

Political Orientations, Values and Political Activities of Hungarian University and College Students

2013 Szabó Andrea (ed)



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Political Orientations, Values and Political Activities of Hungarian University and College Students 2013
Active Youth in Hungary Research Group

Edited: Szabó Andrea

On behalf of The Heinrich Böll Foundation

POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS, VALUES AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
OF HUNGARIAN UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE STUDENTS

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Preface

The following volume was written on behalf of the Heinrich Böll Foundation concerning the Hungarian part-time university and college students' political orientations, values, and their relationship to democracy. The following analysis is based primarily on the results of the research led by Andrea Szabó, PhD, and executed by Active Youth in Hungary Research Group in 2013. Within the study there are several references made to the previous research of the same research group, conducted in 2012 with similar thematic (for details, see SZABÓ A. 2012).

The analysis assumed that Ronald Inglehart's results – published in his 1977 book, *The Silent Revolution* – which argued that educated young cohorts are trying to become more involved in the political decision-making processes, can be adapted to the case of post-communist Hungary as well. We assumed that a value orientation change has occurred among the Hungarian youth, namely that traditional values related to religion, social customs and norms are fading while new behaviour types are emerging due to economic, cultural, and political changes. One can observe a peaceful penetration of values related to self-realization and prestige. These values can be defined primarily culturally. Nearly 25 years have passed since the democratic revolution that took place in Hungary in 1989/1990. This time period is perhaps enough for a new generation to mature. A new generation that is democratic minded and active, which has a vision for the world and of public life, and where appropriate, is willing to explain and defend this vision. Former youth research results, however, also pointed out that next to the emergence of new more democratic, progressive, and green orientations of some young Hungarians, a radical revolution – embedded within sub-cultural roots of right-wing extremism – can also be perceived among the Hungarian youth. The key question to examine is which effect is stronger among Hungarian students: the western-type "silent revolution" or the radical „Hungarian path“ that offers quick and easy solutions?

Research Methodology

The research applied qualitative and quantitative methods of empirical social science research. As part of the qualitative study seven focus group discussions were organized at the country's major academic centres (Budapest, Debrecen, Pécs, Miskolc, Szeged and Győr). During the focus group discussions, characteristics of youth radicalism and post-materialistic values of the youth were tested and examined. Information was collected on student organizations working in universities, about the motivations of the youth's political participation and about the patterns of students' socialization.

Focus group interviews were completed through 20 in-depth interviews. These interviews were held with leaders of student self-governments and activists of youth NGO's linked to higher education. Qualitative techniques were used to provide a more in-depth exploration of the topic. Among the subjects of the 20 in-depth interviews there were student self-government leaders in higher education, activists of youth organizations, leaders of political parties youth sections.

There were also examinations of new issues and problems built into the second stage of our analysis within the interviews and focus group discussion. For example in the empirical stage, student emigration, and the youth's permissive attitudes towards dictatorships was closely examined.

In March-April of 2013 an empirical survey was conducted utilizing a sample of 1300 students.¹ The survey was conducted with a so called hybrid technique: 859 persons (66%) filled out the online survey at the www.aktivfiatalok.hu through the website, while another 441 persons (34%) were asked to answer questions via a face-to-face interviews.

Face-to-face interviews took place between 11th and 25th of April 2013 in 35 institutions across the country. Following the personal interviews, the results of the two different survey techniques were weighted for representativeness on a 3 dimensional, faculty-level. The aspects and considerations of weighting were:

- The composition of the institution's faculty;
- The distribution of men and women within the faculty;
- The distribution of the level of training within the institution and the faculty (university-college, BA, MA, undivided training, PhD).

The margin of error for a 1300 person sample is ± 2.9 percentage points (with a 95% confidence interval), in the course of the examination of the submanifolds; however, the margin of error can be even higher.

About the Structure of the Volume

This volume is a monograph that analyses the relationship between politics, values, and political orientations of the Hungarian university and college students in five chapters. The first chapter analyses their relationship to democracy and dictatorship, and asks how the Hungarian university and college students relate to the ideal and the "real" democracy. The second chapter examines the extent to which students are interested in the politics and public life. As is pointed out in later chapters repeatedly, political interest is a key factor for the activeness of young people, but is also plays a decisive role in the development of preferences, and even the ideological formation of value systems.

The third chapter examines the value system of Hungarian university and college students. The chapter begins with Inglehart's theory, and it tests how post-material and material values permeate the thinking of students. In connection with the post-materialistic value orientations, the most important features of "green students" are also explained. The fourth chapter describes the political activity of the population. The analysis distinguishes three political participation types (traditional, collective, and virtual) and utilizes the same methodology for examination purposes. Finally, the analysis concludes with a presentation of the overall political participation model.

The fifth section analyses the relationship of Hungarian university and college students to political parties. Among the youth the most popular parties are the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), Fidesz, and Együtt 2014–PM. Voters of these three parties are analysed in detail. The study concludes with a study summarizing the main findings of the research.

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 Budapest, November 2013.

Andrea Szabó Editor

1. The 2011/2012 Excel tables of the Higher Education statistics publication, published by the Ministry of Human Resources (EMMI) served as the basis of the quota

I. Students' Relationship to Democracy

Even in 2013, we Hungarians pity ourselves. It is true that there have been a lot of disappointments in our past, which we must remember, but it is time finally to move on. This continuous self-loathing is completely useless to us. It is what weakens Hungary, and the Hungarian Democracy. Perhaps our generation will change this tendency. (Tamás, focus group discussion, Szeged)

I. 1. Introduction

The following chapters of research interpretation examine how Hungarian youths perceive their country's current political climate, and how democracy (perceived and actual) compares to other forms of government. The text attempts to view and analyze the misunderstanding and dissatisfaction with democracy in Hungary, particularly among the youth. We begin this discussion of our research by reviewing the thoughts and opinions of Hungarian students about democracy and dictatorship. This topic is especially of interest to us as it touches on many ideas, which are important to modern political systems, including civic duty, ideological values, and relationships between individuals and political parties. The answers to questions related to these aspects of the Hungarian political system will help shed light on what the Hungarian youth think about their own political system. As a first step in our research it is crucial to begin by examining an important question: do individuals who grow up in a democratic system think democratically?

Orit Ichilov, a prominent Israeli sociologist, wrote in 1990 that even if a generation grows up and matures in a democratic system, it is not guaranteed that that generation will accept a democratic philosophy, nor does it mean that a democratic culture will be reintroduced into their society (ICHILOV 1990). According to Ichilov, political socialization, or the active discussion and discourse about politics and political systems, is the most important goal in a democratic system, as it will prepare society for active participation in a democracy.

Studies related to Hungarian political socialization have traditionally focused on society's opinion of and relationship to the political systems of democracy and dictatorship. According to the *Iskola és Társadalom 2005*² study, high school students' understanding of democracy is highly passive. The teenagers in the study ranked personal security, privacy, and equality under the law as the most important components of Democracy. Despite their significance in an ideal democratic system, few students thought of multi-party systems, freedom to assemble, freedom of expression, or minority rights as an important characteristics of a well-functioning democratic system. The 2008 *Iskola és Társadalom* study did not find a significant change in young people's perception of these matters; personal and social rights continued to be seen as less important than personal and financial security by Hungarian youths. The data showed that young Hungarians had minimal solidarity for those in minorities and in poverty. The first time a study with a large sample was con-

2. Mihály Csákó 2007: Teens' view of democracy 1–3.

ducted pertaining to this topic was in 2008 (*Ifjúság2008*) (Youth2008). The study found that among 15–29 year olds, 14% believe that under certain conditions, dictatorships are superior to democracies; another third claimed that for them there is very little difference between living in a dictatorship and living in a democracy.

According to the data collected by the *Magyar Ifjúság 2012* (Hungarian Youth 2012) study, the percentage of Hungarian youth accepting democracy as the legitimate governing system was 40%, the same as in 2008 (SZABÓ A.—KERN 2011a, 53). There was also little change in the percentage of youth who did not see a difference between dictatorship and democracy (30% in 2012, and 33% in 2008). Those who thought dictatorships were better under certain conditions decreased by nine percentage points to 5%. It is important to note, however, that the percentage of those who did not disclose their beliefs was especially high in 2012 (24%), and it is possible that many of these individuals actually prefer dictatorships, and were uncomfortable disclosing this information.

When the results are sorted by educational background we find that almost a quarter (24%) of those who have less than a high school education could not answer questions relating to the comparison of democracy and dictatorship, and that this proportion is even worse among those who have finished professional schools and apprenticeships (40%). These statistics support the claim made by many studies that the primary education system does not fulfill the role of forum for political socialization, or democratic socialization (SZABÓ I.—ÖRKÉNY 1998, CSÁKÓ 2004, 2008). Other recent studies regarding the lack of democratic socialization in the professional education system (SZABÓ A.—KERN 2010) further support this conclusion.

To contextualize the surveys we have just summarized, it is important to compare the views found therein to the views of adult populations within the European Union member states. In the fall of 2012, Standard Eurobarometer³ conducted a survey, which included the question "How satisfied are you with democracy in your home country?" Hungary ranked in the bottom third of the countries for this question: 29% of respondents were satisfied, while 70% were dissatisfied with democracy in their home country. In the European Union as a whole, the results were significantly more promising: on average 49% of the respondents were satisfied, and 49% were dissatisfied. The happiest nation was Denmark, where 90% of respondents were satisfied. On the other end of the spectrum in Greece, a mere 11% of the respondents reported satisfaction with democracy in Greece. In Eastern Europe, the Poles expressed satisfaction rates similar to the EU average (48%–47%), while the Czechs and the Slovaks (30%–70% and 29%–70% respectively) had very similar opinions to the Hungarians. The Bulgarians (24%–74%), and especially the Romanians (13%–85%) were even more dissatisfied than the Hungarians.

3. Standard Eurobarometer 78. 2012 fall, 53. page http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_en.htm

I. 2. The Most Important Results from the Interviews and Focus Group Discussions.

For the Aktív Fiatalok Magyarországon 2013 (Active Youth Hungary 2013) study, twenty interviews were conducted with youth and civil movement leaders, and seven focus group discussions were held in the country's largest university towns. Before we begin our analysis of the survey's results, it is important to share the thoughts and predictions of our interviewees regarding young Hungarians' attitudes towards democracy and dictatorship.

During the series of interviews we conducted, we asked all of our interviewees what democracy meant to them.

I think I speak for everyone when I say that democracy is very important to us. Relatively little is discussed about democracy at the state level, but rather there is more of a focus on civil-level-democracy, or "basis democracy", at the micro-society level, as well as a focus on the freedom to express and represent yourself at the local level. I think it is understandable that we often ostracize those organizations that openly exhibit a hierarchical system, because we find those unfair. I think this whole story begins from here. We are very self-reflecting in this sense, and when we feel that we are oppressing each other, or we are not listening to certain rural cells, or we are not inquiring about them, then we tend to discuss it. (A.,⁴ Hallgatói Hálózat [Student Network]⁵).

Practically speaking, the point of Democracy is that an opinion, a stance, cannot be forced onto people through power, but rather through reason and logic. If someone claims something, if someone would like to say something, he or she must also answer the question of why. The practical essence of democracy is the clash of opposing opinions through human logos, pathos, and ethos and the process of providing a forum for the debate and discussion of these opinions and claims; democracy means that everyone has the right to say what he or she wants to say or claim, and everyone has the right to judge according to their convictions and beliefs how true and logical each statement argued is. When a bad decision is executed because it was not debated in a democratic forum, that is when we lose the efficiency and advantages of a democratic system. (D., Bibó István Szakkollégium [Bibó István Professional Fraternity⁶]).

4. These interviews have been translated from Hungarian to English; though they have been translated to represent the interviewees words as closely as possible, because of the nature of translation, they are not exact. The interviewees' first initials and their respected organizations are provided in parenthesis after their statements.

5. Hallgatói Hálózat [Student Network]: a self-organising grass-roots group of students and teachers that originally came to life because of the Higher Education Act. Members of the group found that the drastic cuts in state-sponsored tuition and the cost of self-tuition are unacceptable, and they started protesting against the reckless, rash and unpredictable concept of reforms in higher education. The long term goal of Student Network is to mobilize students, so that they can recognize their common interests. To achieve all this, the Student Network is open to all local initiatives of students and/or teachers. Their goal is to gather and collect all these initiatives, plans, suggestions and ideas, to discuss them and help in their realization.

6. 'Szakkollégium' is a school organization similar to a fraternity; however, less social and more professional.

The word that comes to my mind when someone says democracy is active. Democracies only work when you actively take part in them. Clearly there are serious barriers in democracy pertaining to the defense of oneself. Thus if one does not vote, there is no point to the whole thing. In any case this is a very good question, especially here in Hungary, and in general in post-communist countries where we do not have too many roots connected to democracy, and the ones we do have are from about one hundred years ago. Because of this it is very difficult to find a historical moment in our past that both sides of the political aisle can relate to positively, where there is even a minimal amount of consensus between the two opposing political ideologies. I was just in London for a month for an internship. The depth and number of cultural differences between England and Hungary was breathtaking. For example how easily a voter can influence his or her parliamentary representative. Of course this is partly because of the dominance of voting districts in England (over parliamentary-lists), thus the discipline of factions is not as strong there as they are here; however, it is still surprising that if someone wants to see something change, the first thing he or she does is ask his or her supporters to contact their representatives. And they do this, because it works. (D., Társadalomelméleti Szakkollégium [Professional Fraternity of Sociological Theories])

Democracy, if we build off of the original concept, basically gives the power to the people, if not directly, then indirectly through representation. In my opinion, democracy has the fundamental ability to be a well-functioning system. Especially if the citizens of this democracy possess a good intellectual background, and have enough motivation to make important decisions responsibly. In these situations democracy could be a well-functioning system... The disadvantage; however, is that democracy naturally comes with the popular media's manipulative powers, and gives everyone the right to vote and express their democratic rights without any form of censorship. Because of this certain groups of people gain decision-making powers, and gain the opportunity to answer decisive questions, though they might not have the required intellect to answer these questions appropriately and effectively. All in all, I still have to say that Democracy is the best functioning of all available state formations. (M., Batthyány Lajos Szakkollégium [Professional Fraternity of Batthyány Lajos]).

What I am about to say is very textbook like; however, here at IKSZ we interpret democracy (and we want a democratic Hungary) to be a system where citizens with voting rights can make decisions about matters pertaining to them either through plebiscite or through representation. We find it important that certain socio ethical and moral rights and norms are above everything else, and that no one has the power over these norms and rights. This is why we say Hungary is a democracy, and we cannot let it become anything else (there are some disagreements within our organization, but certainly everyone agrees with this last statement).

For us, the fundamental law (constitution) and those norms that Hungary finds democratic are very important. (I., IKSZ [Youth Christian Democratic Coalition]⁷)

Jobbik IT functions as a political organization that accepts the democratic system we live in, and strives to achieve change within the constraints provided by democracy. Democracy is not the best system, but currently there is no better alternative. In terms of the voting system, one important reform that would not conflict with democratic values would be to introduce an educational requirement for voting. This would be crucial because social and political awareness is important for responsible voting, to ensure that one can vote deliberately, and to prevent most types of outside pressure from the voting decorum. (G. Jobbik IT [Jobbik⁸ Youth movement])

We made a special effort to examine and understand the reasons behind the fact that within the younger generations the acceptance of democracy is especially low:

Before 1989 there was a parliamentary dictatorship in which the politics were "unique", and so were the people who participated in politics, and because of this most people began to distance themselves from politics. This changed somewhat because of the atmosphere of the 90s, and the expectation of the time period, specifically the expectation that everything will be better. After four years the country fell into an exceptionally bad situation, and it became clear that nothing is so simple. Our factories were inefficient, and had to close. The privatization was conducted in a flawed way, leading to a lot of failures. It became clear that it is not so easy to bring forth paradise in Hungary after all. This is why many people began to think that no matter what the political system is, it is best to keep your distance from politics; it is not worth having high expectations placed in politics. Capitalism added to this apathy because of its incentives to increase consumption. In Capitalism, people are disincentivized to participate in politics; everyone is driven to do one thing: make money, and then spend that money. (L., Fidelitas⁹ [Youth Movement of Fidesz])

7. IKSZ [Young Christian Democratic Union] is the partner youth organisation of Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, "KDNP"), the fourth largest political group in the Hungarian Parliament, also a member of European People's Party. Established in 2001, IKSZ is the only youth organisation representing christian democratic values in Hungarian political life.

8. Jobbik IT [Jobbik Youth Platform] is the partner youth organization the Movement for a Better Hungary, commonly known as Jobbik, that is a Hungarian radical nationalist, far-right political party, enjoying a large (10-20%) support of the voters. Has been criticized for their anti-roma rhetoric, and their support of the illegal Hungarian Guard.

9. Fidelitas is the youth movement of the governing central right party Fidesz, the party that currently holds an absolute two-thirds majority in the parliament. This party has been plagued with accusations of antidemocratic tendencies, and antimarket policies.

What I see, without knowing the results of this survey, is that historically, especially in liberal arts, and engineering circles, there is a need for a certain dictation from above. In the social sciences, free-liberal values seem to be stronger. I believe that this new tendency in which the proportion of those who want to see an authoritarian leadership from above is increasing can be explained by a historical analysis of the current situation in Hungary. (D., HÖÖK [Unified Student Union]¹⁰)

It is very difficult, but clearly one of my tasks is to assess Hungarian youths' thoughts [on democracy...]. One of the possible reasons behind the drop in the acceptance of the democratic system is that the younger generations want to see a real change. It is no wonder that people say extremists gain strength during times of crisis; many believe these radicals are capable of solving our problems. They do not want to start a debate between the parties- they do not want them to waste their time criticizing each other's work. Let's instead give power to one of them: the one, which is the lesser of the many evils. Let that party lead the country alone. Efficiency and speed are probably the leading motifs behind this belief and logic. Unfortunately many people do not realize that speed is not always the answer to our problems. (E., Nemzeti Ifjúsági Tanács [National Youth Council]¹¹)

Despite the fact, that in certain situations, and I emphasize "in certain situations", a centralized authoritarian system can function more efficiently than a populous driven democratic system, I believe democracy is crucial, and I am a supporter of it. I cannot assess any of history's dictatorships positively. I'm not saying that it could not be done better, but what we have seen thus far in history has been executed badly. I can't really think of a dictatorship where people were happy in general. (P., Szent Ignác Szakkollégium [Saint Ignác Professional Fraternity])

10. HÖÖK [National Union of Hungarian Students] represents approximately 400 thousand students of the country. It has a right to express opinion and to make proposals in any questions concerning higher education. The historical predecessor of HÖÖK was the MEFESZ which had an active role in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 when Hungarians revolted against communist oppression. HÖÖK completes tasks regarding higher education and youth policy that cannot be carried out at institutional or regional levels.

11. Nemzeti Ifjúsági Tanács [National Youth Council] was founded on 1 December 2012 with the purpose of supporting young people (between 18 and 35 years) and the representation of different youth organizations. The NYC aims to be the coordinational partner of respective Hungarian decision making in all cases regarding youth. The National Youth Council is a representation of Hungarian youth and its standpoint in Europe and worldwide. Foundation of NYC opened the way for the representation of young people of Hungary in foreign countries and also for joining the European Youth Forum.

I. 3. The Opinion of Full Time College Students, and University Students on Democracy

In the *Aktív Fiatalok Magyarországon study 2013* (Active Youth Hungary 2013), our initial hypothesis asserted that for the generations growing up after 1990, the difference between the “general idea of democracy” and the “democracy in practice” in post 1989 Hungary is of key importance. This is because the two in reality are different, and this difference has yet to be recognized in either academic discourse, or by the general public. In our research we hypothesized that it is exactly the subjects of our study, the younger generations, who are confronting the differences between an ideal democracy and democracy in practice in Hungary. The *Aktív Állampolgárság Alapítvány* (Active Citizens Foundation) summarized the developing Hungarian situation and the young generations’ position in society at a conference about democracy in the following manner (KENDE 2008, 6):

Since the change of regimes, a new generation has matured in Hungary. This generation’s political activism, political attitude, and relationship to democracy does not diverge completely from those of their parents generation’s. The new generation of «Homo Kádárikusz»¹² grew up short sighted and overly concerned with materialistic needs. Though their society was freer, it lacked both the social solidarity and certainty of the previous era.

Even though the new system is different both institutionally and functionally from the previous, and despite the current system being the antithesis of the last system ideologically (SZABÓ I. 1994, 62–63), to this day there are certain patterns that remain in the new system from the Kádár period which suggest some sort of continuity between these two. Those generations that grew up after the regime change do not have direct memories or experiences from the Kádár era, and thus their values and beliefs connected to socialism and the old system must stem from those structures which continue to host traits from the socialist era (e.g. family, school, contemporary groups and media).

During the *Aktív Fiatalok Magyarországon 2013* (Active Youth Hungary 2013) study, Hungarian full time students had to compare the Kádár era with the current system in 9 dimensions. The majority of the students surveyed were born during the early stages of the change from dictatorship to democracy (1990-1993); that is for the majority of them the previous era is purely history.

Our research suggests that issues with Hungarian university and college students’ understanding of political and social issues stems not from a lack of experience, but rather from difficulty synthesizing available information. It seems that among the youth uncertainty and indecisiveness is exceptionally high. For example, many of the youths we surveyed had a difficult time defining their own ideology. They gave contradictory statements while answering different sections of the survey, which cannot be explained with traditional sociological methods and tools. For example, though some individuals surveyed gave responses in favor of dictatorship, they described themselves as happy with the current dem-

12. Refers to generation socialized under the Kádár era, the era named after János Kádár (1912–1989) who was the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, presiding over the country from 1956 until his retirement in 1988.

ocratic system, and were LMP¹³ (green party) voters, all at the same time. They support state-financed tertiary education system, and protested against the drop of the number of state financed positions in higher education, while at the same time supporting Fidesz¹⁴ (who introduced the drop in state-financed positions). In the second example, such a lack of party loyalty, though popular in modern democracies, has not been seen in Hungarian democracy thus far. Their opinions on the late communist era (Kádár era¹⁵) versus the new-capitalist era can be summarized by 3 points:

1. They believed that under the Kádár era, social security was the greatest priority, with university and college students listing the guarantee of day-to-day survival as a specific (positive) component of the previous system. They also believe that finding an apartment and finding a job were both easier in the Kádár era.
2. They equate new-capitalism with new freedoms, an increase in the number of entertainment-venues, and better chances for admission to institutes of higher education. The story behind new capitalism turned out to be quite interesting. Many young Hungarians associated more freedoms in political and social rights, as well as increasing opportunities for entertainment, and better chances for higher education to be advantage of the new capitalistic system. In recent years, however, many have begun to question the advantage of the new capitalist system in the realm of higher education.
3. According to our data, the current younger generations judge both the Kádár era and the current system based on the individual’s ability to succeed in society. This can be interpreted as the younger generations feeling a sense of familiar satisfaction with their current lives, while at the same time struggling with dissatisfaction at not completely belonging in modern society.

13. LMP [Politics Can Be Different] is a Hungarian green political party. Founded in 2009, it was one of four parties to win seats in the National Assembly in the 2010 parliamentary election.

14. Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union is the governing conservative party. Currently holds an absolute two-thirds majority in the parliament.

15. Under the leadership of János Kádár, during the so called ‘Kádár era’ Hungarian people entered the way of construction of a socialist Hungary. The regimes legitimacy was built on the propaganda that everybody could work, and the majority of the people had acceptable life, secure present and calculable future. Due to great efforts of industrialization industrial production grew 10 times and 400 thousand new flats were built to speed up the urbanisation of the country.

Figure 1.


Students' opinion of the Kádár era and the current system, 2013
multidimensional scaling based on the answers to the survey question

Source: Active Youth Research Group 2013.

We hypothesize that the rationale behind the youths' political thinking is more emotional than that of previous generations. Our claims so far are backed up by survey data. In the past four to five years, the number of students who were not capable of, or did not want to compare the two systems, grew substantially. The percentage of the youth incapable of, or unwilling to answer questions about the two systems lies between 14% and 24%, which in earlier studies (2008) was around 10%. The questions that produced the greatest uncertainty were those where the respondents were asked to compare the two systems; 38% of Hungarian university and college students were incapable of or unwilling to say whether capitalism or the Kádár era was better. Additionally, both in the online, and the personal surveys, a measurable percentage of the respondents claimed that neither is better. In total, 44% of the students found the current system to be superior, while 18% thought the previous system was better. In our opinion however, the most interesting result is not the percentage who felt the current or previous system was better, but rather the extraordinarily large proportion of the students who decided not to answer the survey questions for whatever reason.

Figure 2.

In your opinion, in the following dimensions which system is better:
the previous (Kádár regime) or the current (capitalist) one?
(2013, ± 100 percentage scale, in which negative results refers to the percentage of respondents who preferred the Kádár era in a dimension, positives to the percentage that preferred the new-capitalist era)



Source: Active Youth Research Group 2013.

I. 4. The Consequences of the Lack of a Confrontation; Negative Effects on Student's Views of the "Existing" Democracy.

The consequences of the fragmented, semi-peripheral political socialization that took place in Hungary influenced not only student's views of the Kádár era, but also had an effect of the relationship today's youths have with the current capitalist system and their general expectations for a political system. Since those born in the democratic political system do not have direct memories of the dictatorship, and because of the lack of political socialization, very little information has been passed on to them about the old era. Their only source of political experience is the current democratic political system. Their opinions, however, are not of an ideal democratic system, but rather of the "existing democracy" in Hungary and its failures. Thus, again, the failures of the Hungarian democracy have a negative effect on the views of an ideal democracy, which in turn has a substantial effect on the youths' beliefs when it comes to comparing democracy to dictatorship.

Figure 3.
How Satisfied Are You With Democracy in Hungary?
(2013, Distribution in Percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research Group 2013.

As it is apparent from the 3rd diagram, almost three-quarter of the students surveyed were unhappy with democracy, while only 23% of the respondents were satisfied at all. It is doubtless, however, that one of the most indicative factors for this question was religion, and party preference. The most satisfied group were Christians, where 17% were completely satisfied, and 28% were somewhat satisfied with Hungarian democracy; In contrast, 47% of atheists, and 35% of non-religious respondents were completely dissatisfied with democracy in Hungary today. Among political party supporters, a striking 70% of Fidesz supporters were somewhat or completely satisfied with democracy, while center-leftist supporters were especially critical. Among Együtt 2014–PM¹⁶ and smaller liberal party supporters, almost 90% of the respondents were somewhat or completely dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Hungary. Among Jobbik (far-right party) supporters, 80% were dissatisfied, which is similar to those of LMP voters.

16. Együtt2014–PM [Together 2014-PM] is a political and electoral coalition containing two parties: Együtt2014 [Together2014]) and Párbeszéd Magyarországért [Dialogue for Hungary]. Együtt is a completely new centrist liberal party that has no parliamentary representatives, but is led by a fairly popular ex Prime Minister, Gordon Bajnai. PM is an ex-branch of LMP, a green party, which split up over battles of whether to ally with the socialists and Együtt in an electoral battle against Fidesz. PM does have 8 parliamentary seats in the National Assembly.

The answers to the above question by themselves do not signify the rejection of democracy, since dissatisfaction can stem from the fact that the surveyed individuals are unhappy with the existing democracy, but a democratic system, as a political system, they would generally accept. Because of the youth's perception of democracy, it's important to address the question of whether the same proportion of the youth would prefer a dictatorship over a democracy, if democracy functioned in a different manner, with a different institutional structure. In order to better understand the Hungarian youth's perception on democracy and dictatorship, more specifically to understand the logic behind those who openly picked dictatorships as better than democracy, we introduced an answer to the survey question, which has not been given before in Hungarian surveys. Beyond the standard large-sample survey answers to these questions (democracy is better than all political systems; in certain situations dictatorships are better than democracy; for me, there is no difference between political systems) there was an option for a fourth answers (the current situation is so bad, that a dictatorship would be better).

As the 4th diagram shows, only 36% of respondents believe that democracy is better than all other political systems. A quarter of the respondents claim that for them, there is no difference between political systems, while another quarter of the respondents claim that under certain conditions (20%), or even now (5%) dictatorship would be better than the current democratic system. As it is apparent from the 3rd diagram, almost three-quarter of the students surveyed were unhappy with democracy, with only 23% of the respondents reporting any satisfaction. It is doubtless, that one of the most indicative factors for this question was religion, and party preference. The most satisfied group were Christians, where 17% were completely satisfied, and 28% were somewhat satisfied with Hungarian democracy; In contrast, 47% of atheists and 35% of non-religious respondents were completely dissatisfied with democracy in Hungary today. Among political party supporters, a striking 70% of Fidesz supporters were somewhat or completely satisfied with democracy, while center-leftist supporters were especially critical. Among Együtt 2014–PM and smaller liberal party supporters, almost 90% of the respondents were somewhat or completely dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Hungary. Among Jobbik supporters, 80% were dissatisfied, which is similar to those of LMP voters.

The answers to the above question by themselves do not signify the rejection of democracy; one can be dissatisfied with the existing democracy, while still supporting democratic ideals in the abstract. Because of this, it's important to address the question of whether the same proportion of the youth would prefer a dictatorship to a democracy if democracy functioned in a more ideal manner. In order to better understand the Hungarian youths' perception on democracy and dictatorship, more specifically to understand the logic behind those who openly identified dictatorships as being better than democracies, we added a potential answer to the survey question. Beyond the standard large-sample survey answers to these questions (democracy is better than all political systems; in certain situations dictatorships are better than democracy; for me, there is no difference between political systems) there was an option for a fourth answers (the current situation is so bad, that a dictatorship would be better).

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Figure 4.

Among the following statements, which one do you agree with the most?
(Percentage makeup of the answers)

Source: Active Youth Research Group 2013.

Our claim that students are comparing dictatorship to the current existing democracy, and not to an ideal democracy is also supported by our survey results.¹⁷ Those who believe that the current situation is so bad that a dictatorship would be better logically display the highest disapproval rating (90%) of the current “existing” democracy in Hungary. It is also true, however, that those who think democracy is better than all other systems, are still highly dissatisfied with the current democratic system.

During our research we were also interested in what factors make someone more likely to support a dictatorship. To answer this question, we created a binary logistical regression, in which we included all of the explanatory variables that the preliminary information suggested to be relevant. These were the variables included: age, gender, number of unemployed family members, father’s education level, perception to one’s own financial situation, religion, type of settlement, profession, as well as several identity dummy explanatory variables such as whether the individual is an environmentalist, nationalist,

liberal, conservative, believer of order and stability, interest in politics, as well as party preference.

After running the regression, only a couple of the variables showed significant explanatory value. That is, there are only a few variables that are strongly correlated to one’s perception of dictatorship. The data suggests that those who are more conservative, and who have stronger nationalistic identities, as well as those who believe in order and stability, tend to be more likely to support a dictatorship. Furthermore men are 60% more likely to vote for a dictatorship than women, while Jobbik voters are 180% more likely to support dictatorships than non-jobbik voters (For further statistical details, please see attachments).

17. A Pearson type Khi squared test statistic of 32.22. Significance level: 0,000, Phi value: 0,172.

II. Interests in Public and Political Life

“Politics is a power struggle, and in Hungary this struggle now has a strong negative connotation, conjuring images of mud-throwing, and personal attacks. Because of this politics and politicians have very negative associations in people’s minds. This is true for the younger generations too, and that just worsens the social crises. The interest in the public sphere, and public issues, those problems, challenges, opportunities that surround us, the responsibility not just for one’s self, but for those around us as well, these, on the other hand, are very positive things...”

The past year’s sociological studies on Hungarian youth unanimously suggest that the youths’ political activism and level of interest is highly correlated with their assessment and relationship to the political system they live in- of their acceptance of the political actors, and of how they integrate themselves into society. (SZABÓ I.–ÖRKÉNY 1998; GAZSÓ–SZABÓ A. 2002; GAZSÓ–LAKI 2004; SZABÓ A.–KERN 2011, LAKI–SZABÓ A. 2012A; LAKI–SZABÓ A. 2012b.; SZABÓ A.–ROSS 2012).

Many previous studies have also pointed out that in international comparisons, the Hungarian youths’ political activism and interests are especially low (SZABÓ A.–KERN 2011; SZABÓ A.–ROSS 2012). The European Social Survey’s 6th wave, which was conducted at the end of 2012 and beginning of 2013, strengthened the claims behind this negative tendency. If we compare the results obtained in Hungary in 2013 to those obtained in Hungary earlier, the 6th wave of the survey suggests that among 15–29 year olds political interest has dramatically decreased compared to both the 4th (2008) and the 5th (2010) wave of the study.

Figure 5.

The 15–29 year olds political interests on a 4 point scale
According to ESS studies (2002–2012) (average)

Source: European Social Survey (ESS – Hungary).

The past ten to fifteen years of data collection pertaining to political socialization and voter behavior have also shown a tendency in the population of turning away from politics. More specifically, they showed the evolution of the concept politics. Politics had a slightly positive connotation in the 80s, but the youths’ perception of the concept has steadily deteriorated since, with the word now having a definite negative connotation (SZABÓ I. 2000, LAKI–SZABÓ A.–BAUER 2001, ZSOLT 2005). The 1998 Örkény – Szabó paper on political socialization (SZABÓ I.–ÖRKÉNY 1998) came to the conclusion that compared to the results found in Szabó’s earlier research, which was conducted during the Kádár era, youth interest in politics has significantly fallen.¹⁸ The authors hypothesize that one of the reasons for this tendency is the change in what the word or concept politics encompasses. Our paper shows that this contextual change has an important effect on the youths’ perception of politics, and of their opinion on political activism.

18. While in the 70s and 80s 12% of the youth responded that they were interested in politics, by the mid 90s this number fell to between 3 and 6 percent (depending on the age group).

Building off of the results discussed, the Active Youth Hungary 2012 study hypothesized that since the change of systems in 1989–1990, the youths' interpretation of the concept of politics has gone through a process of continuous discrediting. The increasingly negative connotations associated with the concept have had a negative-spiral effect on the youths' usage of the word. The younger generation does not include the active, day-to-day components of politics in the definition of the word politics. Instead, they place them under "public affairs." Because of this, our study asked each question in a dual form, inquiring separately about politics, and about public affairs. We hypothesized that the two would be correlated, but that interest in politics, because of its negative connotation, would be significantly smaller. We made the same type of contextual distinction in other cases too. Instead of asking whether the respondent took any type of action online pertaining to political issues or questions, we asked instead whether they did so pertaining to public affairs and problems, whether they post, vote, or like matters connected to the public sphere. The data from this test confirmed the impact of the negative connotation associated with politics, and thus we attempted to control for this issue in the second wave of our data collection (in 2013).

Based on the data, the two areas (politics and public affairs) are very closely connected, but are not the same for Hungarian college and university students. The correlation between the two variables is extremely strong in both waves of data collection.¹⁹ In addition, the symmetry between the two variables is relatively high, that is low values in one variable tend to suggest low values in the other, and vice versa.

The Active Youth Hungary 2013 study measured political interests on a five-point scale in order to conform to the standards set up by the previous Ifjúság-studies (Youth-studies).²⁰ In this way the results could be easily compared to Ifjúság2000, Ifjúság2004 and Ifjúság2008 studies' sub-data sets containing university and college students. The results from the sub-data sets of all of Ifjúság studies suggest similar results, with an average interest of 2.6, and a standard deviation that would suggest that about 20% of the respondents were interested in politics (defined as a four or a five on the five-point scale). In comparison, our results suggest a higher level of interest, where the average was 3.0 (2013 second wave) and 3.1 (2012 first wave), and where 35%, and 39% respectively were interested in politics. When asked about public affairs, the Hungarian students gave statistically significantly higher responses, averaging 3.7; 60% of the students were interested in public affairs, and only 10% were not interested at all.

19. Cramer type V value: 0,420 sig=0,000. $r^2=0.7$, significance 0.000 and $r^2=0.65$ significance 0.000.

20. In contrast to ESS, where they use a 4-point scale.

Figure 6.

How interested are you in public affairs? How interested are you in politics?
(Scale 1 through 5; 1=not at all, 5=very interested)

Source: Szabó–Oross 2012 and Active Youth Research Group 2013.

In our research we tried to find those sociological, and ideological variables, which have statistically significant explanatory variables in assessing political interest. This topic has been researched at a deeper level in the recent past (ÖRKÉNY–SZABÓ I. 1999, SZABÓ A.–KERN 2011, LAKI–SZABÓ A. 2012). From these studies it becomes clear that interest in politics is correlated with several important explanatory variables. The effect of political socialization is easily shown; familial characteristics, such as the socio-economic and hierarchical status of the family also seem to be important; personal attributes and characteristics do not seem to be irrelevant either.

The Active Youth Hungary 2013 study examined these interests in a so called binary logistic model.²¹ The results of our study show the typically found political affinity, in harmony with previous research results.

21. The dependent variables: (1st model) take on 1 if the respondent answered 4 or 5 in interest in public affairs. In the 2nd model, the dependent variables takes on 1 if the respondent answered 4 or 5 in interest in political matters.

II. 1. The Model of Interest in Public Affairs.

Interests related to public affairs are correlated with the respondent's socio and familial background. The children of college educated fathers are 1.315 times as likely to be interested in public affairs than the children of non-college educated fathers. (For further statistical details, please see attachments).

Among the university departments (majors), those in the technical, and legal departments show significant differences from the average in interest. The signs of the coefficients, however, are opposite. Those in the technical departments are 0.693 as likely to be interested as the average student, while those in the legal department are 1.974 as likely to be interested in public affairs as their average non-legal department college-mates.

The inquired ideological preferences seem to be statistically significant explanatory variables too. If the student describes his or herself as a rightist (conservative), he or she is expected to be 1.133 times as likely to be interested in public affairs; between the conservative parties (Fidesz versus Jobbik), there does not seem to be a strong correlation to interest in public affairs; however, Együtt 2014–PM voters appear to be 1.85 as likely to be interested in public affairs than the others.

The ability of these interests in public affairs to effect the willingness for political activism is supported by the fact that among traditional direct political activities, a one unit increase in the number of activities a respondent participated suggests a 26% increase in the chance that the individual is interested in public affairs. Similar results can be found regarding online political participation; however, the coefficient there is significantly larger. One additional activity suggests a 117% increase in the chance that the respondent will be interested in public affairs.

II. 2. The Model of Interest in Politics.

Unlike in the previous model (model of interest in the public sphere/public affairs) there is not a significant correlation between the interest in politics of young people with college educated fathers, nor any correlation between interest in politics and an individual's field of education (consult table 3 in the attachments for detailed statistic results). There is a strong link between interest in politics and the gender of the respondent: men tend to be on average 1.785 times more interested in politics than women. There is also a connection between interest in politics and the acceptance of dictatorial systems. Respondents, who tend to favor authoritarian systems, are on average 1.305 times more likely to be interested in politics. The direction of the coefficients of the remaining significant variables behaves just like in the previous case. Interestingly, if we now only focus on the "behavior" of Együtt 2014–PM in this model, the coefficient is far greater than the one in the model for public affairs. We can see that someone who votes for Együtt 2014–PM, is 3.154 times more interested in politics than the average respondent.

II. 3. Which news portals do voters of different political parties favor?

Because online news portals have become the dominant source of news among young Hungarians too (SÁGVÁRI 2011), we attempted to seek the answer to the question of what news pages they prefer by analyzing their information gathering process concerning public affairs and politics. Analyzing the answers of those students who openly provided a preference for a political party, we can say that index.hu is the most read online news source within every political group. For liberal party supporters, hvg.hu is second, followed by origo.hu. Among those who vote for conservative parties, we see that the aforementioned news portals switch places in popularity. Kuruc.info is – of course – the most read online news source among supporters of Jobbik; More than 26% claim to be a frequent reader of the website. Besides Jobbik supporters, 4% of Fidesz, 2% of LMP and 1% of voters without political party preferences said that they gather their information on a regular basis from the site. The least utilized news portal websites were mno.hu and nol.hu; however, the political orientation of their readers is clear; 8% of the individuals favoring Fidesz read mno.hu; 14% of MSZP (social-democratic party)²² and 12% of Együtt 2014–PM voters read nol.hu regularly. The gathered data confirms the results of previous studies: in Hungary today there are structures in place which are clearly influenced by one or the other political side. Thus, there is a good chance that someone can grow up by only watching the television channels, hearing the radio stations, and reading the online and offline media sources of their favored political ideology.

Table 1.
Distribution of news portal readers with respect to their preferred political party.
(The distribution is shown in percentage)

	DK ^{1*}	Együtt– PM	Fidesz	Jobbik	LMP	MSZP
Index.hu	54	58	40	31	50	32
Origo.hu	25	36	28	25	31	27
Hvg.hu	8	48	18	15	35	32
Mandiner.hu	0	5	6	1	9	3
Nol.hu	8	12	5	1	7	14
Mno.hu	0	4	8	2	3	3
Hir24.hu	0	6	7	5	4	3
Stop.hu	0	1	1	1	0	3
Kuruc.info	0	0	4	26	2	0

* Because of the low number of respondents who disclosed themselves as DK supporters, the data for DK is only for indicative purposes.

Source: Active Youth Research Group 2013.

22. The Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungarian: Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) is a social-democratic political party in Hungary. MSZP lost the 2010 elections (won by Fidesz with a 2/3 majority), gaining only 19,3% of the votes, and 58 seats in the parliament. Currently, they are the biggest opposition party in Hungary.

III. Hungarian University and College Students' Value System

There are many perspectives from which it is worthy and legitimate to study the Hungarian higher education students' value system. This chapter attempts to outline, what characteristics describe the relation Hungarian students have to democracy, and their complex opinions related to politics. It is also worthwhile to take a moment, and examine how substantially the value systems of these students have changed, and how present new value systems are. To do this we utilized Ronald Inglehart's analytical framework, and we examined whether a so-called "Post-materialistic" perspective has hit the youth's value system.

It is in Ronald Inglehart's 1977 Silent revolution, that Inglehart first writes about how the value-structure of western Europeans have transformed since the end of the Second World War.²³ In Hungary, in the year 2013, 23 years after the first free elections of the third republic, there is a need for an examination where we study whether these value-structure transformations have taken place in Hungary or not. Firstly because in the past 20–25 years there have been many societal transformations and changes, which suggest that our value system could have changed according to Inglehart's predictions. Our analysis examined what the data shows with respect to the Hungarian college student's mindset. Is it possible that there are preferences in their value systems, which do not resemble the past generation's Materialistic value-system, but rather fit with Inglehart's Post-materialistic value-structure.

The goal of the chapter is to introduce both the Materialistic and the Post-materialistic value structure qualities of Hungarian college students. In light of this comparison, this chapter will also aim to explain what is the reasoning behind these differences. Which factors strengthen one or the other type of value-structure among the youth in Hungary?

III. 1. Methodological Framework

In the data collection process of Active Youth Hungary 2013, we ensured that it would be possible to separate these two important value-structures. One of the questions in the quantitative sections asked "among the following eight values, please select the two that you sympathize with the most." These were the possible values that one could choose from:

- More power to influence government and public affairs
- Thoughts are worth more than money
- More beautiful cities
- War against crime
- War against the rise in prices (inflation)
- Economic growth
- Order in the country
- Less impersonal society.

The categories were created according to Inglehart's examination structure, utilizing Ronald Inglehart's previous work. The values are divided in the following way between the two categories:

Table 2.
The division of values between materialistic and post-materialistic
in Active Youth Hungary 2013

Post-Materialistic Values	Materialistic Values
More power to influence government and public affairs	War against crime
Thoughts are worth more than money	War against the rise in prices
More beautiful cities	Economic growth
Less impersonal society	Order in the country

Source: Active Youth Hungary Research Group, 2013.

We found those individuals post-materialistic who selected two post-materialistic values. Conversely, those who selected two materialistic values were classified as materialistic. Furthermore, those who selected one of each group were classified as "mixed value-structured."

23. According to Ronald Inglehart's scarcity hypothesis claims that for people, the most valuable things are those which there's a scarcity off. As long as existence is the goal (and the environment for this is lacking), the for freedom, and need to express one's self gets however as soon as it reaches a level where sustained existence is no longer the most relevant problem, our value system changes. What we find important changes. Our mental and intellectual freedom and security gets placed in the forefront. Inglehart coins these new values as post-materialistic values. (For more information: INGLEHART 1997, 33–34).

III. 2. The Results of the Study

The Active Youth Hungary 2013 shows that there is a new type of mindset present in the Hungarian youth. This mindset is open to new values that are considered post-materialistic according to Inglehart's framework. All of this is even more interesting, because up until this point the traditional materialistic value-structures has been the dominant one in all generations; it is only in this millennium that such a trend has been noticed among the youth. It is important, however not to over-emphasize the importance of these developments in societal values. In 2013, the situation in Hungary is far from ideal for these trends to continue, or strengthen. It is also important to note that, while for the first time their presence is truly noteworthy, those with post-materialistic values are still in the minority.

Figure 7.

The Percentage Distribution of Students According to Their Value-system

Source: Active Youth Hungary Research Group, 2013.

III. 2. 1. What Do We Know About Post-materialistic Students?

As the diagram above shows, among Hungarian students, about 10% are strictly Post-materialistic, that is about one tenth of those surveyed expressed post-materialistic values. Unsurprisingly, if someone claims to have, or defines his or herself with green and environmental beliefs, he or she is almost twice as likely to sympathize with post-materialistic values. In Hungary, however, there were even stronger predictors. Those who studied social-sciences or were in liberal arts programs were twice as likely to claim post-materialistic values.

Another predictor was one's relation to traditional male-female roles. Those who found traditional male-female roles important, or more precisely answered yes to "a man's responsibility is to make money, a woman's responsibility is housekeeping, and to take care of the children" were only about 35% as likely to pick post-materialistic values when asked.²⁴

The strongest negative indicator of post-materialistic values, however, happened to be one's preferences towards Jobbik. Among the Hungarian university and college students, Jobbik supporters are almost one third as likely to commit to post-materialistic values as an average student. It is important to emphasize that we cannot know for sure which is the cause and which is the effect; that is whether the support of Jobbik causes materialistic values, or whether materialistic values cause one to support Jobbik, or whether it's a simultaneity situation, where both indicators effect each other.

A vote for LMP also has strong explanatory value in predicting post-materialistic values. LMP voters are almost 1.7 as likely to choose a post-materialistic value-set, than an average Hungarian student. This means that the one tenth of Hungarian students who chose post-materialistic values seem to have rather consistent value-system, and political-belief-system. This consistency hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that those with post-materialistic values are more likely to find democracy to be a superior system to dictatorships, or authoritarian systems, in all situations (see chapter one and two).

It is important to compare the Hungarian university and college students post-materialistic value-structure to those of the general Hungarian youth's, the so called Critical Mass generation (SZABÓ A.–KERN 2011). The members of this group pop up from time to time in youth-studies, and primarily represent those individuals who have gained significant social and intellectual capital, have highly educated parents, and mostly live in the capital city or in other large Hungarian cities. Those who are considered the winners after transformation of systems in 1990. The Active Youth Hungary research group, during their 2013 data collection wave and during its interviews and focus group discussions not only confirmed, but strengthened the claim that this group exists.

24. The exact statement in the survey stated: on a scale 1–5 (5 in agreement, 1 in disagreement), how much do you agree with a man's responsibility is to make money, a woman's responsibility is housekeeping, and to take care of the children.

We hope that our study also helps in understanding the Critical Mass group of the current youth generation. The results examined above primarily characterize the Critical Mass, and emphasize and elaborate on what other studies and papers have already explored and found in the recent past. (SZABÓ A.–KERN 2011, and KEIL 2012).

III. 2. 2. What Do We Know About the Materialistic-Valued Students?

The materialistic value-framework is one of the most important traditional characteristics of the Hungarian society. Its existence has had a strong effect on the Hungarian political culture and political state of mind. After the Second World War, during the welfare state of socialism, the attainment of materialistic needs took strong priority over other needs, and the roots of this value-system exist today. Additionally, traditional societal values, such as family, local community, fell into the background. In short, the materialistic became dominant in Hungary by the time the age of transformation arrived. This is well exhibited by the fact that the Hungarian population primarily expected and yearned for an improvement in quality of life from the change of regime, rather than personal and societal freedoms.

The materialistic values, according to Active Youth Hungary 2013, continue to be strongest value-system in Hungary. The above mentioned questionnaire found that more than half of the respondents answered with a value combination that characterize a materialistic value-system. This fact emphasizes the previously state claim, that though there is now a noteworthy group in Hungary, who find postmodern values important, but their numbers, even among those well educated, is still small. The materialistic value systems dominance is still unquestionable, but it is also clear that there has been a positive trend in the direction of post-materialistic values registered.

Among the explanatory predictors for materialistic values, support for Jobbik stands out. Someone who votes for Jobbik is twice as likely to exhibit materialistic values than those without a preference for Jobbik. These explanatory variables are summarized in the following table.

Table 3.
The Value System Explanatory Variables According to the 2013 Data Collection.
Binary Logistic regression

Explanatory Variables	Materialistic Values	Post-Materialistic Values	Mixed Values
	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
Would vote for Jobbik	1,925***	0,364**	0,727
Would vote for Együtt–PM	0,673**	0,969	1,634**
Would vote for LMP	0,580**	1,680	1,342
Green/sustainable Values	0,652**	1,900**	1,157
Agreement: Democracy is better than all other political systems	0,721**	1,313	1,219
Economic studies	1,352	1,033	0,661**
Humane/Social Sciences studies	0,791	1,968**	0,887
Agreement "a man's responsibility is to make money, a woman's responsibility is housekeeping, and to take care of the children"	1,284	0,385**	0,951
Budapest address	0,783	1,473*	1,062
Father with higher education diploma	0,784*	1,101	1,248
Would vote for Fidesz	1,288	0,721	0,943
Technical Studies	1,191	0,628	0,945
Legal Studies	1,196	1,068	0,851
Male	0,855	1,173	1,075
Lives without problems	1,348	0,590	0,893
Participation in offline organizations/events	0,965	1,068	1,005
Participation in online organizations/events	0,906	1,026	1,074
Agreement: Among the poor, most are at fault for their situation	1,057	0,529	1,162

Source: Active Youth Hungary Research Group, 2013.

Those studying economics are significantly more likely to have a definite choice that is decisive between post-materialistic values and materialistic values. Though statistically not significant, and thus we cannot confirm with a 95% confidence interval, in our survey economic students that responded tended to be more materialistic than post-materialistic. Further research is required to confirm this hypothesis. Those respondents who claimed to subjectively live without “financial problems,” also preferred materialistic values – although this result was non-significant, this finding could be also a relevant one. The mass and makeup of the materialistic population strengthen the hypothesis that there is a large proportion of the population who are struggling for their day-to-day existence, and thus exhibit materialistic values and needs, which are then reflected in their political and social views. These factors, along with the variable of support of Jobbik, strengthen the hypothesis that there is a large proportion of the population who are struggling for their day-to-day existence, and thus have materialistic values, which are then reflected in their political and social views.

Another explanatory variable, which increases individuals’ tendencies to have a materialistic value-system, is support for Fidesz.²⁵ Nonetheless, within the survey someone supporting the governing party, controlling for all other variables, was on average 1.3 times as likely to host materialistic values than the rest of the population. This same non-significant effect can be found among those with beliefs in traditional male-female roles, that is among those who agreed with the statement: “a man’s responsibility is to make money, a woman’s responsibility is housekeeping, and to take care of the children”²⁶.

If we examine which explanatory variables predict that someone would not host materialistic values, then we will find that voting for LMP, defining oneself as green/sustainable, and identifying with Együtt 2014–PM stand out. Additionally, the agreement with the claim that “democracy is better than all other political systems,” as well as living in Budapest, and having a father with a high level of education are binary explanatory dummy variables where a “yes” predicts that an individual will be less likely to be “materialistic” in value-orientation.

All in all: someone with materialistic value-set is more likely to be a Jobbik voter, and have traditional views on the roles of men and women; someone with non-materialistic views, however, is more likely to have a green/sustainable identity, and vote for LMP or Együtt 2014–PM.

III. 2. 3. How Do we Characterize People With Mixed Values?

The third group of people in our examination included those who picked on materialistic and one post-materialistic value. This group encompassed nearly four-tenth of the sampled population, thus they are not at all insignificant, and we cannot exclude the explanatory variables, which predict that someone has a mixed-value system.

Among the explanatory variables, the support of Együtt 2014–PM stands out. This fact emphasizes how heterogeneous the supporters of Együtt 2014–PM, even among the university and college students. Those who study economic related fields are statistically significantly less likely to have mixed values, while the model found a non-significant negative correlation between Jobbik voters and tendency to have mixed values. The most telling statistic, however, remains to be that Együtt 2014–PM tend to have mixed values.

In Short: the Green Youth

In this text, it is important to briefly discuss what value systems those of the youth generation have, who identify themselves as green/sustainable.

Those students that live in Budapest, are of the female gender, and who have well educated fathers (proxy for parents), are more likely to be green/sustainable. On the left/right political ideological scale, it is true that the more “rightist” someone is, the less likely that individual will identify themselves as “green.” In terms of public affairs and activism, the experiences in Western Europe are repeated in Hungary: the more interested an individual is about public affairs, the more politically active someone is the greater the chance of him or her being “green”.

A membership in environmental protection/conservation/preservation organization, logically, also increases the chance that someone identifies his or herself as “green.” In terms of education, those who are in the humanities are more likely to be green, than those who are in other areas; LMP voters, naturally, are also likelier to have green views. The most repulsive explanatory variable, unsurprisingly, happens to be support of Jobbik.

25. But again, unfortunately our modest survey data was not enough to find significance at strict levels, and thus further research is needed.

26. Respondents with these traditional views did, however, with statistically significant results, exhibit non-post materialistic values. That is they were statistically more likely to choose materialistic and mixed views than the average population

IV. Political Participation Among the Hungarian Youth

There was a study conducted in the 90's examining individual aspects of democratic participation (STUMPF-GAZSÓ 1992), which found that the youth, instead of the traditionally active past of political participation, have begun to keep their distance from political participation in all of the age groups. Gázsó Ferenc and Laki László's work has studied the effect of the change of systems on the Hungarian youth's relation to politics in the 1990s and 2000s. In their research pertaining to youth's political activism (GAZSÓ-LAKI 2004, 176), they attribute the distancing from politics to the negative connotations associated with political parties, and of the negative opinions connected to the values that politicians and political parties represent. Following their study, most of the further studies related to the Hungarian youth conducted in the 2000s took on the name "Ifjúság (Youth);" every four years a large sample study was conducted related to the youth and politics (SZABÓ A.-BAUER-LAKI 2002, BAUER-SZABÓ A. 2005, BAUER-SZABÓ A. 2009). However, the most recent studies and papers relating the youth's political participation have utilized a wider definition of what participation is.

While in the past decades there has been a decrease in political participation in the dimensions of western democracy's traditional political participation methods (voting, participation in political organizations, connection to political institutions), in civil participation there have been signs of an increase in participation (DALTON 2008; INGLEHART 1997; NORRIS 2002, 2007; KLINGEMANN-FUCHS 1995; PATTIE ET AL. 2004; KRISZI 2008; DALTON ET AL. 2004). Activism related to election, such as voting, campaigning, and participation in political parties, have become especially unpopular. Protests, and citizen lobbying groups, as well as acts not directly related to parliamentary politics have become more popular. Some researchers claim that it is not the least experience voters', or the youths' interest or level of participation that has become lower, but rather their attitude towards politics in general that has deteriorated. The youth have become more skeptical, critical, skeptical (HENN-WEINSTEIN-WRING 2002), but this should not be equated with the lack of willingness for political participation. Those studies that have examined this question generation by generation, have found that the youth are forming a generation, which are less interested in traditional forms of political participation (PHELPS 2004), but all of this does not support the oversimplified claim that the youth have become disillusioned with politics. (ZUKIN-KEETER-ANDOLINA-JENKINS-DELLI CARPINI 2006, 118-189).

The study of the development of political participation turned out to be a theoretical challenge for researchers, as during their research they came across terminologies and concepts that needed to be researched and have not been researched before. For example, when examining political participation, it was important to examine both the political and civil components of participation. (DAHLGREN 2000; DALTON 2004; DE VREESE 2006; DUNLEAVY 1996; LIVINGSTONE-BOBER-HELSPER, 2005; O'TOOLE-LISTER-MARSH-JONES-MC-DONAGH 2003; PHELPS 2005; VERBA ET AL., 1995). Among most of the studies that examined participation, it is a common trait that beyond measuring institutional participation (membership in party, participation in political events, participation in elections), they

included the previously mentioned new participation forms that are non-institutional. In most cases they separate the two forms of participation, so that the "new" and "old" forms can be compared. Verba, Scholzman, and Brady's research examined direct participation, and indirect participation. Banes and Kaase (1979) studied compared "traditional" and "non-traditional" participation, Inglehart and Catterberg (2002) "elite driven" and "anti elitist," Norris (2002) "citizen oriented" and "case-oriented", while Dalton "responsibility-based" and "commitment based" participation.

There is now an agreement among researchers of political participation in that political participation can be divided into different clusters depending on the action's nature. Verba, Scholzman, and Brady's approach seem to be appropriate for this study.

In our study, we listed the different types of political participations/activities in the following three groups (based on their required resources):

The "Traditional" political participation forms encompass many activities, and have been described extensively by Szabó Andrea and Kern Tamás' research (2011, 18-19). Using their approach, voter participation, participation in political organizations (political parties, unions, etc...), as well as the tasks related to these organizations (such as campaigning, congressional meetings, speaking up in the organization, etc...) are all traditional forms of participation. These participation forms have been around since the dawn of democracy, and these are usually forms of activism that require different levels of individual innovation over time, and that achieve different results from the perspective of the collective and the perspective of the individual. These forms are primarily connected to each other historically.

The "Collective" participation form, or in other words direct democratic participation describes those forms of participation, in which the citizen's direct participation is required, but unlike with many traditional forms of political participation, long-term commitment is not necessary. We further separate those Collective forms of political participation that require high levels of commitment and time and a lot of face to face activities, with those that require a low level of commitment and time. The above cited research paper by Szabó Andrea and Kern Tamás qualifies those activities as ones that require a lot of resources, time, and commitment, and substantial amounts of face mobilization in political protesting. Within this subset, the top of the hierarchy is the traditional confrontational legal protests, which require the participant's full commitment. These direct forms of protest include sitting-strikes, blockades, expressive and symbolic acts (such as hunger strikes). Direct participations that require few resources, come with low risk and require low level of commitment and involvement include signing statements and petitions, or petition letters and postcards, for example.

Beyond the above two forms of participation mentioned, we also examined a third, new form of political participation: "virtual" participation. With the help of the internet, it has become possible to take part in a participation that can be either traditional or direct and collective, through blogs, social media, comments related to public affairs, posts, and many other. This new form of participation typically requires low levels of commitment and few resources. In Active Youth Hungary 2013 we asked five questions pertaining to virtual political participation and activism.

We examine the three activism forms through the frameworks of one model. In this, we are trying to find an answer to the question of whether a new form of political activism is present or not among Hungarian university and college students, and whether this new form of online political participation and activism is truly different in nature and consequences from those traditional ones we have historically been accustomed to. Additionally we want to examine whether there actually are three distinct groups of political participation within the Hungarian youth?

Before writing our paper and conducting our research, we drew up our hypothesis of political activism and participation among students in higher education in a simple diagram. In this diagram we hypothesized that participation in elections, and membership in organizations will strongly dominate the space of political mobilization, while the direct democratic participation will have a significantly smaller role in the arena. We hypothesized that the new, virtual participation is increasing in prominence, and is currently similar in size to traditional democratic participation. Naturally all three types have overlapping areas, where the middle area, overlapped by all three political spheres of activism, encompass those young individuals who are most active. Those in this area are likely to become the future politicians of Hungary. On the other end of the spectrum we hypothesize that the relative majority of the youth does not partake actively in politics, and does not participate in public affairs either, that is the majority of the youth is completely passive in this sense.

Figure 8.
Hypothesis Relating to Political Participation

IV. 1. Traditional Participation

Among the many traditional civil democratic participation forms, Active Youth Hungary 2013 chose to use willingness to vote in the upcoming parliamentary election, or take in political organizations prior to the election as the measure of the traditional form of political participation.

IV. 1. 1. Level of Organization

There have been a number of studies conducted in the past ten years regarding the level of formal organization among the Hungarian youth (for example the "Ifjúság" studies), which anonymously describe the youth as disorganized, disintegrated generation. All of the examinations showed, however, that among the youth, those in university and college form a small isolated island that is somewhat of an exception to the general rule. They are the ones who are relatively more active, of whom a relatively large proportion, for example 55% of those in college, have some form of organizational background (SZABÓ A.–KERN 2011, 69). The Active Youth Hungary 2012 study backs up this assertion. (SZABÓ A.–ROSS 2012).

Like in the study conducted a year and a half earlier, in our 2013 study we found sport-organizations to be the key dominant element of organizations that the youth partake in; it would be a bit of an exaggeration to define their participation in such organizations as political. The second most popular type of organization for the youth was academic and intellectual organizations, of which every fifth youth is connected to. Following these academic organizations are cultural, traditional, arts-related clubs and organizations, as well as religious organizations. The remaining organizations (we listed twelve in our survey) did not boast large enough support, and therefore were significantly less relevant than the popular organizational categories. Perhaps the most important development of the past year, and one which resounded strongly in the general population, was the rejuvenation of student-led and organized student councils, unions, and organizations. Specifically HaHA's (Hallgatói Hálózat-Student Network) 2012 winter protests, which according to HaHA had the support and activism of 2% of the total student population in Hungary.

Figure 9.

Are You Connected to the Following Groups or Organizations?
 (The percentage distribution of those groups which were mentioned
 by more than 10% of the respondents)

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

The results showed that 40% of Hungarian university and college students responded negatively to all of the organizations, that is they were not formally affiliated with any of the listed types of organizations. 29% of the students were affiliated with one organization, and a further 17% were affiliated with two organizations. Only 15% of the students were affiliated with more than 2 organizations. (The average number of affiliations was 1.4, where 0 is being affiliated with none of the types listed, and 12 is being affiliated with all twelve types of organizations.

The data suggests that the frequency of formal ties to organizations grows as the education level of the respondent grows. The strength of the relationship also increases linearly with the time spent in higher education (PhD programs); this suggests that those who have spent significant amounts of time in an institution find easier an organization, which they find themselves closely connected to. What the respondent was studying was almost an important factor in determining how many, and what types of organizations the respondent was a part of. Those studying religious studies, for example, though there are relatively few of them, were living a much more active organizational life than those in other programs. It is not by accident that those in Christian higher education institutions seem to have stronger connections to organizations than those of other institutions. Perhaps it is not completely evident, but there is no significant difference between supporters of one political party and supporters of another in respects to organizational activism.

In the interest of measuring the non-formal participation in organizations, in the process of collecting the data we provided the respondents with a question regarding their participation and activism in slacker, more undefined organizations (such as a musical group, or a hobby group, or a film club). Our examination and survey finds that about 56% of the youth take part in such lax organizations.

Because it became clear from the data that the youth's connection and relation to politically active organizations, or organizations related to public affairs is significantly more timid than their participation in many organizations of the non-political nature, we created an indicator from the results of our research, which is specifically an indicator regarding participation in public affairs and politics related organization. Here, only those organizations were listed that have an important political or public-affairs related role. These organizations include:

- Hök
- HaHa
- Other student unions and organizations
- Christian organization and other Religious group²⁷
- Human Rights Movements
- Political parties' youth movements
- Environmental organizations
- Other organizations that try to influence public affairs or politics.

Our data shows that of the Hungarian higher education students, about 36%, that is slightly more than a third, have commitments to organizations partaking in politics and public affairs. More than half, or 58% of the respondents are not connected to such organizations (6% provided no answer).

27. In Hungary, religious organizations often have a strong role in public affairs.

Figure 10.

Connection and Affiliation to Public Affairs and/or Political among Hungarian University and College Students (Percentage Distribution)

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

IV. 1. 2. Participation in Elections

Sociologists who specialize in elections and electoral participation examine willingness to participate before an election with the following question: "If there were a parliamentary election this Sunday (and you had the right to vote), would you certainly take part, likely take part, likely not take part, or certainly not take part in the voting?" When examining willingness to vote, it is not the past that is examined, but rather the future. In this sense it is very difficult to compare this statistic with an actualized electoral participation rate, or with an organization participation rate. To bridge the difference, and address this problem, the theory suggests that one should only examine and study those individuals who selected "certainly will participate" in their research. In their case it is likely that their willingness to vote in the future will turn into reality.

Compared to the Active Youth Hungary's previous study, conducted with two waves of data collection (one at the end of 2012, and one at the beginning of 2012), the percentage of those who are certain in their electoral participation has decreased. While at the end of 2011, and beginning of 2012 50% of university and college students were certain that they would take part in an election next Sunday, in 2013 this statistic changed to 47%. During our research we attempted to find answers to what factors affect the youth's willingness to participate in an election. In order to address this question, we conducted a binary logistic regression analysis.²⁸

28. The model was significant, and explained 21% of the variation in the dependent variable.

According to the regressions we ran, the models suggests that none of following explanatory variables had a significant effect on one's willingness to vote: technical education, type of home, subjective perception of one's own financial situation, one's relation and opinion to dictatorship, one's parents education level²⁹, whether the individual plans to work abroad. Interestingly online activism (where a respondent can scale his or her activeness in the online community on a 1–5 scale) was not significant, while offline activism (which can take up a score of 1–14, depending on how many offline activities a respondent takes part in. Examples would be petitions, boycotts, etc...) did end up being significant.

The models suggest that for each unit that an individual is more interested in public affairs, his or her chances of participating in voting grow by a factor of 1.818.³⁰ When a respondent claims to be one unit more radical, their chances of taking part in voting increase by 17.1%³¹. It is very important to mention that Együtt 2014–PM voters are 4.033 times, while Fidesz voters are 2.691 times likelier to go vote than the average student. Those studying economics related fields are 1.572 times as likely to vote as everyone else on average, while an increase of plus one offline activity in public affairs or politics results in the model predicting a 28.9% increase in willingness to vote.

Willingness to vote and affiliation/ membership in organizations, though not to strongly, are correlated. In short it can be said that the higher the probability that someone will take part in voting, the higher the probability that that individual is member of at least one organization.

Willingness to vote and membership of public affairs or political related organizations, however, are strongly correlated. Those with memberships in organizations related to public affairs and politics are characterized by a higher willingness to vote than those who are not members of such organizations. The correlation is maintained backwards as well; that is those who are certain in that they will vote, are on average predicted to be 5% more affiliated with political and public affair related organizations.

All in all, based on the strong correlation between activism in public affairs and political organizations and willingness to vote, we can conclude that at least 30% of the students of Hungarian higher education are not participating, in the strict sense, through traditional political participation. One quarter of them only declared willingness to vote (no affiliation with political or public affairs related organizations), while 14% of them declared affiliation with such organizations, but were not certain in whether they would vote. In the classical sense, 19% of the studied population participates in politics or public affairs in the traditional sense. They are the ones who would certainly take part in an upcoming election this Sunday, and who are also members of public affairs and politics related organizations. In the future we will refer to this small group as traditional participants.

29. Whether the father has a college diploma was used as a proxy for parent's education.

30. The interest in public affairs in the survey stated: on a scale 1–5 (5 very interested, 1 not at all interested).

31. A respondent can scale his or her opinion on a 1–7 scale. (1 moderate, 7 radical).

Figure 11.
The Traditional Public Affairs/Political Participation Types Among Hungarian University
and College Students.
(Percentage Distribution)

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

IV. 2. Collective Participation

As mentioned earlier, one of the important conclusions of the last wave of our research pertained to the challenge of the stereotypical claim that Hungarian students are generally politically passive (SZABÓ A.–ROSS 2012). The Active Youth Hungary 2013 study, as in most dimensions, strengthened the results and the conclusions of the previous year's study in this field as well. We can continue to decidedly claim that the image of students spending all of their time in ruin pubs chugging beer has become outdated. We are not claiming that students like these do not exist, but to expand this stereotype to the whole of the student population is far from fair and accurate.

University and college students were given 14 collective/ direct participation activities³², of which they were asked to specify whether they had participated in such an event during their lives. According to our hypothesis, the frequency of these activities could be placed in order based on the difficulty to partake in such an event.

The results suggested that only 26% of college and university students did not involve themselves in any of the listed activities. The rest partook in at least one, but most in more than one of the listed activities. In fact, one fifth of the respondents participated in four or more of the protesting activities associated under "collective/ direct participation."

32. Signature collection; signing a political declaration; participation in a demonstration; spontaneous protest; march on the street; boycott; campaign activity; wearing a button, contacting a politician; activity within a political party; being a candidate at an election; becoming an elected official of an organisation, donating money to party or to NGO.

If we were to create an index based on the results of the participation among the 14 listed events, where 0 would be equated with an individual not taking part in any of the activities, and 14 describing an individual who partook in all 14 activities at least once in his or her life, than the average result would be 2.1. This strengthens the claim that those participating in political/public affairs one event, will often participate in another of the similar type.

According to our 2013 spring data collection, the most popular collective/ direct democratic participation among full-time students is boycotting. 36% of the respondents chose this answer. About 30% of the respondents took part in petitions and signing of political statements (asked separately), and about 30% took part in protests. Following these direct forms of protest, 21% of the respondents answered that they have contacted their local or national representatives.

Figure 12.
Have you taken part in the following activities?
(The distribution of those answers that received more than 10% yes)

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

2012 was an important year for political protests, as the Hungarian society familiarized itself with a new demonstration types: spontaneous protests and marches. This form of protests has become the 6th most popular form of direct participation; 16% of tertiary education students partake in such activities, which is especially high considering that this form of protests had not really existed in Hungary previously.

This was the first time in our series of studies that we measured "donations to organizations," because our experiences have shown that more and more political and civil organizations have been asking for donations from their supporters and sympathizers. About 16% of the responding students donated some amount to their preferred organization.

More than one tenth of Hungarian college and university students were committed directly to a political party, which is proven by the fact that nearly one tenth of them participate in campaign activities, or purposely wears symbols that represents one of the political parties. Finally, only one other participation reached 10%: "have been elected an official in an organization." It is important to mention that because of the strong aversion from political parties, we decided not to narrow down the question between political parties and organizations. Presumably the responding students understood this statement, legitimately, to encompass official positions in student unions and student legislative branches.

The insensitivity of collective participation is correlated with certain socio-demographic explanatory variables. These significant variables have changed somewhat since the last wave. While in the Active Youth Hungary 2012 study high income, Budapest residence, and male gender were the strongest predictors of activism, this year lower income students showed a drastic increase in direct/ collective participation. This could be a result of a new level of dissatisfaction among students in Hungary.

Among the students surveyed, those who studied social sciences, arts related studies, or religious studies were more likely to partake in direct/ collective forms of participation. In terms of education, those who have taken part in higher education for several years, that is students in PhD and Masters programs, exhibited the highest level of political activism. Institutionally speaking, by far the most active students were those that attend Christian higher education institutions, as well as those attending private institutions. The least active were those attending public colleges and technical schools (as opposed to public universities). Those who consider themselves to be Christians tended to have higher rates of activism, while the same could be said for the participation rates among those students who claimed to be openly atheists. The two groups of course, presumably, are active in support of different goals, and representing different ideologies.

When we examine the supporters of political parties, Supporters of Együtt2014–PM are the most active, followed by Jobbik supporters, and then Fidesz supporters. The least active students with political preferences seem to be those who prefer MSZP.

IV. 3. Virtual Participation

"Seven years ago, to convince people to attend a protest required a very large effort from the organizers...There were events and protests that were planned and advertised half a year before the event. Today Matolcsy makes a speech in the morning, and by night time we have a protest in front of the National Bank." (András, Budapest)

„I think that the internet has a positive effect. While there was no Facebook, not only were there fewer protests, but the section of the population that was hidden, but had opinions was finally revealed. Many of the people do not want to go to protests, but still want to express their opinion. Facebook and the Internet give them a forum to do so. Because of this forum, many of these people have been encouraged, and very little is stopping them from actually participating in a protest. Perhaps Facebook can have a nourishing effect." (Noémi, Budapest)

The questions raised concerning the internet and those info-communicative technologies connected to the internet, and the political participation that it hosts can be summarized with one question: do the participants of this forum really encompass at least partially a new, previously politically not mobilized portion of the population? Does it provide a viable form of political participation to some who would otherwise not be willing to participate in the debates surrounding them? (A more detailed study on the matter: SZABÓ G.–MIHÁLYFFY 2009, 87.) The previously conducted study concerning Hungarian youth and online political activism strengthens the hypothesis made earlier (HÁRI 2010, 104), that at least among the youth, the political potential within the internet is utilized primarily by those groups who are already committed and politically active.

The previous wave of our research found no or very slight differences between those in this third group of political participants (Virtual) and those in the first two (Traditional, and Collective). It seemed that the internet's democratization effect had minimal additive power compared to the traditional democratization forms. (SZABÓ A.–ROSS 2012). The Active Youth Hungary 2013 study, utilizing the previous results, tested virtual participation. We asked five questions connected to online public affairs, societal problems. The intensity of participation in the activities we asked about produced a clear hierarchical scale.

Figure 13.
The Different Forms of Virtual Participation
(The Percentage of the Population who Participate Occasionally or Frequently in the Following:)

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

Considering both occasional and usual participations, more than half of the students who responded to our survey vote online, and 49% like certain pages. About 41% of the respondents claim that they create events online too. 32% of the students respond to others' comments, while 12% of them have a blog page.

Despite our preliminary expectation, which we hypothesized from the lower "costs" associated with online participation, and because the internet is taking up an ever increasingly significant portion of Hungarian students' day to day life, merely one tenth of the students in the survey participate in the activities we have listed on a frequent- systematic schedule. The systematic participation is more or less parallel with the diagram presented above, but it is worthwhile to note that among those who have a frequent systematic schedule for their online activities, voting and creation of events have the same frequency.

The truly interesting results come from the diagram below. The following diagram (partly) examines what college and university students do not participate in. Almost one half of the students don't even participate in liking issues related to public affairs. The proportion of students who engage in online voting on such issues barely reaches the fifty percent mark.

Figure 14.
Different Forms of Virtual Participation
(Distribution in Percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

These results further reinforce the claim that virtual activism takes on more of a periodical complimentary role than a supplementary role. As it will later be proven, online activism does not substitute traditional or collective/ direct democratic participation. We note that because there is such a large gap between frequent-systematic and occasional online participation, we have chosen to utilize only the data from the frequent-systematic online participants in the following analysis.

IV. 3. 1. What Factors Influence the Youth's Activism Online?

In our last research publication (SZABÓ A.—ROSS 2012) we hypothesized that online communication and participation is composed of more liberal, center-left oriented young students, while conservative rightist roots dominate offline participation. In our research we were also looking for answers to what explanatory variables help predict the type of individual who is politically active online. For this we conducted a linear regression model.³³

Of the 33 possible explanatory variables we saw that the membership of public affairs-political organizations had the strongest statistical effect. Pupils who disclosed membership in such organizations exhibit 0.222 units higher activity online. We saw the importance of involvement in public affairs in this model as well. For each unit of increase in interest of public affair related questions, on average, the model predicted an individual who was 0.184 units more active online. Political interest, similarly, had a strong positive effect; that is one unit increase in political interest, holding all other explanatory variables constant, leads the model to predict a 0.115 unit increase in online activism.³⁴

In terms of political values and ideologies, only those who refer to themselves as "radical" showed a higher than average participation online. A one-unit increase in radicalness predicts, on average, a 0.083 increase in political activism online.³⁵ The hypothesis that perhaps liberal center leftist students are more active online than their classmates does not seem to be backed up by the data we have collected.

Among the socio-demographic factors we found a significant correlation for gender, and subjective view of one's own financial situation in predicting online participation and activism. Interestingly enough perception of one's own financial situation shows a negative correlation, that is the worse a student's perception of his or her financial situation is, the likelier it is that this person is politically active online.

Among the majors, only natural sciences stood out: natural science students on average are 0.107 units more likely to active online. This is an important conclusion because we hypothesized that the internet would activate, democratize those societal groups (in this situation students) who do not have enough time to partake in traditional and collective forms of political participation because of the "costs" (i.e. time).

The remaining 25 explanatory variables did not show significant results.

The data on virtual participation, thus, does not validate the hypothesis that virtual participation replaces or substitutes other forms of political participation. The virtual and non-virtual political participations are not alternatives of each other, but compliments of each other. The internet provides a new complimentary form of activism for those students who have been already been classified as politically active.

33. The model was significant, and explained 48% of the variation in the dependent variable.

34. The interest in public affairs and in political matters in the survey stated: on a scale 1–5 (5 very interested, 1 not at all interested).

35. A respondent can scale his or her opinion on a 1–7 scale. (1 moderate, 7 radical).

The question is whether this generalization is true for occasional online activism as well. Perhaps it is the occasional, non-frequent participation that allows otherwise politically non-active students to express their opinions. Perhaps with fixed schedules, little free time, the periodical online participation is a type or refuge from passivity; an appropriate channel that allows these otherwise passive students to on occasion express their opinions and become politically active, even if only through virtual mediums.

Table 4.
Online participation according to respondent's major*
(Percentage distribution)

	No participation	Occasional Participation	Frequent Participation
Computer Science	46%	41%	13%
Doctoral Science	46%	44%	9%
Medical Science (not doctoral)	41%	47%	12%
Agrarian Sciences	38%	45%	17%
Technical Sciences	33%	53%	14%
Economic Fields	31%	53%	16%
Average	31%	52%	17%
Artistic Training	30%	45%	25%
Natural Sciences	27%	56%	17%
Legal Studies	26%	54%	20%
Teaching	22%	67%	12%
Liberal Arts	20%	57%	23%
Social Sciences	16%	51%	33%

*only majors with at least twenty respondents included.

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

The above table suggests natural science, legal studies, liberal arts, and teaching program students showed above average participation rates in "occasional" online activism. Among the listed majors, those in the legal studies and liberal arts programs already exhibited higher than average "frequent" online activism, that is the new group in this segment seems to be natural science students and teaching program students. In their cases it can be argued that the virtual sphere provides them with a forum for occasional political activism. In the cases of the other majors tested in the hypothesis, however, (such as medical science, doctoral, technical, and computer science) there is no such connection found, and they seem to have a higher than average proportion of their population partaking in no virtual activism what so ever.

IV. 3. 2. With What Can we Associate College Student's Participation in Organized Protests?

„The advantages and disadvantages of communication online are the same. The news and communication reaches many people, many of these people commit to coming, but then many forget about it altogether. This is because after a while people are invited to so many events, that they don't even check what they are invited to anymore. This takes away from the quality, and importance of an invite. And from this point on invitations are not taken seriously (on either side). This is different from when you get an invitation in hand. That you do not forget. This is why (in this dimension) it is worthwhile to stay with the traditional approach.” (Marietta, Szeged)

„There are so many stimulations that affect us on a day to day basis. In the world of smartphones and wifi, that we do not even notice posters anymore. It's good to have movement-organizations on the web, as well as communication, we just have to be very careful with it. We have to make sure that a message does not register as spam for someone. Instead a message should include useful information. That is we cannot overstep the stimuli threshold, after which the targeted audience will ignore the message presented for them.” (Tamás, Szeged)

After the importance of the internet became clear in the 2012 student protests,³⁶ our research group decided to directly ask the respondents whether they have taken part in online organized protests. One fifth of the respondents took place in protests, demonstrations, and movements, of which they were notified of online.

To understand which factors influenced someone to participate in an online organized protest, we examined the responds with the help of a binary logistic model. Of the relevant explanatory variables in the model,³⁷ the largest effect is exhibited by the respondents membership in organizations. Provided the respondent was a member of HaHa (Student Network), the model predicts a 9.157 higher probability of the individual partaking in an internet-organized protest.

In terms of the party-preference predictors, Együtt 2014-PM voters are predicted to be 2,063-more likely participate in an internet organized protest, while those who support Fidesz are 0.33 as likely as the average student to engage in such an event

The (living) location of the respondent also proved to be a significant predictor, where living in Budapest increased the model's prediction of and individual's chance of participating in an online organized event by a factor of 1.782.

36. Students protested against the Hungarian government's planned cuts in state subsidies to finance college tuition in Budapest, December 10, 2012. More than 1,000 students rallied blocking bridges over the Danube in freezing weather and marched to parliament. The protest later became a nationwide movement and students organised similar actions in different Hungarian cities during several weeks.

37. The model was significant, and explained 30,7% of the variation in the dependent variable.

Some of the explanatory variables which proved to be insignificant were radicalism, interest in public affairs, major, or one's perception/relation to dictatorships.

An important result of our research is that we can confirm the expectations of the skeptical with respects to online participation. This is because in our model online participation and activism did not show a statistically significant and important role in determining whether an individual participated in online organized protests. That is, just because someone systematically and frequently reads and clicks on online news headlines, blogs, pages, likes and comments, he or she is not any more likely, according to our model, to participate in a demonstration. When analyzing this conclusion, it is also important to consider (for comparative reasons) that one additional offline event participation correlates with, on average, a 45.6% increase in the chance of an individual participating in an online organized protest.

IV. 4. Conclusion: Participation Structure of Hungarian Students

Leading up to our study we hypothesized that voting and organizational membership will be the actions that dominate political mobilization that direct democratic participation will have as significantly smaller role, while the new virtual participation is in the process of increasing in dominance. We hypothesized that the three types would have overlapping populations, where the middle region, overlapped by all three forms of participation, would encompass the politically most active Hungarian youths.

Compared to our preliminary predictions, the direct form of participation did end up taking the most dominant position; almost three-quarters of the youth participated in some form on direct participation in their lives. Our research reinforced the assertion that to understand Hungarian college and university students' it is vital to closely examine direct democratic participation. 19% of the students reported participating in traditional forms of political activism, while those admitting to participating in virtual forms of political activism was significantly below our expectations: only 17% claimed to have done so. We summarized our results in an aggregated diagram.

It is very interesting, that single form of participation is very rare (less than 10% in all cases); that is one form of political participation often attracts other forms to it. That is if a student is at least occasionally active in one form, that student will likely be active in other forms of activism too.

Figure 15.
The public affair and/ or political participations' aggregated model

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

32% of the surveyed students distanced themselves from all forms of political activism (or the data on them was not adequate), and were thus passive. The passive youth, compared to the average, are less interested in public affairs, barely interested in politics, and do not talk about public issues and questions at home or with friends. A larger than representative portion of passive students consider themselves to be in the center of the political spectrum. They are much more critical and skeptical of any system, as almost 40% of them believe that "for people like them, one political system is like another." Their political preferences, as one would have probably presumed, are hard to characterize. There is a rather high level of uncertainty among them, and a large portion of them would certainly not take part in an election held this upcoming Sunday.

A larger than average portion of medical and doctoral MD, technical, and computer science students are politically passive. They are also overrepresented by those who are not religious (but not atheists), and those who "live without problems."

Were there to be a parliamentary election held this Sunday, 47% of the respondents claimed that they would certainly take part in the voting. In terms of affiliation with organizations, 29% are affiliated with one, 17% with two, while 15% of students claim to be affiliated with three or more organizations. Directly or indirectly, based on student's affiliation with public affairs and issues related organizations, 36% of Hungarian college and university students, that is a bit more than one-third of them have connections to political or public affairs related organizations. 58% of them are not connected to such an organization at all. Only two percent of those questioned responded that they were affiliated directly with a political party. Analyzing this data, we can conclude that 19% of the students questioned took part in traditional public affair activism.

Three quarter of the students (74%) took part in some form of collective/ direct political participation. The most popular form of direct political participation was boycotting; 36% of the students claimed they have boycotted before. About 30% of the students participated in protests, and close to the same proportion engaged in some form of petition, political statement signing. Though spontaneous protests is a completely new form of demonstration in Hungarian society, it has already become the 6th most popular form of demonstration among the Hungarian youth (16% of the respondents have taken part in spontaneous protests). Those in the social sciences, and art departments, and those in religious studies showed the highest willingness to partake in collective/ direct activism.

Though the internet has spread to almost 100% of Hungarian college and university students, contrary to our hypothesis the virtual activism is not as prominent as expected. Virtual participation takes on a complimentary role, and does not substitute traditional or direct forms of participation. Our 2013 research strengthens our previous claim, that virtual participation does not democratize, and in general does not encourage new, previously passive individuals, to partake in public affairs and politics.

The 2012 student protests resulted in an especially interesting overlap between the members of the virtual and collective political participation form (which makes up 9% of the examined population). The correlation between collective/ direct participation and virtual participation is strong: the model predicts that an individual participating in one additional type of offline activity will be on average 1.456 times as likely to have partaken in a form of virtually (online) organized demonstration. Online activity (news clicks, bogs, page likes) in itself is not correlated with participation in virtually (online) organized protests and demonstrations.

The area overlapped by all three forms of political participation (active youth) in our sample consisted of only 6% of the respondents. This population represents those youths who actively politicize with all three forms of political participation.

Studying the three participation forms, one can establish that some of the more important predictors with significant explanatory value, that help predict an individual's probability of lying in the "active" area include the student's family's socio-demographic background, socio-cultural background, level of political socialization, as well as certain pre-disposed traits.

Compared to the average, PhD students, males, and upperclassmen show higher tendencies to be "active". In terms of area of study, those studying social sciences, liberal arts are more likely to be "active." Atheists and Christians are also more likely to be "active" than those who responded otherwise, and seem to be highly interested in both public affairs related, and political issues. The data suggests that activeness is partially determined by the availability of family and friends who a student discusses public affairs, social problems, and politics.

Ideologically active youth are characterized as polar, in that they often host liberal or conservative, leftist or rightist views. On the radicalness scale, the active youth, on average, is found to be significantly more radical than the rest of the student population. A larger

than representative portion of them identify themselves as having nationalistic feelings, being Christian democratic, or on the other side, being leftist radical, social democratic, green, and environmentalist. This polar tendency can also be observed in respect to student's relation and opinion of democracy and dictatorships. 61% of the active youth find democracy better than all other forms of political system, while a quarter of them could accept democracy under certain conditions. Finally, it is important to note that the active youth have very varied parliamentary-party preferences, but unlike the rest of the population, they have decided who they support, and construct part of the stable voting base for these political parties.

V. Distribution of Party Preferences among Hungarian College and University Students

The party preferences of the youth have always diverged from the preferences of the older generations and this divergence has been relatively independent of the time period or location. More recent Hungarian research regarding the youth's political preferences (STUMPF 1994 and 1996, KARÁCSONY 2005) have followed Mannheim's footsteps, and have attributed the differences in preferences to political socialization. Because the current pensioners socialized in the 1970's, they, on average, have closer ties to MSZP (social-democratic party); similarly, today's 40–50 year olds, those who socialized around the transformation of systems (circa 1989), are strongly driven by anticommunist emotions and rhetoric, and thus the majority of them have backed Fidesz (the governing conservative party). At the same time the generation that has matured since the transformation of systems in 1989–1990 does not have a distinct political tie that unites them. For this generation Fidesz is not a reform party like for many from the 1989-era.³⁸ In the youth's eyes, both MSZP and Fidesz are outdated parties that rot in leading the country and being in opposition. What are the preferences of the youth then?

Medián³⁹, Tárki⁴⁰, and Ipsos⁴¹ public polling organizations have released many polls regarding this question, which have found that new political formations such as Jobbik (far-right party) and LMP (green party) receive far greater support among the youth than among the general population. Because Fidesz's dominance among the political parties is exceptionally strong right now, it should come as no surprise that though the magnitude of their support is smaller, a plurality of the youth still support Fidesz. Nonetheless, the 2nd largest party is clearly Jobbik among the youth (which is not the case for the general population). In fact in certain polls even LMP receives greater support than the socialists.⁴² We also know, based on the previously cited polls, that LMP has greater support among those individuals who have higher levels of education, just like, against common belief, Jobbik too tends to have higher than average support among the more educated societal groups. Those with lower levels of education tend to support the two older large parties (Fidesz and MSZP). If we consider the results of these polls and the two new parties' growing online mobility, support, and activism, then the result of last year's partially online, partially offline data collection of university and college students should come as little surprise to us.

In the diagram one can see the results of the 2012 survey and data collection. These results should be compared with the 2013 data. We indicated the support of the parties among those who have made a definite choice (decided voters).

38. When referring to the 1989 generation, or to those from the 1989, we are referring to the generation that socialized, that is spent most of their 20s in that era.

39. http://hvg.hu/hvgfriss/2012.51-52/20125152_hova_szavaznanak

40. <http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2012/kitekint/20120207.html>

41. <http://www.republikon.hu/upload/5000269/partok%20felidben.pdf>

42. According to 2012 data.

Figure 16.
Party Preferences Among University and College Students in 2012, and in 2013. (Distribution in Percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2012 and 2013.

Like in 2012, Jobbik received the plurality of the support in 2013 as well, but the magnitude of the radical parties support has decreased marginally. Because concurrently Fidesz's support has grown slightly, the difference between the two rightist parties has more or less dissipated. Consequently the proportion of students who would vote for the right (among decided voters) has not changed much since 2012; a little more than half of college and university students would vote for one of the two parties representing the right. Similarly, the proportion of undecided voters among the youth has remained around 40%. While the support of the left is similar to what it was a year ago, there have been significant shifts between the parties. The emergence of the Együtt 2014–PM (centrist liberal party) has stirred up the youth base, as the coalition has already reached a level of support almost as high as Fidesz, and they are by far the most popular leftist party among the youth in Hungary. We could not examine this in our data collection, thus we cannot be certain about this, but it is highly probable that many voters changed their support from LMP (in 2012) to Együtt 2014–PM (today). Part of the coalition is, after all, a fairly significant broken off faction that diverged from LMP. Compared to LMP losing 60% of its support among the youth population, MSZP and DK (centre–left party) have also lost some of their student supporters, but not nearly as much. Still, in 2013 the two parties together only make up slightly more than 4% of the surveyed student population.

In the next section we will introduce what type of characteristics describe young supporters of each political party, who would vote for each party, and what motivates them to do so. Because in our survey sample of 1300, the number of those who selected LMP, DK, and MSZP are too low to make statistically sound inferences and conclusions about them, we

will refrain from generalizations about their base. The three most popular parties among the youth, though, had high enough support to make statistically significant inferences; the next section will describe and analyze the youth supporters of Jobbik, Fidesz, and Együtt 2014–PM.

Pertaining to LMP supporters, even with only 97 respondents selecting LMP as their favored party a couple of short, conservative generalizations can still safely be made. It seems that young LMP voters place themselves in the center on the left-right spectrum. They consider their views as somewhat liberal and definitely green and sustainable; they do not consider themselves radical, and they are supporters of the democratic system over all other political systems. In the focus group discussion greens and liberals were the most common words to describe LMP voters.

V. 1. Jobbik

Jobbik is a political party that has significant support in every corner of the country. It should be clear just from the party's sheer size that Jobbik is a highly colorful and diverse party, and that it is not at all true that the party is composed of "the ones who lost-out," or those who have been socially deprived since the transformation of systems (KOVÁCS 2013; RUDAS 2010; BÍRÓ NAGY – RÓNA 2011). Among university and college students, like last year, Jobbik had supporters from all major socio-economic sectors of society and could convince people in completely different economic and social situations to support their party. In the social dimensions Jobbik over-performed among men, those studying in BA programs (that is those under 22 years of age), those who are single, those who live in strongly knit communities, and those who have trouble making do financially on a day-to-day basis. It is crucial to note that these sociological variables did not show strong explanatory value, and Jobbik had support among the opposing sociological groups as well. In a multivariate analysis, that is controlling for all the explanatory variables that we considered relevant, there was only one demographic variable that maintained statistical significance as a non-joint explanatory variable: Jobbik supporters are often first generation intellectuals, and have fathers with only around a high school education.

In last years study we found that Jobbik's support among first time voters can be tracked back to subcultural factors: Jobbik voters are often first time voters in their teens or early twenties who are still unemployed, are generally not in a serious relationships, often are not members of civil organizations or voluntary associations, and thus have a significant amount of free time and energy to spare. Some of the youth uses this energy to feed their interest of politics and public affairs. For many of them there are not many options to choose from. In much of Hungary, especially in eastern Hungary, Jobbik and its extreme right subculture was the most dedicated organization, and the party that spent significantly more resources and energy trying to appeal to the youth than the others. Jobbik organized concerts, beer fests, camps, technical forums, and many other youth oriented

events on a systematic basis (RÓNA-SŐRÉS 2012). This year's survey results strengthen the hypothesis: 26% of respondents find Jobbik to be active in their community, which is in comparison to 30% of respondents who found Fidesz to be active in their community. Even more stunning is that only 18% found LMP, MSZP, DK, and Együtt 2014–PM active combined. Because we know Jobbik's support among the youth and the general population, we can conclude that Jobbik's strong results in this question can only be achieved if supporters of other parties recognized Jobbik's presence in their community as well.

Jobbik supporters are more interested in politics and public affairs than the average potential voter, and on average exhibit higher unemployment rates than non-Jobbik voters (statistically significantly different from rest of the population at). Only one in every four Jobbik voter is currently working (statistically significantly different from rest of the population at while only one in three Jobbik voter has had at least three months of work experience. Though the differences compared to other young party supporters are not statistically significant, it might be interesting to mention that most Jobbik voters have not been in a serious relationship.

Nonetheless, statistically speaking the differences are much stronger in ideological and value-system preferences than in sociological dimensions. 57% of young Jobbik supporters affiliate with "nationalism" and "stability and order" as slogans, whereas only 28% of Fidesz voters associate to similar slogans (even though Fidesz is equally keen on these values). On the two dimensional ideological scale, Jobbik supporters naturally identify themselves as radical rightist and conservative (but it should be noted, that only a slight majority of Jobbik supporters identified with conservatism). Because of Fidesz's dominance among those considering themselves conservative, only the "radical" slogan gained significance in our multivariable regression. One difference between conservatives of the Fidesz party, and those supporting Jobbik, is that Jobbik supporters do not blame the situation of those in poverty on the impoverished; in other words they do not claim that one is necessarily responsible for his or her financial situation. Students who blame the poor for their own situation are half as likely to be Jobbik supporters according to the multivariate statistical analysis.

Only one in five Jobbik supporters rate democracy as the best political system. This is significantly lower than supporters of the other parties. Slogans of stability and order are also highly indicative of Jobbik supporters, but it must be noted that identification with these slogans were only significant in a two variable regression. In the multivariable regression, that is after we controlled for all explanatory variables, the best predictor continued to be Jobbik supporters' stance on the Roma. The model predicts that someone who agrees with the statement "Crime is in the blood of the Roma people" is on average three times as likely to be a Jobbik supporter than students in general; to emphasize the strength of this explanatory variable, the multiregression model that predicted this strong and significant correlation had another anti-Roma statement included in it as an explanatory variable; this correlation of a factor of three held true even after controlling for this other variable.

Jobbik offers a compact solution to most societal and economic problems. Often this is done through scapegoats, or vast overgeneralizations, but the simplicity of Jobbik's rhetoric seems to be attractive to those in their teens. This does not, however, mean that those who support Jobbik's simple rhetoric agree with the totality of their favorite party's platform. Many of Jobbik's younger supporters took part in the higher education protests, many of which were organized by HaHa, which is a student network supported mostly by intellectual students on the left. More than half of Jobbik youth supporters claimed that they took part in the educational protests, while only about one in four took part in Jobbik demonstrations.

Perhaps the best tool for mapping the reasons and motives behind the youth's support of Jobbik is our survey question requesting the respondents to describe each political party using 11 descriptive adjectives and phrases provided. Answers to this question showed just what the qualities are that the youth admire in Jobbik. 36% of the sample surveyed said that Jobbik does a good job appealing to the youth; that is many of the non-Jobbik youths claimed that Jobbik succeeds in appealing to them or their age group. LMP received similar results, but Fidesz and Együtt 2014–PM received this compliment only half as frequently, while there was almost no one who would claim MSZP appeals to the youth. Perhaps an even stronger message regarding Jobbik's support was that more college and university students (24%) claimed that among the available political parties, Jobbik had a "credible fight against corruption," than for any other party. Regarding this statement, LMP received second place, as 14% of the respondents agreed that such a description characterizes the green party. Finally, the party's third and perhaps most important strength lies in their stance on the Roma situation. 76% of Jobbik supporters, and 26% of the general youth population considers Jobbik's rhetoric and policy regarding the conflicts between the Roma and non-Roma population as satisfactory. In short, with this societal question, and in this dimension, Jobbik seems to have succeeded into collecting sympathizers outside of its base (issue-ownership).

Though we did not include "commitment to nationalism" as a descriptive statement in our question, based on previous results of the survey, and based on other surveys, we can claim that next to the three mentioned strengths of Jobbik, nationalism is one of the key components that motivate students to support the party. In the open-ended section of our survey 8% of respondents claimed that "nationalistic" or "patriotic" identifiers came to their mind when they thought of Jobbik. In a similar open-ended question focus group discussions all lead to the participants stating that nationalism and patriotism strengthened Jobbik's base.

The survey question was also successful in measuring what are the connotations associated with Jobbik. 40% of all respondents associated Jobbik with racism, extremism, as well as anti-Roma, anti-Semitic rhetoric, and Nazi-beliefs; these were also the most common negative descriptions in the focus groups. The data shows that 6% of the respondents would describe the party as "aggressive" above all other descriptions. 10% of the respondents criticized the party without any concrete criticisms ("disgrace", "untenable", "lunatics", etc.). The focus group leaders, and the survey editors took extra care not to influence the respondents' opinions on these matters; these were answers to open-ended questions. Thus, in conclusion, though the party has been very successful in its growth, it faces very serious restrictions in terms of its potential for future expansion in support.

V. 2. Fidesz

In the Active Youth 2013 study, Fidesz gained second place in terms of support among the questioned college and university students. 16% of the respondents claimed to support Fidesz. Since the 2012 study the governing party's support has grown marginally among the youth, but this growth is small enough that it could just be statistical error/noise. One of the plausible reasons for Fidesz's potential strengthening can be attributed to the collapse of LMP's voter base. LMP's support among the youth dropped from 18% to 8% since the 2012 survey. Again, it must be emphasized that this is within the margin of error, but it is still important to mention that Fidesz was the only party that was able to gain in its youth support compared to the 2011-2012 survey (with the exception of Együtt 2014–PM, which did not exist in the previous survey). Fidesz's dominance nationally as the largest political party with the most extensive and active political network is abundantly clear. Even among the youth students find Fidesz to be the most active political party.

Figure 17.

According to Your Opinion, How Active are the Political Parties Where you Live?
(e.g. local forums, protests, program organizations, posters, etc.,
in percentages)

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

The strongest explanatory variable describing Fidesz voters was self-declared religious affiliation. A student who considers his or herself to be religious, controlling for all other explanatory variables, was 3.5 times as likely to vote for Fidesz than a random student from the general population. Another fairly strong explanatory variable was agreement with the self-responsibility value statement.⁴³ A student who votes for Fidesz is about twice as likely to agree with the statement "Instead of the state, people should be responsible for themselves." This value seems to coincide with Fidesz voter's view on those in poverty. A Fidesz sympathizing university or college student is almost 1.8 times as likely to agree with the value statement "the majority of those in poverty are responsible for their own situation."

Among those students who believe that their job prospects and opportunities for employment are good students are 70% more likely to vote for Fidesz. Unsurprisingly Fidesz college and university students have much more optimistic views about their future. Those who are confident in their future are, on average, 1.5 times as likely to vote for Fidesz. This is strengthened by the factor that among those students who believe that one of the biggest social problems in Hungary is uncertainty and unpredictability, the probability of someone voting for Fidesz will drop to 2/3 of the general student population. Comparatively, among those youths who believe one of the biggest social problem in Hungary has to do with lack of culture, lack of motivation and determination of their own, the probability for a Fidesz vote is almost one and a half times larger than among the general population. Those who believe that the youth's problem stems from the youth and the responsibility of the youth is to fix their problems believe in a world where they emphasize citizens' responsibilities over citizens' rights. For these people and for those who believe in order and discipline, and stability, Fidesz is popularity grows by about 50%. All in all people who believe in stability and order, and are optimist, on average, prefer Fidesz more.

Similarly as with other parties, education type turned out to be an important predictor or indicator in terms of support of Fidesz. Legal studies students were twice as likely to vote for Fidesz than other students, holding all other variables in our explanatory model constant.

A negative explanatory factor in determining a youth's votes is one's opinions on desegregated Roma education. On average, those who believe in desegregated education, that is an integrated Roma and non-Roma education system, are about 30% less likely to vote for Fidesz than someone out of the general population. In this respect Fidesz voters are actually very similar to Jobbik sympathizers. The conservative worldviews are also reflected in the view of Fidesz supporters on female roles. Those who agree with the statement "a man's responsibility is to make money, a woman's responsibility is housekeeping, and to take care of the children" are more likely to vote for Fidesz by a factor of 1.6.

In the qualitative portion of the research, many parts of the focus group discussions were spent discussing the opinions people have developed about the parties. When describing Fidesz, the words "authoritarian", "power-hungry," and "disgrace" came up on several occasions. The most common negative quality of Fidesz described by focus group members was abuse of authority. The positive descriptions were related to their active role in national politics (that is politics for all fifteen million Hungarians, and not just the ten million living in Hungary), the representation of Hungarian interests against foreign interests, as well as their goal-oriented reforms.

The survey portion of the research included a couple of open-ended questions, which could be used to better understand the exact nature of the youth population's opinion of the parties. A quarter of the respondents used phrases or words to describe Fidesz that were simply descriptive, such as Viktor Orbán (the Prime Minister), government, rightist, etc. About one fifth of the answers were general criticisms, while about one tenth of the respondents used the word "dictatorship" in describing Fidesz. 8% of the respondents used the word "lying/liars." From these statistics it is clear that most Hungarian students are not satisfied with Fidesz's achievements, and have a negative image of the party. All of these criticisms, though, should be considered in relation to the other parties; Fidesz's popularity has grown marginally since the last survey, and they are now the second most popular political party among university and colleges students.

One of the lessons of the focus groups is that among the party politicians, the one word that describes Prime Minister Viktor Orbán the best for students is charisma. For János Áder (the President of Hungary), the descriptive word most often used was "the president," and adjectives to describe his personality or characteristics were rarely used. Most students had negative opinions of László Kövér (Apeaker of The Hungarian Parliament), often describing him as arrogant, and hypocrite. Lajos Kósa, on the other hand, was much more liked. Many respect him for his achievements as mayor of Debrecen. The Deputy Prime Minister, Tibor Navracsics, is less well known than the others talked about in the focus group; he received the description of "man in the background" very frequently during the qualitative portion of our research.

All in all Fidesz seems to be an elitist party among Hungarian college and university students. Fidesz supporting students seem to be optimistic about their future, believe their chances for employment are good, find personal responsibility important, and do not host strong solidarity towards those in poverty. The youth supporting the governing party find the most decisive problem in Hungary to be internal to society, that is a lack of culture, and determination of the youth. It is worthwhile to emphasize that their value system is not always consistent with their (positively rated) status quo: Post-materialistic life values have not become popular among Fidesz supporting students yet. More precisely Fidesz supporting college and university students are not to be differentiated from the students supporting other political parties based on their value system, but rather based on their views of their life. In fact in this Fidesz supporters are a very distinct group with well-defined identifiers (such as religion). Their political beliefs, on the other hand, are significantly less coherent. Young Fidesz supporters seemed to describe themselves as conservative, social democratic, green, as well as with many other political identifiers equally frequently.

43. Do you agree or disagree with: „Instead of the state, people should be responsible for themselves.“

V. 3. Együtt 2014–PM

During the 2013 data collection wave (2013 March through 2013 April) Együtt 2014–PM was considered a completely new political formation. The party, headed by ex Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai quickly expanded among college and university students in Hungary. In a matter of weeks it became the third most popular political organization among the youth. About 14% of the respondents backed the party; just this relatively high support gives reason to examine the factors that strengthen Együtt 2014–PM. It certainly wasn't the organizational power of the party that strengthened Együtt 2014–PM, as during the data collection the party was so young that only 8% of the respondents sensed any type of activism (such as protests, events, discussions) in their home district. As a means for comparison, 17% of the respondents sensed such activism coming from LMP (a significantly smaller party), and 33% sensed it from the socialist party (MSZP). It is worth mentioning as a footnote, that the leftist parties were far from reaching the level of activism of the rightist parties.

It is important as a preliminary step to understand the types of students who would support Együtt 2014–PM. In general these students are more open in their thinking, and they are more willing to accept the stamp of "liberal." Instead of believing in the "nationalist" and "national" politics, Együtt 2014–PM supporters seem to support European way of thinking. Among the party loyalists, 44% consider themselves liberal, while 26% consider themselves western/European when describing their views. Smaller proportion of these students prioritize order and stability (12%), but even for those who do, the open-ended portion of our questionnaire suggests that order and stability has a different meaning for them than for Jobbik supporters. These students rank uncertainty and unpredictability as one of the major sources of problem in Hungarian society, and for them order and stability is a way to combat these diseases. For Jobbik supporters order and stability is more about strong nationalist emotions, and order between the people.

In terms of their value system Együtt 2014–PM supporters are most like the leftist coalition voters from the beginning of the 2000s. In their basic-values they are central-liberal and leftist in that they believe in liberal rights and freedoms. An important characteristic of the organization is thus self-control, and calm and predictable politics and solutions; they are strongly against radical politics.⁴⁴ This is one of the main internal differences between Jobbik and Együtt 2014–PM party supporters. While young Jobbik voters are very proud of their radical self-definition, and host strong materialistic values, young Együtt 2014–PM voters stand out from the moderate significantly less.

A majority of the party's base is composed of males, and tends to have highly educated parents (proxy used- father's education). Their support is significantly higher in Budapest, and one central characteristic of Együtt 2014–PM supporters is their activeness online. The internet seems to be the best tool in reaching out them: our multiple variable logistic regression shows that among the youth active online, there is a statistically significantly larger chance of them voting for the Együtt 2014–PM coalition than among the general population.

44. On the radical–moderate scale they are much closer to the moderate.

As for their basic beliefs: Együtt 2014–PM voters are strong believers in democracy. Our multiple variable regression model shows that a youth's belief that democracy is better than all other available political systems, increases the probability that that youth will vote for Együtt 2014–PM by 80%! Furthermore hierarchical respect does not seem to be essential for their values and beliefs, while they have strong quarrels with accepting authoritarian political systems. These characteristics are not only important in describing Együtt 2014–PM youth supporters, but in distinguishing them from the rest of the youth population; among Hungarians, the thirst for a charismatic authoritarian leader is relatively strong, and, as discussed, the criticisms against democracy is strong. Együtt 2014–PM coalition student supporters identify themselves in relation to (as an opposing force to) the two strong rightist parties.

Együtt 2014–PM supporters accept and are open to the Hungarian minorities (specifically to the Roma in Hungary) much more so than members of other parties. Holding all other variables in our regression constant shows that an approval of desegregation of schools increases an individual's chances of voting for Együtt 2014–PM by almost 2 fold. Another level of acceptance is exhibited by their beliefs and values when it comes to gender roles, in which they portray modern leftist perspectives. They mostly disagree with the common saying "a woman's place is in the kitchen." Their modern beliefs in gender, racial, and general equality related issues distinguish Együtt 2014–PM university and college students strongly from the supporters of other parties. With all this in mind, it is still important to mention that while Fidesz's youth supporters are strongly distinguishable in many ways from the supporters of other parties, this cannot be said about Jobbik and Együtt 2014–PM supporters.

It is worthwhile to examine what those students who support Együtt 2014–PM, and the general student population thinks about Együtt 2014–PM. Együtt 2014–PM supporters have faith in the party's ability to lead the country (60%), and believe that their candidates are highly prepared to change the country for the better (57%). The general population tends to believe that the political formation caters to the young, but that its only goal is power. Nevertheless most people agree that the organization has well prepared politicians who are ready to lead the country.

In the focus group discussions, like for other parties, there were both negative and positive descriptions in connection to Együtt 2014–PM. In terms of negative descriptions, many of the participants referred to the PM members as "traitors" and "inexperienced." (PM broke off from the green party, LMP, in the belief that to defeat Fidesz in the newest electoral system, an electoral coalition is absolutely necessary). Positive descriptions included a belief that the party is highly diverse, its potential to govern successfully, and also the approval of the message of hope the party is attempting to spread.

All in all among Együtt 2014–PM college and university students, we have a greater chance of finding someone who is from Budapest, has highly educated parents, modern, open, with European value systems, and in many beliefs and values someone who is the exact opposite of a Jobbik college or university student. The mildly liberal students who believe in a democratic system, are against authoritarianism and do not want one single charismatic leader are more likely to be Együtt 2014–PM supporters than not. Compared

to the previous Active Youth studies conducted and the previous data collection waves, one thing can definitely be said: among college and university students Együtt 2014–PM has become a force to be reckoned with. It is questionable, however, whether the formation, which likely won over much of its support from LMP, will be able to maintain its level of support among the youth. LMP's example shows that voters' volatility is rather high among this age group. The question in the open-ended portion of the questionnaire underlines how, in contrast to the two rightist parties, a large group of stable party preference for Együtt 2014–PM has not developed to date. Even the positive descriptions seem to be momentary compliments (hope, new, co-operation, etc.), and are not of the ideological nature, which have proven to be more long term.

Table 5.
Explanatory Variables for Each Political Party,
Logistic Regression

Explanatory Variable	Jobbik	Együtt-PM	Fidesz
	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
Religious	1,038	0,330**	3,547***
Father with diploma (proxy for parent's education)	0,554***	1,232	1,185
Agree: Democracy is better than all other political systems	0,690*	1,810***	1,164
Agree: Roma children have the right to study in a school along with non-Roma kids.	0,605***	1,895***	0,682**
Agree: Instead of the state, people should be responsible for themselves.	0,940	0,822	1,972***
Moderate or radical	1,950***	0,784***	0,993
Confident in his/her future	0,906	0,813	1,526**
Confident in opportunities for employment	1,145	0,844	1,668***
Agree: Uncertainty and unpredictability are the youth's greatest problem (in Hungary today)	1,340	2,683***	0,632
Agree: Most of those in poverty are personally at fault for their situation.	0,494**	0,660	1,758**
Agree: Increased discipline is necessary to maintain and defend order	1,358	0,802	1,517**
Agree: A man's role is to make money	1,048	0,405**	1,630**
Agree: A drive to crime is in the blood of the Roma	2,909***	0,982	0,956
How many online (political/ public affair) activities do you partake in?	1,112	1,244**	0,821**
Are you from Budapest	0,655	1,641**	1,260
Legal studies student	0,903	1,603	2,073**

Explanatory Variable	Jobbik	Együtt-PM	Fidesz
	Exp(B)	Exp(B)	Exp(B)
Male	0,925	1,406*	0,843
How many offline (political/ public affair) activities do you partake in?	1,082*	0,994	1,056
Agree: A lack of culture and motivation are the biggest problems among the youth.	1,239	1,193	1,476*
Economic Studies Student	1,149	1,246	0,901
Technical Studies student	1,206	1,146	0,966
Liberal arts and Social sciences student	0,912	1,167	1,451
Living in deprivation	0,896	1,003	0,758
Kids should learn respect and discipline	1,251	0,849	1,347
Agree: The country needs strong leadership	1,330	0,718	0,900
How many organizations are you an active member of?	1,019	1,017	0,897
Post-materialistic values	0,838	0,616	0,753
Materialistic values	1,339	0,745	1,208
Agree: Unemployment is the biggest problem for the youth.	1,465	1,098	0,952

Note: binary logistic regression models. Dependent variables: would vote for Jobbik, Együtt 2014–PM and Fidesz (dummies). Independent variables are dummies as well. *significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 95% level; *** significant at the 99% level

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

In the next section we summarize the answers provided in the open-ended section through a table. In this way the statements can be compared. The question in the questionnaire stood as:

"In the following section you will be provided with the names of political parties. What comes to your mind about each of the listed political parties? We ask you to write down the single descriptive word or phrase that comes to your mind first. The description can be positive, or negative, depending on what comes to your mind first!"

Table 6.
Associations related to Jobbik
(percentage distribution)

Jobbik	Relative percentage
Radical (positive)	20
Extremist	12
Descriptions that are positive with limits	10
Especially positive descriptions, nationalistic, patriotic	8
Nazi fascist	7
Racist	6
Anti-Roma	6
Other	6
Aggression	5
Ranting, silliness, frivolous, stupid	3
Disgrace, shameful	3
Lack of expertise	2
Hungarian Guard	2
Negative feelings without any specifics	2
Stability (positive)	2
A lie	1
Anti-Semitic	1
Hatred, Hate-loving	1
Revival of Great-Historic Hungary	1
Corruption, thieves	0
Total	100

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

Table 7.
Associations related to Fidesz
(percentage distribution)

Fidesz	Relative percentage
Descriptive Fidesz, Orbán, governing party, rightist	26
Non-concrete criticisms	20
Dictatorship	9
Lying	7
Demagogue, populist mind washing, populist promises	4
Good hearted, hard working, acceptable, sincere (positive with limits)	3
Hubris, egotistical,	3
Corrupt, thieves	3
other	3
Last chance for hope, for the youth and a successful future	3
Failure, did not work out, without success	3
Centralization, strong state	2
Family	2
Successful, crisis management, fight for freedom	2
Especially positive descriptions	1
Oligarch	1
Dilettantism, arrogance	1
Tuition fees, compulsorily work in Hungary in exchange for education	1
The crises and scandals associated with the party, austerity measures	1
Hungary, Hungarian, patriotic, protecting Hungary's interests	1
Professional, capable of governing	1
Decisive, self confident,	1
Divided, scary,	1
Old, outdated	1
Family, family centered	0
Total	100

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

Table 8.
Associations related to Együtt 2014–PM
(percentage distribution)

Együtt 2014–PM	Relative percentage
I don't know them, who are they?	34
A joke, funny, non-concrete criticisms	14
Positive description with limits: chance, promising, opportunity	11
Bajnai	7
New	5
Hopeless, without power	4
Other	4
Not established, unconfident, directionless, goalless, without direction, no courage	3
Especially positive descriptions	2
A lie	2
Foreigners, in the pocket of the Americans	2
SZDSZ 2, liberal	2
Goose ²	2
Hope	2
Collaboration, working together, dialogue	2
Corruption, stealing	1
Jews	1
Failures return, unbelievable	1
Communists, MSZP, Gyurcsány (ex Prime Minister, highly disliked by public)	1
Bankers, thieves,	1
Technocrats, experts	1
Total	100

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

Table 9.
Associations related to LMP
(percentage distribution)

LMP	Relative percentage
Descriptive, can be different, green	16
Hopeless, without power, dead	16
I don't know who they are	13
Non-concrete criticisms	11
Positive descriptions with limits	9
SZDSZ 2 liberals	9
Other	4
Divided, failed faction, split party	3
Hippies, gays, pot-heads, environmentalists, protestors, bicyclists	3
Not serious, a joke	3
Especially positive descriptions	2
Politics cannot be different, it could be even more different *(spin on the name of the party Politics Can be Different, LMP)	2
Youth	2
Lie	1
Corruption, thieves	1
Dilettante, incompetent	1
Jews	1
A disappointment	1
Idealists, utopia, dream-world	1
Foreigners, in the pocket of Americans	0
Druggies	0
Total	100

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

Table 10.
Associations related to MSZP
(percentage distribution)

MSZP	Relative percentage
Nonconcrete criticisms	19
Old, outdated, old-fashioned	14
Descriptive: leftist	12
A lie	9
Communist, Socialist	9
Corrupt, they steal, they cheat	9
Other	7
Past eight years, Gyurcsány (ex Prime Minister, highly disliked by public)	5
Positive descriptions with limits	3
We fucked up ³ , Őszöd	3
Weak, chanceless	3
Especially positive descriptions	2
Indebtedness, debt, crisis	2
Betrayed our country, non-patriotic, foreign lovers	1
Dilettante, incompetence	1
Not serious	1
Total	100

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

Table 11.
Associations related to DK
(percentage distribution)

DK	Relative percentage
I don't know them, who are they?, Nothing	36
Chanceless, powerless, dead	13
Gyurcsány	12
Cannot be taken seriously, cannot be qualified (so bad), especially negative	8
Other	6
A lie	5
MSZP 2, communists	4
Descriptive	3
A joke, laughable, "haha", not serious	3
Especially positive	2
Corruption, thieves, criminals	2
Positive with limits	1
Betrayed our country, foreigners, in the pockets of the Americans	1
Pensioners	1
Unbelievable, awful	1
Characterless	1
Power hungry	1
New, we'll see, it'll soon become clear	1
Jews	0
Total	100

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

Table 12.

“Do you think the following statements correctly describe the Hungarian political parties?”
(Student Population, in percentages) Note: E-PM means Együtt 2014 –PM.

	E-PM * voters on E-PM	General population on E-PM	Fidesz voters on Fidesz	General population on Fidesz	Jobbik voters on Jobbik	General population on Jobbik	LMP voters on LMP	General population on LMP	MSZP voters on MSZP	General population on MSZP
1. Caters towards the young.	50%	18%	47%	16%	67%	36%	65%	37%	27%	3%
2. Has well prepared politicians	57%	14%	77%	35%	55%	17%	31%	10%	49%	19%
3. Is only power hungry	5%	16%	19%	48%	10%	26%	7%	13%	19%	45%
4. Represents green/sustainable values	15%	5%	13%	4%	19%	5%	70%	50%	5%	1%
5. Is more interested in appealing economics powers than its own constituents.	9%	11%	19%	31%	11%	8%	6%	8%	16%	30%
6. Is worried about those at a disadvantage	45%	13%	55%	17%	38%	15%	47%	23%	38%	13%
7. Fights against corruption with the most credence	34%	7%	36%	8%	65%	24%	41%	14%	11%	2%
8. Provides consultation with the people before making decisions	49%	7%	58%	18%	52%	17%	44%	18%	32%	8%
9. Capable of leading the country if elected	60%	14%	80%	27%	65%	15%	28%	6%	57%	12%
10. Fights for gender equality	29%	10%	23%	10%	22%	8%	43%	27%	35%	9%
11. Has a proper answer for the conflicts between the Roma and non-Roma population	23%	5%	32%	9%	73%	26%	23%	7%	27%	4%
88. I do not recognize this party	8%	15%	6%	13%	6%	14%	12%	13%	3%	15%

Source: Active Youth Research Group, 2013.

VI. Conclusion

VI. 1. The Political Activeness of the Hungarian Youth

In our study we have shown in detail the political activeness, political values and orientation and political affiliation of the full time Hungarian college and university students. Below we characterize the students' political activeness, values and political orientation using a multivariable model. This model contains all the questions, topics, problems that we have analyzed above but with some additions based on gender and the level of the father's education level. The multivariable statistical procedure groups the students into six clusters. For simplicity and easier understanding the clusters were named after the political parties, which weighed the most in each given cluster. We need to note, however, that political affiliation is not necessarily the most important characteristic of a given cluster. The table below summarizes the most important characteristics of each cluster. Probably one of the most important conclusions that we can draw from the table is that LMP does not form a separate cluster.

Table 13.
Political clusters of College and University Students*

	Size (%)	Name	Most important characteristics
1. cluster	42	undecided	sceptical towards the system, uncertain, indeterminate, mostly women, maybe green
2. cluster	20	Együtt – PM	democrat, liberal, European, atheist, interested in public affairs, likely to vote on LMP
3. cluster	18	Fidesz	Christian democrat, religious, right wing, conservative, satisfied
4. cluster	14	Jobbik	radical, in favour of dictatorship, strong anti-roma sentiment
5. cluster	5*	MSZP	consists of 3 groups: social democrat, left wing radical, liberal, moderate, democrat
6. cluster	1*	DK	liberal, interested in public affairs, democrat, activist

Note: K-Means Cluster method. The clusters are in order in increasing size.

**The cluster is so small, that statistically interpretations cannot be made based on it.

The largest cluster is called “undecided” and it makes up 42% of the students. This group does not carry a single strong trait but is characterized by several less marked characteristics. Out of these the most important characteristic is skepticism of the system, which means that they do not particularly care what political system they live under. They are unsure whether they want to vote in the upcoming parliamentary election and if they do want to vote they are uncertain about which party to vote for. Their strongest political characteristic is self description of being “green;” however, they are completely passive and disinterested in social and political issues. In a sense their green orientation is the choice for the lesser of evils. In this group people with undergraduate degrees are overrepresented and so are people with computer science, health, medical and science degrees. Compared to their ratio to the total number of students the members of this group are overrepresented in state schools.

The second largest group is named the Együtt 2014–PM cluster because the party preference is the most important characteristic of the group. In the Hungarian values versus the Western values question they markedly identify themselves with the latter. They are strongly in favor of democracy even though they are highly skeptical with the current version of democracy. Their mindset is liberal and pro European. They are open to politics and to social problems. Based on their fathers’ level of education they can be characterized as coming from highly educated background, and as urban dwellers and atheists. Their preferred method of political participation is being active on the Internet. They are overrepresented among students holding masters and PhD degrees (therefore among older students) and also among students majoring in the social sciences (economics, political science and liberal arts).

Being a Christian democrat is the best predictor of the third group, followed by three equally important traits: religion, being a Fidesz voter, and satisfaction with the current democratic system. The members of this cluster are conservative, right leaning and mostly active in traditional ways of political participation. It is important to note regarding this group, that while they hold traditional values they deem democracy as the best type of system. This group is overrepresented among degrees that are not split into undergraduate and master’s studies, among religions studies majors, legal studies majors, education majors and students pursuing advanced theological studies.

Another cluster among full time university students in Hungary is the cluster named after the Jobbik Party (the name also reflects the most important characteristic). Members of this group are strongly nationalistic, radical thinkers, and they denounce all forms of Western ideology. On the left – right scale they strongly pull to the right. They accept “Roma (gypsy) crime” as a fact and notably, under certain circumstances, they would be willing to trade democracy for authoritarian rule. This is the sole cluster where gender plays an important role given the fact that the majority of this group consists of males. The Jobbik cluster is a very active and virulent group and they are highly active in collective forms as well as the virtual forms of political participation. They are overrepresented among students pursuing a degree under the older system, among college level students, computer science, engineering and liberal arts majors.

The cluster named MSZP is ideologically mixed but actively leftist. Due to a lack of significant number of observations in the group, we can only make few conservative observations. It is certainly noteworthy that this group is strongly pro democracy but is highly dissatisfied with the current democratic system. The members of this group are active in everyday politics and a subset of the group is staunchly pro European, showing many similarities with the supporters of the Együtt 2014–PM organization.

At the end of our study we have plotted each cluster along a left-right and moderate-radical axis and also along a left-right and liberal-conservative axis in order to visualize the similarities and differences among the clusters and their distances from each other.

Figure 18.
Hungarian University and College Students Cluster Map on Left-Right and Moderate–Radical Scale

*The clusters received their names based on the party that provided them with the greatest support.

Figure 19.
Hungarian University and College Students Cluster Map on Left-Right and Liberal-Conservative Scale

*The clusters received their names based on the party that provided them with the greatest support.

VI. 2. Important Conclusions from this Study

The significant proportion of students who couldn't compare the two political systems, as well as the fact that many of their responses to survey questions went against core democratic values emphasizes the value of forums for political socialization, and the passing on of information about political systems. Our research does not support the idea that a democratic politically active model with political socialization is in place in Hungary. Instead we see a society full of repressed social conflicts, and only semi-peripheral political socialization in place.

We have not successfully dealt with our past. Furthermore, it is still unclear exactly how the past should be digested, nor what kind of value we should place on our relationship to the past. Though young Hungarians conceded that democratic rights, access to entertainment and overall quality of life were all better in the current democratic system, the failed Kádár system was still deemed more desirable in several inquired dimensions (including access to housing, social security, and job security and opportunities). Though the democratic system received higher marks overall, both the Kádár era and the democratic system are negatively perceived.

We have also failed to fully deal with our present. There has been little to no political socialization regarding the formation of democracy in Hungary since 1990, how this democracy differs from an "ideal democracy," or the values of a modern democratic

system. This is why since the end of communism, the satisfaction with democracy has been decreasing continuously, and with it the system's legitimacy in the eyes of the youth. Meanwhile, the political discourse that does exist is not about the reform of democracy into a better, more efficient system, but rather about the potential benefits of an alternative authoritarian system. The dissatisfaction is partially explained by the fact that the younger Hungarian generations' understanding of democracy, as other studies have found (e.g. LAKI-SZABÓ A. 2012A and LAKI-SZABÓ A. 2012b), is at least partially economical. That is the satisfaction with democracy can partially be explained by the country's economic performance, and by the general quality of life in Hungary.

The Active Youth Hungary 2013 shows that there is a new type of mindset present in the Hungarian youth. This mindset is open to new values that are considered post-materialistic according to Inglehart's framework. All of this is even more interesting, because up until this point the traditional materialistic value-structures has been the dominant one in all generations; it is only in this millennium that such a trend has been noticed among the youth. It is important, however not to over-emphasize the importance of these developments in societal values.

The same study shows that the direct forms of participation are the most popular among students; 74% of them have at least once participated directly. This study reinforced that in order to understand political participation of students, we need to examine direct forms of participation. Those who are active direct participation, a participation form that comes with higher risks for the individual, are more likely to be active in other forms of participation as well. 19% of students chose tradition forms of participation but only 17%, much lower than our hypothesized expectation, chose virtual forms of political participation.

32% of the students have either no interest in political participation or we have not been able to gather any data on them; they can be classified as "passive". While virtually 100% of the students use the Internet, the virtual forms of political participation are not nearly as significant and extensive as we assumed. Virtual participation can be regarded as an auxiliary form of participation that does not substitute traditional and direct forms of political participation. Our 2013 study reinforces our previous statement that the virtual arena does not add to the democratic discussion and it does not activate previously inactive groups. The most active youth group, which engages in all three forms of participation, represents only 6% of the student population.

Our data shows that the two rightist conservative parties have a little more than half of the support among the youth generation, but if we define LMP as a leftist party, the support for the left is only marginally lower. Among first time voters Fidesz and Jobbik are somewhat more popular than among the all of the respondents. The three most popular parties among the youth, though very complex, can be separated both demographically, and ideologically.

Despite Fidesz's "people's party" overtones, in our sample the party seemed to show elitist tendencies. Those students who sympathize with Fidesz are certain about a positive future, and feel confident in their employment prospects. With this comes a world view

in which they put the emphasis on self-responsibility. One is responsible for one's own problems. They would step up against the Roma conflict with discipline and order. Their strongest characteristic, however, is the extremely high proportion of religious students who support Fidesz (even compared to the rest of the population). As for their classical ideological and value related views and preferences, the party is very diverse, and there are no few indicators in this realm, which are statistically significant at a high confidence level.

Demographically speaking Együtt 2014–PM and Jobbik university and college students are not as easily characterized. Együtt 2014–PM students are often from well-educated families, and are more likely be from Budapest, while Jobbik supporting students are often first generation intellectuals, are more likely to live in small municipalities, and are often lower class than Együtt 2014–PM supporters. These correlations are much weaker than for Fidesz. Both parties have a very large, a very complex and diverse voting base. Perhaps the only common ground between the two parties base is that both are highly interested and active; members of both parties take part in a number of offline and online political activities.

In political ideological questions, however, Jobbik and Együtt 2014–PM are easy to define too. Együtt 2014–PM is mostly composed of liberal, European supporting, open-minded students, while Jobbik supporters are often nationalists and highly patriotic. On the moderate–radical scale the two parties are also very different. In fact, in many questions the two parties are the antithesis of each other. From how to manage the Roma-Hungarian ethnic conflict, to their views of democracy and authoritarian systems, these two parties represent the opposite sides of the spectrum.

Attachments

The Explanatory Variables for the Support of Dictatorships
(binary logistic model/ logged linear regression coefficient values)

	B	Exp(B)
liberal	-0,121	0,886
conservative	0,651	1,917***
strong national sentiment	0,811	2,251***
order and stability	0,5	1,649**
green	0,391	1,478
gender	-0,511	0,6***
type of place of living	0,064	1,066
education level of father	0,004	1,004
age	-0,042	0,959
religious	0,196	1,216
atheist	0,261	1,299
jobless	-0,162	0,851
subjective economic state	-0,102	0,903
politics	0,095	1,1
humanities	-0,171	0,843
informatics	0,381	1,463
legal studies	-0,065	0,937
engineer	0,236	1,266
social sciences	0,227	1,255
Együtt2014	-0,231	0,794
Fidesz	0,378	1,459
Jobbik	0,585	1,794***
LMP	-0,178	0,837
MSZP	-0,489	0,613
Constant	0,008	1,008

-2 Log likelihood=1218,485^a; Nagelkerke R Square=0,117.

*The significance level; the greater the number of *, the higher the more significant.

Interest in public affairs
logistic regression values

	B	Exp(B)
postmaterialism_d(1)	-0,012	0,988
offline_participation	0,231	***1,260
online_participation	0,775	***2,170
Fidesz(1)	0,113	1,119
Jobbik(1)	0,275	1,317
Egyutt(1)	0,615	**1,850
in favour of dictatorship(1)	-0,037	0,964
men(1)	0,025	1,026
subjective economic state (1)	-0,153	0,858
graduatedfather (1)	0,274	*1,315
left/right	0,125	*1,133
economist(1)	0,096	1,1
engineer(1)	-0,366	*,693
legal studies(1)	0,68	**1,974
Constant	-1,005	0,366

Nagelkerke R Square= 0,201.

* The significance level.

Interest in politics
logistic regression values

	B	Exp(B)
postmaterialism_d(1)	0,132	1,141
offline_participation	0,141	***1,151
online_participation	0,319	***1,376
Fidesz(1)	0,234	1,264
Jobbik(1)	0,055	1,056
Egyutt(1)	1,149	***3,154
in favour of dictatorship(1)	0,266	*1,305
men(1)	0,582	***1,789
subjective economic state(1)	0,188	1,207
graduatedfather(1)	0,227	1,255
left/right	0,247	***1,280
economist(1)	0,317	1,374
engineer(1)	-0,128	0,88
legal studies(1)	0,295	1,343
Constant	-3,007	0,049

Nagelkerke R Square= 0,202.

*The significance level.

Determinants of electoral participation
Values of logistic regression

	B	Exp(B)
publicaffair	0,598	1,818***
moderate/radical	0,158	1,171**
Együtt(1)	1,395	4,033***
Fidesz(1)	0,99	2,691***
economist(1)	0,452	1,572*
engineer(1)	-0,194	0,824
village(1)	-0,344	0,709
subjective economic state deprivation(1)	-0,194	0,823
dictatorship(1)	-0,093	0,911
offline_participation	0,254	1,289***
online_participation	0,067	1,069
graduatedfather(1)	0,147	1,159
planningabroad(1)	-0,05	0,951
Constant	-1,932	0,145

Nagelkerke R Square= 0,217.

*The significance level.

Explanatory factors of online participation. Values of linear regression

	B	Beta	Sig.
Member of public organisation	25,071	0,222	0
Are you interested in politics?	12,92	0,184	0
social science 1 yes 0 no	37,926	0,107	0,001
MSZP 1 yes 0 no	43,455	0,087	0,006
Are you interested in public affairs, social problems?	11,076	0,115	0,009
subjective economic state	-8,101	-0,08	0,015
moderate / radical	5,315	0,083	0,021
gender	-10,505	-0,059	0,099
LMP	14,734	0,043	0,188
conservative	15,088	0,046	0,204
Együtt14	11,458	0,043	0,217
liberal	11,183	0,053	0,229
informatics	-13,819	-0,04	0,234
European	10,775	0,04	0,318
Jobbik	8,867	0,036	0,336
atheist	9,541	0,03	0,348
democrat	5,002	0,027	0,475
teacher	10,981	0,021	0,513
green	6,944	0,025	0,525
engineering	4,482	0,02	0,581
graduated father/mother	-3,293	-0,018	0,589
sciences	-5,735	-0,017	0,606
order and stability	4,39	0,018	0,657
maximum vocational training mother/father	-7,611	-0,012	0,708
Fidesz	-2,569	-0,011	0,756
medicine	-2,77	-0,009	0,787
strongly nationalist	3,166	0,01	0,799
lives in a village	-1,614	-0,007	0,827
legal studies	-2,757	-0,007	0,832
religious	-2,162	-0,007	0,841
lives in Budapest	-1,251	-0,006	0,852
in favour of dictatorship	-0,299	-0,001	0,968
vote on DK 1 yes 0 no	-0,041	0	0,999
(Constant)	-43,194		0,073

R Square = 0,275. / *The significance level.

Factors affecting likelihood of taking part in protest organized on the Internet
Values of logistic regression

	B	Exp(B)
moderate/radical	0,059	1,06
publicaffair	-0,003	0,997
online_participation	0,181	1,198
offline_participation	0,376	1,456***
economist(1)	-0,408	0,665
engineer	-0,146	0,865
Együtt(1)	0,724	2,063***
Fidesz(1)	-1,108	0,33***
lives in Budapest(1)	0,578	1,782***
Student network(1)	2,215	9,157*
in favour of dictatorship (1)	-0,185	0,831
Constant	-2,63	0,072

Nagelkerke R Square= 0,307.

*The significance level.

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(Footnotes)

1. The Democratic Coalition (Hungarian: Demokratikus Koalíció), abbreviated to DK, is a centre-left political party in Hungary led by former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. Founded in 2010 as a group within the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the party split from the MSZP on 22 October 2011 and became a separate party. It has ten MPs in the National Assembly.

2. Reference for one of Bajnai's former agricultural enterprise, which went bankrupt and made lost for many farmers who had goose

3. Reference to Gyurcsány's Öszöd speech: he said that they fucked up and did not do any good for the country.

