary logistic regression model for settling abroad permanently	33.
Table 9. Student answers characteristic of different interpretations (What does democracy mean for you?)	41.
Table 10. Group positions on the ideological scales (averages)	44.
Table 11. Prevalence of political ideas (percentages)	45.
Table 12. Socio-demographic characteristics of groups (percentages)	47.
Table 13. Offline protest and relationship to the system (percentages)	49.
Table 14. Online protest and relationship to the system (percentages)	50.
Table 15. The proportion of social dimension elements within groups of satisfaction levels (percentages)	52.
Table 16. The binary logistic model of organization	55.
Table 17. Collective (offline) participation among Hungarian university and college students between 2013 and 2015 (percentages)	57.
Table 18. The binary logistic model of protest	59.
Table 19. Protest and relationship to the system (percentages)	59.
Table 20. Comparison of collective offline and online activity (percentages)	62.

Table 21. The binary logistic model of online protest	65.
Table 22. Online protest and the relationship towards the system (percentages)	65.
Table 23. Comparison of offline collective and online activity (percentages)	67.
Table 24. Support for parties based on gender, age, permanent residence, religion and financial situation (percentages)	73.
Table 25. Support for parties according to parental educational attainment (percentages)	74.
Table 26. Support for parties according to fields of study (percentages)	75.
Table 27. Command of language, organizational connection, and online/ offline activity among party supporters (average points)	77.
Table 28. Presumed career perspective among party supporters (average points). (View of the future: 1=not at all certain; 5=very certain; possibility for employment: 1=very unfavourable, 5=very favourable)	78.
Table 29. Frequency of media consumption among party supporters. (average points, scale of 3, with 1=regularly; 2=occasionally; 3=never)	79.
Table 30. Distribution of the left–right scale among party supporters (percentages)	80.
Table 31. Distribution of the liberal–conservative among party supporters (percentages)	81.
Table 32. Distribution of the moderate–radical scale among party supporters (percentages)	82.
Table 33. Party support based on political labels (percentages)	83.
Table 34. Perception of the democratic political system and dictatorship among party supporters (percentages)	84.
Table 35. The average points of agreement with political statements among party supporters (scale of 5 where 1=oes not agree at all; 5=agrees completely)	85.
Table 36. How well parties are known and associations connected with them (percentages)	86.
Table 37. Logistic regression analysis among party supporters. Voting for the given party is the dependent variable	88.
Table 38. Determinants of choosing the green political label. Logistic regression analysis.	90.
Table 39. Significant differences between the experiences and opinions of men and women (percentages within the individual genders)	91.
Table 40. Command of language, possibilities for employment, political interest, organizational connection and online/offline activity according to gender	92.

Table 41. The statistical relationship between those who exit and those who protest	96.
Table 42. Distribution of those who exit and protest (average values)	99.
Table 43. Distribution of those who exit and protest based on value labels (percentages among those who could give an answer)	100.

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## About the Active Youth in Hungary Research Group

The Active Youth in Hungary Research Group is a civil, independent research team founded in 2011 and is specialized in youth research, especially about university and college students. Research conducted by the Active Youth in Hungary Research Group follow the results of previous Hungarian and international youth studies and allow for comparison of various aspects, in particular the effects of the economic crisis that broke out in 2008.

The present book is a result of three research phases conducted by the research group. The first research phase (which received widespread media coverage) took place in December 2011 – February 2012. The second phase was conducted in March–April, 2013 and the third in March 2014.

The head of the research team is Andrea Szabó, PhD.

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*Two years have passed since the publication of the study "Political Orientations, Values and Activities of Hungarian University and College Students", in which we analyzed the questions of whether in a democratic system a generation of new democrats could emerge, and to what extent Hungarian youth is committed to democracy as a system of rule. This current volume of the study further examines existing and new tendencies of Hungarian youth regarding their political choices and the reasons behind them. While previously only students who reside in the country were in the focus, the scope of this recent study has been extended to include the political involvement and attitudes of that part of the Hungarian youth who already are emigrating or are planning to soon move abroad. The title, "Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect – Political Attitudes of Hungarian University and College Students" reflects a possible alignment of the various paths of political behavior observed within this generation.*

*What are the attitudes of youth in Hungary towards democracy, and how active are they in politics? What are their party preferences, and how involved are they with public life? Are they planning to leave the country, and if so, do they become less or more engaged with Hungarian politics from abroad? This study explores such questions and attempts to place the findings into a theoretical framework developed for this purpose using the categories of exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect, based on the terminology established by Albert O. Hirschman and his critics and followers.*

*We hope that the empirical findings of this study can help the work of policy-makers and other professionals who are committed to democratic values and are striving to find answers to the political challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.*