

2013/1

Mark J. Ferguson

“The Programme to Policy Linkage”

Examining the Pledge Fulfillment  
Potential in Germany,  
2002–2005

**“The Programme to Policy Linkage:”**

**Examining  
the  
Pledge Fulfillment  
Potential  
in  
Germany, 2002-2005  
(Draft)**

*Presented at the  
Institute of Political Science  
Center of Social Science  
Hungarian Academy of Science,  
Working Papers in Political Science Series  
January 31, 2013*

Mark J. Ferguson, PhD<sup>1</sup>  
*University of Alabama*

**Abstract:** Scholarly research on pledge fulfillment has examined various institutional settings which have had indicated differing levels of fulfillment. These scholars have examined the Westminster system, majority and minority coalition governments, and minority governments. Scholars have also examined presidential and semi-presidential systems. However, pledge fulfillment in Germany has yet to be fully examined. This paper asks to what extent do governing parties in a grand coalition fulfill pledges, compared to available research? This paper will examine how the Schröder II and Merkel I governments were capable of fulfilling their pledges.

---

<sup>1</sup> Portions of this paper appeared during the 2010 and 2012 MPSA Conferences and in this author’s dissertational work. This paper is a precursor to a journal submission. Please do not cite without permission. Please contact this author at [mjferguson@crimson.ua.edu](mailto:mjferguson@crimson.ua.edu) to receive permission.

## 1. Introduction

Research on pledge fulfillment, or redemption, has attempted to explain the variance of pledge redemption rates caused by controlling the instruments of governments and institutional design. Pledge research scholars have presented evidence that parties are quite adept at fulfilling their campaign promises. These scholars illustrate that the individual institutional design of a country plays an important part in pledge fulfillment. Governing systems with few veto points, e.g., Westminster systems, research indicates that the British governing party is capable of fulfilling a significantly higher percentage of their campaign pledges when compared to presidential and coalition systems (See: Royed 1996; 2007; and 2009; Thomson 2001; Costello and Thomson 2007; and Thomson et al. 2009).

However, research has not fully examined pledge fulfillment in Germany. Germany has a long tradition of being governed by coalition governments. The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which the last Schröder II and Merkel I governments fulfilled the mandate model. This paper examines the extent to which pledge fulfillment occurred for all legislative parties during the Schröder II (2002-2005) and Merkel I (2005-2009) governments. This paper will unfold as the following: First, a literature review of pledge fulfillment in various institutional settings and a historical account of these two governments. Second and third, this paper will progress into a discussion of the hypotheses and methodology used in this paper. Finally, I will present my findings on pledge fulfillment and a discussion of the relevance of the findings.

## 2. Literature Review

### *Research on Pledge Redemption*

Pledge redemption research has utilized the mandate model, or the responsible party model, as their guide. Using this model, pledge fulfillment scholars have attempted to determine the extent to which candidates/parties have been able to fulfill their pledges, and, if there is a failure of fulfillment, what can explain this. This research has been applied to the various institutional settings, seeking to better understand how pledge fulfillment is achieved under single-party majoritarian, presidential and semi-presidential, majority coalition and minority governing systems.

Terry Royed (1996) examined pledge fulfillment in the United Kingdom and U.S. during the Thatcher and Regan eras. Traditionally a single-party majority system with few veto points, the institutional design of the United Kingdom has proven to be advantageous for Tory- and Labour-led governments alike in fulfilling pledges that is not evident under the U.S. presidential system due to the limiting nature of divided government. From this institutional vantage point, one should expect Thatcher was better able than Reagan to fulfill her campaign pledges.

Royed found that governing parties in the UK fulfilled their pledges at significantly higher fulfillment rates than the opposition parties and their U.S. counterparts (Royed 1996). In two terms under Thatcher, the Conservatives nearly averaged 85 % of their pledges fulfilled, while the opposition Labour Party averaged 24 % during the same time period. Under Reagan and divided government, the Republicans fulfilled an average of 60 % of their pledges, while the Democrats averaged 49 % (Royed 1996, 64). Royed's (1996) findings illustrated that 1) parties

are affecting public policy by enacting their pledges that and 2) different institutional arrangements provide for different degrees of pledge fulfillment across parties.

Similar results can be seen in the cases of Ireland and Spain. During the past 30 years, from 1977-2007, Ireland's governments have had multiple governing settings that provide a unique opportunity to observe pledge fulfillment: These governments have either been single-party majority government, minority coalition governments, single-party minority governments, or majority coalition governments (Thomson et al. 2009, 1). During the last instance of a single-party majority governance in Ireland, the *Fianna Fail* government of 1977-81, fulfilled more pledges than the opposition National Coalition Party. Additionally, Thomson et al. (2009, 20-21) conclude that parties that control the "relevant ministerial post, the prime ministership or both have a probability of pledge fulfillment comparable to that of the majority single-party government," the 1977-81 *Fianna Fail* government.

In Spain, the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) held an absolute majority of parliamentary seats from 1989 until 1993. During this period of single-party majority rule, the PSOE was able to fulfill nearly 74 % of its pledges (Artés 2009, 9). Again, these results from Ireland and Spain are within expectations since a single-party majority government controls the instruments of policy formation and implementation.

Other scholars have illustrated that coalition systems are capable of fulfilling campaign promises. In coalition governments, governing parties often form legislation after compromising on policy goals in order to secure passages. In the examination of the Netherlands, Robert Thomson (2001) finds that Dutch parties in coalition governments do fulfill pledges at high rates. Thomson shows that parties do matter for policy since parties in the Netherlands are keeping their promises on policy. In addition, Thomson (2001) finds parties that are in the governing coalition have higher redemption rates than opposition parties.

In multiple studies of Ireland, Lucy Mansergh and Robert Thomson (2007) and Roy Costello and Thomson (2007) compared its fulfillment potential with the U.S, U.K., and the Netherlands. Mansergh and Thomson (2007) found that Irish parties did redeem their pledges; however, institutional arrangements of a country matter. Coalition governments do fulfill their pledges, but at lower rates than the Westminster system and the American system. In other words, the type of government institution does matter in pledge redemption. Single-party majority systems have higher fulfillment rates and larger gaps between in and out of government parties (Mansergh and Thomson 2007). Costello and Thomson (2007, 8) found that Irish governing parties have higher fulfillment rates than their opposition parties. The authors also found that ministerial control is important: the party that controls a governing ministry, e.g., the Health Ministry, is better capable of fulfilling or partially fulfilling its pledges from that policy area (Costello and Thomson 2007, 10 and Mansergh and Thomson 2007, 322).

Additionally, research on minority governments has shown indications that pledge fulfillment is possible even if the single party or coalition of parties do not hold a majority of legislative seats. Elin Naurin (2002 and 2007) in her examination of Sweden found that though the governing arrangements, i.e. minority governments, appear on the surface to make it unlikely that the governing party would be able effectively translate its pledges into legislation, that the results in fact indicate a different reality. Naurin's findings indicated that minority governments are fully capable of fulfilling their pledges and that the governing party, the Social Democrats, fulfilled their nearly 86 % of their pledges.

In similar work examining Spanish minority governments, Joaquin Artés and Antonio Bustos's (2008) focused on two issues. First, why do parties-out-of-government in Spain

support the minority government; and, second, under these governing conditions, how well did the Spanish system fulfill the mandate model. After using content analysis of Spanish electoral pledges, Artés and Bustos (2008) and Artés (2009) concluded that the opposition parties, in particular the CiU, rationally supported minority governments in order to achieve pledge fulfillment, which would otherwise be lacking if there is not already established support. Under this symbiotic arrangement, both the minority government and the CiU mutually benefited from this arrangement to achieve fulfillment success (Artés and Bustos 2008; Artés 2009).

In Ireland, however, the results indicated that the Irish minority governing parties had a more difficult time redeeming their pledges than our previous two cases of Sweden and Spain. Thomson et al. (2009, 20) find that though the party or parties in government were more likely to redeem their pledges than opposition parties when party controls the office of prime minister and the corresponding ministerial post, or if the party is the single governing player, which is in line with the authors' previous research on ministerial control. However, under the minority coalition governments of Fine Gael and the Labour (1981-82) parties and later, Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats (1997-02) parties, Thomson et al. (2009, 20-22) found that these minority coalition governments had lower fulfillment rates, compared to the minority single-party government of Fianna Fail (1987-89). Thomson et al. (2009, 14-15) find that in minority coalitions, parties not in control of the relevant ministries or the office of prime minister were not likely to achieve fulfillment success. However, all government types are more likely to have their pledges fulfilled than not fulfilled (Thomson et al. 2009, 15).

#### *Germany: Schröder II and Merkel I*

This brings us to the German case. The inclusion of the German case has three advantages. First, the German case compliments these previous cases by adding to the growing body of literature on pledge fulfillment and increases the diversity of pledge fulfillment cases. Second, this case provides an excellent opportunity to examine how German federalism, with its additional veto points, works in Germany. Third, the German case allows one to compare grand coalitions compare with other coalition governments.

As the literature indicates, coalition systems tend to have lower fulfillment rates than Westminster states. Coalition systems tend to have more veto points than Westminster Systems that will either significantly change the nature of legislation or prevent its passage. German governments, as a coalition system, must also face this political reality to secure passage of legislation.

Additionally, Germany is a federal state. In most federal states, we tend to find in most of them bicameral legislatures (Mahler 2003, 74; and Lijphart 1999) and tend to have powerful upper houses and judiciaries (Lijphart 1999).<sup>2</sup> Federalism matters in this discussion as a causal mechanism of pledge fulfillment via important institutional structures that can block governmental actions. In particular, federalism can matter in two ways, a strong upper house that can be controlled by the opposition and a strong judiciary that has the power of judicial review, both of which could be impediments to pledge fulfillment. However, for the purpose of this discussion, I exclude the judiciary on the grounds that judicial decisions that negatively affect the fulfillment of pledges tend to happen after the conclusion of the sitting government.

---

<sup>2</sup> With the exception of Canada. Canada uses the Westminster model at the national level, but it also uses a federal structure, which grants Canadian provinces the constitutional authority to make laws.

The German upper house, the *Bundesrat*, is a strong institution that can be controlled by the opposition, providing a strong veto point to legislative passage (Kurien et. al., 1998; Mahler 2003; Kesselman et. al., 2009; and Almond et. al., 2008, 269). Even in the event that both houses are controlled by the same party, there is no guarantee that the *Bundesrat* will acquiesce to the policy goals of the party in the *Bundestag*. Throughout the post-war institution's history, the *Bundesrat* would block or force changes to legislation. Major examples of this come from the 1990s when the SPD-led *Bundesrat* blocked the Kohl Administration's tax cuts efforts (Orlow 1999, 313) and the extensive negotiations between the Schröder governments and the Christian Democratic-led *Bundesrat* on tax reforms and Agenda 2010 (Eironline November 12, 2003, Landler December 16, 2003, Zohlnhoefer and Egle 2007, and Williamson November 8, 2005).

In 2005, both the SPD and the Christian Democrats would form the second grand coalition after inconclusive elections that September (Williams 2006, 1). The parties by no means welcomed the union of the two parties. Politicians from both parties pointed out that they are ideologically polar opposites, potentially leading to gridlocked government. Matthias Platzeck, at the time the chairman of the SPD, was even reported as say, "This is a sober marriage of convenience," (Whitlock November 15, 2005).

In contrast, the German public held a more positive opinion. The German public viewed the grand coalition as the "best way to fix the country's economic problems" (Whitlock November 15, 2005), but worried the experiment would be a short one. Remarkably, though governing was by no means without its controversy, Chancellor Merkel and the grand coalition survived the entire four-year electoral mandate and was able to function as a government (Conradt 2009, 198).

As the literature has shown, there is a common perception that grand coalitions are more difficult to govern than coalition governments. This difficulty is analogous to mixing water and oil together, and the difficulty is based on the ideological differences between the governing parties. When combining two ideologically opposed parties into one governing coalition, with each party possessing uncompromising core beliefs, policy compromises and agreements are more difficult to achieve.

There, inevitably, exist certain core beliefs that each party may possess, on which neither party may be willing to compromise. Ideological clashes between the two governing parties are expected; over time, ideological differences weaken the government's ability to achieve policy formation. Eventually, the ideological gulf between the political parties may be too great to overcome, leading to government paralysis and eventually fresh elections to resolve the impasses.

In the case of Germany, many expected the grand coalition would collapse before the end of its mandated term. However, the 2005 to 2009 grand coalition defied the odds and lasted its full electoral term. This can be attributed to the desire of the Chancellor, Angela Merkel (CDU), and the party leadership of the SPD to provide some sense of governing stability. Not surprising, over the past four years, ideological differences did emerge between the major parties that made governing difficult.<sup>3</sup> The fact that the government lasted the full is counterintuitive of the stability of grand coalitions. When scholars and politicians alike were predicting a short lifespan

---

<sup>3</sup> Controversies with Hartz IV, the BND's Iraq spying affair under the previous government, the highly contested Hessen state elections, and the buildup to new federal elections in 2009 all contributed to this governing difficulty as well.

for the government and gridlock, the grand coalition was capable of surviving and passing legislation.

### 3. Hypotheses

This work addresses three substantial questions regarding pledge fulfillment in Germany. First, it examines the extent to which German government parties fulfill their pledges and thus are connected with the mandate model.<sup>4</sup> (H1) *In line with previous research on the mandate model, I apply the mandate model's hypothesis that parties in government should be better capable of fulfilling pledges, compared to out-of-government parties.* The rationale behind this hypothesis is simple. Government parties are better capable of controlling and exercising the instruments of governmental authority to obtain legislative success.

Addressing this question requires looking at the pledge fulfillment of both government and opposition parties: In line with previous research, I hypothesize that these parties out of government are capable of fulfilling pledges, however, at lower fulfillment rates than parties in government. Royed (1996) and Thomson (2001) found evidence that parties-out-of-government do enjoy some legislative success. One possible explanation for this is that some pledges -- e.g., crime prevention and security -- are pledges that are advocated by all parties regardless of the political control over government, thus becoming a source of legislative success for all political parties.

A second question this work attempts to address is to what extent do the results obtained for the German grand coalition and normal coalition government differ? For this question, I have developed two hypotheses. Hypotheses 2a: *The Schröder II government will have slightly higher fulfillment rates than the Merkel I grand coalition government.* Hypotheses 2b: *The grand coalition will function as well or better than normal coalition governments.*

These hypotheses are based on perceptions of what governing life under grand coalitions will be like. The first perception is based on a pessimistic view. As the literature has argued, coalition governments have more difficulty fulfilling their pledges, compared to majority systems. However, when ideologically opposed parties are forced to form a government, even lower fulfillment rates should be expected. Again, the expectation is that ideological differences make it more difficult for the grand coalition to govern, producing more government gridlock, and ultimately more compromises on policy issues.

Under the governing conditions of grand coalition governments, the literature suggests that fulfillment should be lower than that of majoritarian governments and regular coalition governments. Under grand coalition governing arrangements, we should expect more compromising on campaign promises or outright rejection of pledges to maintain governing harmony and stability. Under these conditions, we should expect lower fulfillment rates compared to coalition governing parties. These compromises should have a more direct impact on the ability of the two parties to redeem pledges.

How do opposition parties fare in grand coalitions? Again, consistent with the literature, we should expect lower fulfillment rates in grand coalitions compared to normal coalitions. However, there may exist an advantage for these parties out of government under grand coalition

---

<sup>4</sup> I consider a governing system to be able to fulfill the mandate model criteria if the governing party or parties are capable of fulfilling a minimum of 50% of their pledges. This is a threshold that should be easily met by most systems. Fulfilling anything below 50% would mean that the governing system should be considered not to support the mandate model.

governments. This advantage arises when the grand coalition parties are unable to come to terms and when one party seeks outside legislative support to accomplish a goal. In return, these parties may demand higher rewards in the form of pledge support.

A third question asks how well do German fulfillment rates compare with fulfillment rates in other systems. By answering this question, we are better able to address the extent to which the German political system corresponds to the mandate model. (H3) *This work hypothesizes that the majority of government pledges are redeemed in a coalition government setting, compared to opposition parties, and should fit the model well as compared to other countries.* After taking institutional design into account, this paper argues that we should expect fulfillment levels to be consistent with the literature on coalition governing systems.

If we examine Table 1, we see where previous research has placed other countries and their individual rates of pledge fulfillment. One notices that majoritarian systems have higher rates of fulfillment than the United States or coalition governments; such as Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, etc.

<Table 1 Here>

Under grand coalition governments governing conditions, the literature suggests that fulfillment should be lower than that of majority governments and of coalition governments. Under grand coalition governing arrangements, one should expect more compromising on campaign promises or outright rejection of pledges in order to maintain governing harmony and stability.

#### **4. Research Design**

In this section, I present the methodological approach to understanding pledge fulfillment in Germany. To identify campaign pledges, I conducted a content analysis of the 2002 and 2005 party manifestos of all legislative parties. All manifestos were obtained in the original German. Each party manifesto was constructed and introduced to the wider voting public at its party conferences before the elections of this study. These documents are easily obtainable from the parties' websites.

To identify pledges, Terry Royed's (1997, 79) definition of party pledges was used to identify pledges. Once a statement was identified as a potential pledge, the criteria for pledge identification as established by Royed states that a potential pledge must be specific enough to withstand objective evaluation of "whether or not the action was indeed taken or the outcome produced." The very nature of campaign pledges may also have soft or hard language overtones, such as "We should," "We support," "We will," "We want," etc. These statements were also considered as pledges and included in these results. Vague or rhetorical statements were excluded from consideration as they could not be objectively evaluated.

A total of 990 campaign pledges were identified from all of the legislative parties in the *Bundestag* from 2002 and 2005. Identified pledges were placed in either of the following main policy categories: Economics, Social Welfare, Civil Rights and Liberties, Crime and Security, Foreign Policy, Environment, and a general category, which consists of pledges that do not fit any of the main categories. Pledges were then placed in a subcategory in accordance with the main policy category and examined for type of action advocated by the party. Pledges were either designated as change pledges or status quo (SQ) if the pledge did not call for policy changes. A percentage of SQ and change pledges were made for each category and subcategory.

In the hope that intercoder reliability is achieved, several native German speakers were asked to search the manifestos and the subsequent government agreement to provide confidence in the results. Portions of each of the parties' manifestos for both governing periods were given to five native German speakers. Additionally, I translated Royed's definition of pledges and instructions on how to identify pledges into German. My translations were checked for grammatical accuracy by a native German speaker. In the sections provided to the participants, I identified 245 pledges (2002) and 240 pledges (2005). For 2002 and 2005, a total of 299 and 269 pledges were respectively identified by the participants. These results indicate that there is high level of reliability, 82% (2002) and 89% (2005), between myself and the participants.

The final step was to examine redemption rates once a final pledge count has been established. To identify pledge fulfillment, I examined numerous sources that would indicate fulfillment: Newspapers, books on each government, magazines, and the governments' and political parties' websites. Pledges were classified as fulfilled, not fulfilled or partially fulfilled based on the supporting evidence available or a lack thereof. A pledge was considered unfulfilled if there lacked corresponding evidence of government action or outcome. In other cases, when a pledge called for some government action or benchmark and either can be identified, however the results did not fully reach what the particular benchmark the party advocated; these pledges were treated as being partially fulfilled.

## 5. Characteristics of German Pledges

In this section, I present the characteristics of pledges by the legislative parties during the federal elections of 2002 and 2005. In both elections, the political debates were generally centered on policy debates of reforming the economy and the *Sozialstaat*. However, international events in 2002, in particular the potential of an American-led war against Iraq, took an added role of importance in the campaign discussions of that year.

Table 1 presents the total number of pledges made by all political parties in 2002 and 2005. In addition, Table 1 identifies the types of pledges of each party's manifestos for both 2002 and 2005. Table 1 provides information on the number of pledges found to be advocating a status quo, e.g., no substantial policy change, or changes to current government policies.

In Table 1, one is struck by the predominance of pledges that advocated policy changes. In 2002, the governing parties, the SPD and the Greens, both made pledges that advocated policy changes, 92 and 93 % respectively. However, by 2005, and as the incumbent governing parties, the percentage of change pledges dropped to 84 and 82 % respectively. It could be argued that both the SPD and Greens were more inclined to protect their policy gains made during the 1998-2005 period and did not see the need for substantial policy changes in some areas. Not surprising, the opposition parties, consisting of the Christian Democrats, the FDP and the PDS, all advocated policy changes in their individual manifestos in excess of 90 %.

### <Table 1 Here> Number and Types of Pledges in Germany<sup>5</sup>

The governing parties of the Schröder II government, on the other hand, advocated slightly fewer change pledges in both the economic and social-welfare policy areas, in contrast to the opposition parties again saw the need to promote changes in policies in perceived policy failures or a lack of attention by the government.

---

<sup>5</sup> The symbol \* denotes government party.

Tables 2 and 3 present examples of pledges identified from the legislative parties' original 2005 federal elections manifestos. Each pledge was randomly selected using a random number generator program called "Random Number," created by Scott D. Saccenti (2006). Each pledge is accompanied with the original German and a description of the particular pledge, which includes whether or not the pledge was fulfilled and background information as to why the decision was made. Before each pledge is a number, which corresponds to the pledge identification designation this author assigned to the pledge in each of the original party manifestos. Each pledge was identified as either a "Change" pledge or "Status Quo (SQ)" pledge. Finally, each pledge is accompanied with sources that were used to make a decision on pledge fulfillment.

### <Tables 2 and 3 Here> Examples of pledges

The pledges in Tables 2 and 3 cover a variety of policy topics, ranging from tax and financing policies to gender representation. The pledges also present a good mixture of pledges that advocated policy changes or status quo. 60% of the presented pledges proposed policy changes. When possible, the sources that determined the outcome these presented pledges came from the German government's website. In other cases, as previously mentioned, other sources were used; such as newspapers, magazines, scholarly papers, etc.

## 6. The Fulfillment of Election Pledges in Germany

In this section, pledge fulfillment results are presented for both the governing and opposition parties from both governing periods. Fulfillment results for each table are presented as either "Fully," "Partially" fulfilled and "Not" fulfilled for each party in this study.

Looking first at results of Schröder II in Table 4, both the governing parties, the SPD and the Greens, were capable of at least partially fulfilling 68.4% (SPD) and 50% (Greens) of each of their respective pledges. As the senior coalition partner, the SPD had a distinct advantage over the Greens in pledge fulfillment. If we were to examine the government as a whole in terms of fulfillment, the Schröder II government was capable of fulfilling 58.7%, 169 pledges, of a total of 288 pledges both parties made. These results for the Schröder II government are in line with previously conducted research on coalition systems.

### <Table 4 Here> Pledge Fulfillment in Germany, 2002-2005

When we examine the full results of the opposition parties collectively, the evidence presented indicates that collectively these parties have more difficulties in achieving pledge fulfillment success when compared to the governing parties' results. In line with previous results on pledge fulfillment, these results indicate that opposition parties are capable of fulfilling their pledges, albeit at significantly lower levels than the governing parties. Only the CDU/CSU was capable of fulfilling fully and partially 56% of its pledges, which is nearly in line with the governing parties' results.

Tables 5, 6, 8 and 9 show the pledge results based on policy areas for all legislative parties during both governing periods. When we examine the results, we notice that a) neither the governing parties had any great difficulty fulfilling their pledges, b) as a government, the parties in government mostly performed better than the opposition parties, c) ministerial control is a significant pledge redemption advantage, and c) grand coalition governance need not necessarily result in legislative paralysis.

### **<Tables 5 and 6 Here> Breakdown of Government/Opposition Parties' Pledges by Policy Areas, Schröder II**

Looking first at the Schröder II government, if we were to only examine the results for the economic and social welfare pledges in Tables 5 and 6, the fulfillment advantage certainly lies with the governing parties. In Table 5, the Schröder II governing parties were highly successful in fulfilling their economic and social welfare pledges. If we were to then only examine all remaining policy areas in Tables 5 and 6, we will immediately notice two results. First, the remaining pledge areas tended to have fewer actual pledges than economic and social welfare pledges. Second, the actual difference redemption rates between the governing parties and the opposition under Schröder II was 3 %. We can attribute the poorer than expected results for the government as being mostly driven by the Greens' inability to fulfill its pledges. In contrast, the opposition parties performed well because of the Christian Democrats' strong performance.

Lastly, we notice that in the case of the Schröder II government, the control over the relevant ministries was a strong indicator of fulfillment success. The Social Democrats controlled eleven out of fifteen ministerial posts and exhibited strong fulfillment results. Of the four posts under the Greens' control, only in the area of environmental policy did the party enjoy any fulfillment advantage. The Greens also controlled the Foreign Ministry which meant that any fulfillment success was contingent upon external cooperation, which was not easily obtained from either Germany's European partners or global allies.

In Table 7, we are presented with the fulfillment results for the second German grand coalition government and the opposition parties. Again, examining individually the governing parties first, the CDU/CSU and the SPD were capable of fulfilling at least partially 69% and 66% of their pledges, respectively. What is striking about these results is the relatively higher percentage of pledges that were partially fulfilled among the two governing parties. 27% of the SPD's pledges and 23% of the CDU/CSU's pledges were partially fulfilled, which is significantly higher than the corresponding category of pledges during the Schröder II government as seen in Table 4, an explanation of which will be offered shortly.

### **<Table 7 Here> Pledge Fulfillment in Germany, Merkel I**

Examining the grand coalition government as a whole, 234 pledges were made between the two governing parties. A total of 157 pledges, or 67.1%, were found to be fully and partially fulfilled. These results are clearly higher than the results of coalition governments thus far examined. In fact, these results are on the upper scale of pledge fulfillment, mirroring the results on U.S. pledge fulfillment and the lower end of research conducted on single-party governments (See: Naurin 2009, 58, Table 4.1).

The opposition parties in Table 7 exhibited similar trends as the opposition parties in Table 4. The Greens, not legislatively the largest opposition party, nonetheless had the best fulfillment results of the three parties. The Greens at least partially fulfilled 46 pledges, or 51.7% of its pledges, while the FDP and the PDS least partially fulfilled 38 pledges, 46%, and 28 pledges, 40%, respectively. Combined, the opposition parties made 241 pledges of which 112 pledges, 46%, were fulfilled. These results are slightly higher than the results of the opposition parties of 2002-2005.

By examining the fulfillment rates by individual policy areas under Merkel I (Tables 8 and 9), we see that the previous fulfillment advantages under Schröder II continued as both the CDU/CSU and SPD performed significantly better than the opposition parties in both policy areas. We notice that the SPD performed better in economic pledge redemption, whereas the Christian Democrats performed better in social welfare pledges. We also see that the governing parties performed extremely well of at least fulfilling 69 % of all remaining pledges as compared to only 50 % for the Schröder II governing parties. Table 9 shows that the fulfillment rates for the opposition parties remained consistent across parties.

**<Tables 8 and 9 Here> Breakdown of Government/Opposition Parties' Pledges by Policy Areas, Merkel I**

An explanatory factor for the differences in opposition fulfillment rates between the two governing periods can be found in the composition of the grand coalition. Grand coalition governments are in theory composed of a broader ideological left-right spectrum. This broader ideological representation allows for greater fulfillment opportunities for the opposition than under single ideological coalition government. In other words, the Merkel I government afforded the opposition parties with stronger results because the government's ideological composition was collectively closer to that of the opposition parties' individual ideologies.

Under Merkel I, ministerial control appears not to have given the CDU/CSU or the SPD any particularly strong advantage in fulfillment of pledges. First, the ministries were equally distributed between the governing parties. Second, the results of higher partially fulfilled pledges suggest that, with the overlapping ministerial authority and the inability of either party unable to fully control the policy formation process, more extensive policy negotiations and compromises between the coalition partners was commonplace between the parties than seen in Schröder II.

In Table 10, we see that the German government's results are still in line with other coalition governments' results. Of the 522 pledges made by the four governing parties, 326 pledges, or 62%, were at least partially fulfilled. The opposition parties for both time periods made 468 pledges. A total of 209 pledges, or 44.7 %, were fulfilled.

**<Table 10 Here> Combined Pledge Fulfillment German Results, 2002-2009**

Lastly, we are not seeing the strong effects of the *Bundesrat* on pledge fulfillment equally in both governing periods. The CDU-dominated *Bundesrat* proved to be veto point to Schröder's attempt to pass the Agenda 2010 in December 2003 (Williamson November 8, 2005), but remained mostly mute under Merkel I.<sup>6</sup> These results seem to suggest that the *Bundesrat* may at times be an effective veto point to legislative passage and at times not.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Prior to the two governing periods of this study, the *Bundesrat* was instrumental in providing institutional blockage to the *Bundestag* or secured legislative changes from the government. During the late 1990s, the SPD-controlled *Bundesrat* was successful in blocking tax cuts proposed by the Kohl government (Orlow 1999, 313). In 2000, Schröder was successful in securing the support of the Christian Democrat-led *Bundesrat*, and won passage of tax cut legislation, however, only after concessions to the opposition.

<sup>7</sup> According to Thomas König (2005), the *Bundesrat* may not be the veto player as argued. According to his findings, the *Bundesrat* has rarely used its veto powers to block legislation. Rather, it appears that conciliation committees, similar to the U.S. Congress' reconciliation committees, are used to reconcile differences between the *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat* (König 2005, 1) before institutional differences caused the scuttling of legislation. The

## 7. Are the Hypotheses Borne Out?

### *Hypothesis 1*

Based on pledge fulfillment results provided in this work the hypothesis is borne out. Therefore, we can safely conclude that Hypothesis 1 is supported by the evidence presented here. German governing parties are better able to fulfill their pledges, as compared to their opposition party counterparts.

### *Hypotheses 2a and 2b*

The results indicate that our understanding of grand coalition governments may need to be revised. The stronger fulfillment effect was seen by the Merkel I government, not as expected by the Schröder II government. Despite the institutional challenges, Merkel I performed better than Schröder II in overall pledge fulfillment. The results show that the Merkel I government at least partially fulfilled approximately 67% of their pledges, as compared to the 59% for the Schröder II government.

On the face of it, the results appear to be counter-intuitive to prevailing thought. Five possible explanations seem to explain this phenomenon. First, since Schröder was faced with internal SPD opposition to many of his policies and the fracturing of the SPD as a whole, Chancellor Schröder's coalition was unable to secure continuous party support. The breakdown of party discipline among the Social Democrats created a governing atmosphere that made it more difficult to pass legislation, which led to an early termination of the government and lower fulfillment rates.

Second, as Dorothee Heisenberg (2005) suggested, the policy differences between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats in 2002 and 2005 were not particularly great. Table 11 provides credence to Heisenberg's observation. The table shows that, first, the majority of pledges identified were unrelated to each other. Second, parties from the same ideological family tended to have higher rates of pledge agreement. More importantly, there is relatively strong policy agreement between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, which provided the Merkel I governing parties with a strong basis to form legislation.<sup>8</sup>

### **<Table 11 Here> Relationship Among Pledges in Germany**

Third, on a practical level, the development of a *Proporz*-like system under Merkel I may have forced the acceptance of compromises between the parties.<sup>9</sup> Third, there may be a more fundamental reason that helps to explain these results: Elections. Whereas many politicians were pessimistic about the duration of the grand coalition (William Drozdiak 2006, 68), the German public held a more positive opinion and wanted the parties to work together (Whitlock

---

2006 federal reforms may have further influenced the reduction of the *Bundesrat*'s ability to affect legislation during much of the grand coalition (Deutsche Welle (2) March 7, 2006 and BMI).

<sup>8</sup> In my dissertational work, the relationship among pledges was individually examined according to year and policy area. I also included the results of the Linke.PDS party. The full relationship results may be obtained by contacting this author.

<sup>9</sup> In fact, the very nature of the 2005 grand coalition government agreement has been characterized as being highly detailed as to what policies to pursue and how to pursue them (Saalfeld 2010, 85). The government agreement, therefore, did not provide the parties and individual ministers with much room for interpretation or even to deviate from policy goals.

November 15, 2005). The public position, coupled with a potential electoral backlash for being an obstructionist party, created a strong incentive for both parties to be seen as working together to solve Germany's most pressing issues.

Lastly, another advantage the grand coalition enjoyed that was instrumental in pledge fulfillment was the aforementioned control of the legislative seats the governing parties. Over 70% of the legislative seats were controlled by the CDU/CSU and SPD. So, once the party leadership of both parties agreed on a compromise, it is very certain that the passage of the legislation will happen.

Therefore, we can conclude that Hypothesis 2a was not supported, while Hypothesis 2b was. The evidence indicates that, in this case, a grand coalition need not be hampered in pledge fulfillment and has the ability to surpass the fulfillment abilities of a normal coalition.

However, does this necessarily mean grand coalitions are more preferred to normal coalitions to achieve strong pledge fulfillment? In short, not necessarily. There are two conditions of a grand coalition we need to keep in mind. First, the ideological differences between the governing parties remain the defining distinction between them and remain a source of friction between the two parties. This will serve to hamper fulfillment. As Heisenberg noted, there was moderation by the Social Democrats on some policy issues. However, if a party can moderate, that same party or the other party may also become more radicalized as the political environment dictates.

Even with the policy similarities on economic and social welfare, there was still ideological friction and public dissatisfaction with the direction of the government's policies among members of both parties during Merkel I. Additionally, as evident with the defection of many SPD supporters to the Linke.PDS, the support of policies by the party leadership may not translate to full support by parliamentarian back-benchers and the typical party supporter. Though the governing parties controlled a super-majority of the legislative seats, among many parliamentarians, the support was begrudgingly given to the party leadership.

Second, and to the point, we simply do not have enough evidence that would support that assertion. One case on pledge fulfillment is hardly adequate to make that determination. Further study on grand coalitions is most definitely needed before we can make a concrete claim to that effect. An excellent case to include in any future examinations of grand coalitions would be Austria as the state has a long history of utilizing them since 1945.

### *Hypothesis 3*

Hypothesis 3 seeks to place the German results in relationship to previous research. Based on the complete results, I am able to place the German system (See Table 7). Looking at total fulfillment for both governments, Germany comes out slightly higher than other coalition systems -- 62%, compared to the next highest coalition fulfillment rate, 60% for Norway, confirming the hypothesis. The normal coalition results of 59% (Schröder II) are a bit further down the list, and closer to the results of the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and France. The grand coalition results (Merkel I) are identical to the results of U.S. Presidential system.

### **<Table 12 Here> Average of Government Parties' Election Promises Fulfilled**

The results thus show that the German system on the whole performs well for a coalition government. Federalism and the potential veto points it brings – a strong upper house and judicial review – does not act as a particularly great impediment to pledge fulfillment. This is in

spite of the fact that the opposition controlled the *Bundesrat* the majority of Schröder's two terms as Chancellor.

## 8. Conclusions

This chapter has presented fulfillment results for two governing periods in Germany, Schröder II and Merkel I. Within this context of pledge fulfillment in Germany are several features of German governance that may reduce pledge fulfillment success; such as coalition governance and institutional design. When the prospect of a grand coalition arose in 2005, pessimism among politicians and observers who predicted an early dissolution of the government came to the forefront. However, as history shows, the grand coalition government survived the four year legislative period despite the predictions.

Overall, this paper illustrates that the German model of government does provide the governing and opposition parties an avenue of fulfilling pledges at rates comparable to other coalition governments studied. We found, in line with other studies on coalition governments, coalition governments tend to drive down fulfillment rates for the governing parties as compared to single party governments. The Schröder II opposition parties' results were in line with similar research. Surprisingly, the grand coalition governing parties performed better than the Schröder II government and most coalition systems examined. These results are also counterintuitive when we consider the governing union of parties that occupy the left-right ideological spectrum. It is logical to expect ideological differences to play a significant role in preventing pledge fulfillment. However, coupled with equal ministerial and legislative dominance, strong policy agreement between the parties, a Proporz-style system, and fear of electoral backlash all contributed to the success that the Merkel I government enjoyed.

Institutionally, we do not see the consistent impact on pledge fulfillment by the *Bundesrat* as expected. During the Schröder II government, the *Bundesrat* was instrumental in blocking the passage of the Agenda 2010 legislation of Schröder's. Passage only came when Schröder agreed to some changes within the legislation. However, in other occasions, the effects of the *Bundesrat* are not as evident. Despite its constitutional requirement to approve legislation, the *Bundesrat* has rarely exercised its full veto over the *Bundestag* (König 2005). Federal reforms in 2006 may have played a role in further reducing the influence of the *Bundesrat* on overall pledge fulfillment, especially for the grand coalition.

Overall, the two German governing periods have exhibited a strong potential to fulfill pledges. The German results are mainly within line with results of other democratic systems examined in this volume. Additional research on Germany may support this contention. Any additional research should undoubtedly include the first post-war German grand coalition, 1966-1969 to examine whether or not higher than expected fulfillment rates are commonplace. Research on grand coalitions can be expanded to include other states as well. The hope here is to reveal if there are commonalities in pledge fulfillment among other grand coalition governments. If not, research should try to determine the variations in pledge fulfillment.

## Bibliography

Artés, Joaquin. 2009. "Do Spanish Politicians Keep Their Promises?" Prepared for Comparative Party Pledge Group Workshop, Gothenburg, Sweden, 25-26 June, 2009.

Artés, Joaquin and Antonio Bustos. 2008. "Electoral Promises and Minority Governments: An Empirical Study." *European Journal of Political Research* 47: 307-33.

Bivol, Alex. October 1, 2009. "Romania's 'grand coalition' collapses." *The Sofia Echo*. <[http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/10/01/793336\\_romanias-grand-coalition-collapses](http://www.sofiaecho.com/2009/10/01/793336_romanias-grand-coalition-collapses)>

Casert, Raf. November 25, 2006. "Dutch Election Reflects Europe's Anxiety." The Associated Press. <[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/25/AR2006112500209\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/25/AR2006112500209_pf.html)>

Conradt, David. 2005. "The Tipping Point: The 2005 Election and Deconstruction of the German Party System." In *Launching the Grand Coalition: The 2005 Bundestag Election and the Future of German Politics*. Edt by Eric Langenbacher. Berghahn Books: New York. Pp 13-28.

Conradt, David P. 2009. *The German Polity*. 9<sup>th</sup> Edition, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company: Boston.

Costello, Rory and Robert Thomson. 2007. "Election Pledges And Their Enactment In Coalition Governments: A Comparative Analysis of Ireland." Presented at the ECPR general conference, Pisa, Italy, 6-8 September, 2007.

Handlesblatt.de. August 9, 2005. "Was die große Koalition 1966 bis 1969 lehrt." <<http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/ b=941325, p=6, t=ftprint.doc page=0;printpag>>

Helms, Ludger. 2005. "The Grand Coalition: Precedent and Prospects." In *Launching the Grand Coalition: The 2005 Bundestag Election and the Future of German Politics*. Edt by Eric Langenbacher. Berghahn Books: New York. Pp 49-68.

Heisenberg, Dorothee. September 22, 2005. "Why a Grand Coalition in Germany Might Not be a Total Disaster." *American Institute for Contemporary German Studies*. <<http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/heisen092205.aspx>>

Kiss, Laszlo. 2008. "The Austrian Elections: from Grand Coalition to Grand Coalition The Erosion of the People's Parties." Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. <[http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/MKI-tanulmanyok/T-2008-29-Laszlo\\_Kiss\\_J-austrian\\_elections\\_2008.pdf](http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/MKI-tanulmanyok/T-2008-29-Laszlo_Kiss_J-austrian_elections_2008.pdf)>

Kraske, Marion and Walter Mayr. "The Austrian Far Right A Grand Coalition Fails, Leaving Room for Radicals." *Der Spiegel*, July 18, 2008. <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,566744,00.html>> Last Accessed on September 1, 2009.

- Mansergh, Lucy and Robert Thomson. 2007. "Election Pledges, Party Competition, and Policymaking." *Comparative Politics*. Vol 39, No. 3. 311-329.
- Miko, Francis T. January 17, 2006. "Germany's "Grand Coalition" Government: Prospects and Implications." Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL33252.
- Naurin, Elin. 2002. "The Pledge Paradox: Why do people think parties break their promises?" Conference Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session in Turin, Italy. March 22-27, 2002.
- Naurin, Elin. 2007. "The Promising Democracy. Election promises and Public Opinion in Strong Minority Single Party Government: The Swedish Context." Presented at the 4<sup>th</sup> ECPR General Conference, Pisa, Italy, September 6-8, 2007.
- Naurin, Elin. 2009. *Promising Democracy Parties, Citizens and Election Promises*. University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg: Sweden.
- Royed, Terry J. 1996. "Testing the Mandate Model in Britain and the United States: Evidence from the Reagan and Thatcher Eras," *British Journal Political Science* 26: 45-80.
- Royed, Terry J. 2007. "Is the U.S. a 'Responsible Party System?' Evidence from the Comparative Analysis of the Enactment of Party Pledges." Paper presented at the General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy, 6-8 September, 2007.
- Royed, Terry J. 2009. "The Impact of Institutions on the Policy Influence of Parties: The Case of the UK and US." Prepared for Comparative Party Pledge Group Workshop, Gothenburg, Sweden, 25-26 June, 2009.
- Thomson, Robert. 2001. "The Programme to Policy Linkage: The fulfillment of Election Pledges on Socio-economic Policy in the Netherlands, 1986-1998." *European Journal of Political Research* 40: 171-197.
- Thomson, Robert, Rory Costello, Edwina Love, and Lucy Mansergh. 2009. "The Fulfillment of Election Pledges in Ireland, 1997-2007." Prepared for Comparative Party Pledge Group Workshop, Gothenburg, Sweden, 25-26 June, 2009.
- Turner, Henry Ashby. 1987. *The Two Germanies Since 1945*. Yale University Press: New Haven, Connecticut.
- Whitlock, Craig. November 15, 2005. "Germany's Grudging 'Grand Coalition' Parties Finalize Deal for Government Neither Really Wants." *The Washington Post*.  
<<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/14/AR2005111400832.html>>
- Williams, Michelle Hale. 2006. "German Grand Coalition and the 2005 Federal Election: Evidence of Party System Polarization and Catch-all Party Convergence." Presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31<sup>st</sup> -September 3, 2006.

**Table 1: Number and Types of Pledges in Germany, 2002 and 2005<sup>10</sup>**

	<b>SPD*</b>	<b>SPD*</b>	<b>CDU/CSU</b>	<b>CDU/CSU*</b>	<b>Greens*</b>	<b>Greens</b>	<b>FDP</b>	<b>FDP</b>	<b>PDS</b>	<b>PDS</b>
	<b>2002</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2005</b>
<b>Status Quo</b>	8% (11)	16% (19)	10% (9)	8% (10)	7% (11)	18% (16)	8% (8)	10% (8)	8% (3)	10% (7)
<b>Change</b>	92% (125)	84% (97)	90% (82)	92% (108)	93% (141)	82% (73)	92% (89)	90% (74)	92% (36)	90% (63)
<b>TOTAL PLEDGES</b>	100% (136)	100% (116)	100% (91)	100% (118)	100% (152)	100% (89)	100% (97)	100% (82)	100% (39)	100% (70)

<sup>10</sup> The symbol \* denotes government party.

**Table 2: Examples of Pledge Fulfillment (2002)**

<b>Party</b>	<b>Translated Pledge</b>	<b>Original Pledge</b>	<b>Explanation</b>	<b>Source(s)</b>
<b>SPD*</b>	343. We will therefore create a nationwide program called "Future Education and Care" with an introductory budget of € 4 billion, € 1 billion per year. (Change)	Wir werden deshalb ein bundesweites Programm „Zukunft Bildung und Betreuung“ mit einem Finanzvolumen von 4 Milliarden € auflegen, 1 Milliarde € pro Jahr.	This pledge was classified as fulfilled. On May 12, 2003, the federal and state governments agreed to create this program with the federal government allocating 4 billion Euros for the program.	Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) <a href="http://www.bmbf.de/en/1125.php">http://www.bmbf.de/en/1125.php</a>
<b>CDU/CSU</b>	1. That is why we will gradually and consistently sink that state quota, the percentage of the work of the public sector in the entire economic performance, from the current ca. 50% to under 40%. (Change)	Wir werden deshalb die Staatsquote, den Anteil der Ausgaben der öffentlichen Hand an der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Leistung, von derzeit knapp 50% schrittweise und dauerhaft auf unter 40% senken.	This pledge was marked as partial. According to Table 1 of Giacomo Corneo's (ESifo Economics Studies, Vol. 51, 1/205 p159-189) indicates tax rates for this was reduced to 41%. The results are close to the Christian Democrat's goals, but they did not fall below the 40% mark the party advocated.	Table 1 of Giacomo Corneo's (ESifo Economics Studies, Vol. 51, 1/205 p159-189)
<b>Greens*</b>	383. We want Germany to take the initiative in introducing the Tobin Tax and other recommended instruments to regulate and restrict the currency speculations. (Change)	Wir wollen, dass Deutschland in Europa eine Initiative zur Einführung der Tobin-Steuer und anderer geeigneter Instrumente ergreift, um die internationalen Finanzmärkte zu regulieren und die Devisenspekulationen einzuschränken.	The Tobin Tax is/was a proposed global tax on financial transactions. This pledge was considered as unfulfilled because this tax was not introduced during Schröder II.	
<b>FDP</b>	208. The FDP rejects the so-called "Tobin Tax." (Status quo)	Eine Sondersteuer auf Devisentransaktionen - die so genannte "Tobin-Steuer" - lehnt die FDP ab.	This pledge was considered fulfilled as the party rejected the introduction of the Tobin Tax and it failed to become law during Schröder II.	
<b>PDS.Linke</b>	44. We will introduce according to France's example a quota law for all party election lists (ballots) for the areas of political participants. (Change)	Für den Bereich der politischen Teilhabe werden wir nach dem Beispiel Frankreichs ein Quotierungsgesetz für alle Listen von Parteien zu Wahlen vorlegen.	Some parties already have rules in place that require gender quotas for female candidates. However, during Schröder II, this did not come about as a legal requirement. Therefore, this pledge was considered unfulfilled.	

**Table 3: Examples of Pledges Made on Social Welfare (2005)**

Party	Translated Pledge	Original Pledge	Explanation	Source(s)
<b>SPD*</b>	17. The corporate tax for corporations will be reduced from 25% to 19%. (Change)	17. Der Körperschaftsteuersatz für Kapitalgesellschaften wird von 25 % auf 19 % reduziert.	This pledge was classified as fulfilled. In 2008, the government passed the Business Tax Reform Act ( <i>Unternehmensteuerreform</i> 2008 - UntStRefG), which reduced the corporate tax from 25% to 15%.	Federal Government's <i>Bundesgesetzblatt</i> - (BGBl. I S. 1912). Changes found in Art. 16 G vom 20. Dezember 2008 (BGBl. I S. 2850, 2858) and (Art. 17 G vom 20. Dezember 2008).
<b>CDU/CSU*</b>	74. For the period of 2006-2019, the sum of 156 Billion Euros has been promised through the Solidarity Pact Aid. These promises remain unchanged and in the complete sum. {East Germany} (Status quo)	74. Für den Zeitraum 2006 – 2019 sind Solidarpaktmittel in Höhe von 156 Mrd. Euro zugesagt. Diese Zusage gilt unverändert und in voller Höhe.	This pledge was identified as fulfilled. There were two major sources supporting this fulfillment claim. Both sources detail that the German government did pass funding legislation of 156 billion Euros as part of the Solidarity Pact II program for eastern Germany.	Deutsche Welle's October 3, 2006 article, "Germans Celebrate Unity Day With Mixed Emotions." <a href="http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2192138,00.html">http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2192138,00.html</a> The Federal Republic of Germany. <a href="http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_239470/Content/EN/StatischeSeiten/Schwerpunkte/Wirtschaftsstandort_20Deutschland/kasten4-aufbau-ost-wird-fortgesetzt.html">http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_239470/Content/EN/StatischeSeiten/Schwerpunkte/Wirtschaftsstandort_20Deutschland/kasten4-aufbau-ost-wird-fortgesetzt.html</a>
<b>Greens</b>	50. We reject an increase of the VAT. (Status quo)	50. Eine Erhöhung der Mehrwertsteuer lehnen wir ab.	This pledge was classified as not fulfilled. At the time of the 2005 elections, the VAT was at 16%. However, on June 16, 2006, the German government raised the VAT to 19 %, which was eventually approved by the Bundestag. The raise came into effect on January 1, 2007.	The German Statistical Federal Ministry (Statistisches Bundesamt). <a href="http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/STATmagazin/Preise/Archiv/Themenkasten/ThemenkastenMehrwertsteuererhoehung.property=file.pdf">http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/STATmagazin/Preise/Archiv/Themenkasten/ThemenkastenMehrwertsteuererhoehung.property=file.pdf</a>
<b>FDP</b>	56. We want the dissolution of the Federal Agency for Work ( <i>Bundesagentur für Arbeit</i> ). (Change)	56. Wir wollen die Auflösung der Bundesagentur für Arbeit.	This pledge was identified as not fulfilled. Originally called the <i>Bundesanstalt für Arbeit</i> , the Federal Institution for Work, was renamed <i>Bundesagentur für Arbeit</i> , the Federal Agency for Work, as part of the "Dritte Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt" (Hartz-III) and was not dissolved.	<a href="http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/">http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/</a>
<b>PDS.Linke</b>	80. The VAT shall remain at 16%. (Status quo)	80. Die Umsatzsteuer (Mehrwertsteuer) soll bei 16 Prozent bleiben.	This pledge was as not fulfilled. On June 16, 2006, the German government raised the VAT to 19% and came into effect on January 1, 2007.	The German Statistical Federal Ministry (Statistisches Bundesamt). <a href="http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/STATmagazin/Preise/Archiv/Themenkasten/ThemenkastenMehrwertsteuererhoehung.property=file.pdf">http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/STATmagazin/Preise/Archiv/Themenkasten/ThemenkastenMehrwertsteuererhoehung.property=file.pdf</a>

**Table 4: Pledge Fulfillment in Germany, Schröder II**

	Governing Parties			Opposition Parties		
	SPD	Greens	Government	CDU/CSU	FDP	PDS
<b>Fully</b>	58.8% (80)	41% (62)	<b>49.3%</b> <b>(142)</b>	41% (37)	21% (20)	18% (7)
<b>Partial</b>	9.6% (13)	9% (14)	<b>9.4%</b> <b>(27)</b>	15% (14)	12% (12)	18% (7)
<b>At least Partially</b>	<b>68.4%</b> <b>(93)</b>	<b>50%</b> <b>(76)</b>	<b>58.7%</b> <b>(169)</b>	<b>56%</b> <b>(51)</b>	<b>33%</b> <b>(32)</b>	<b>36%</b> <b>(14)</b>
<b>Not</b>	31.6% (43)	50% (76)	<b>41.3%</b> <b>(119)</b>	44% (40)	67% (65)	64% (25)
<b>Total</b>	100% (136)	100% (152)	100% (288)	100% (91)	100% (97)	100% (39)

**Table 5: Breakdown of Government Parties' Pledges by Policy Areas, Schröder II<sup>11</sup>**

	SPD							Greens						
	ECO	SW	CR	C	FP	ENV	Gen	ECO	SW	CR	C	FP	ENV	Gen
<b>Fully</b>	65%	57%	75%	40%	5%	33%	88%	48%	55%	17%	35%	18%	46%	20%
	(17)	(40)	(3)	(4)	(6)	(2)	(7)	(10)	(28)	(3)	(6)	(2)	(11)	(2)
<b>Partial</b>	8%	7%	0%	20%	18%	17%	12%	19%	4% (2)	11%	0%	7%	12%	0%
	(2)	(5)	(0)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(4)		(2)	(0)	(3)	(3)	(0)
<b>At least Partially</b>	<b>73%</b>	<b>64%</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>73%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>59%</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>58%</b>	<b>20%</b>
	<b>(19)</b>	<b>(45)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(6)</b>	<b>(8)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(8)</b>	<b>(14)</b>	<b>(30)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(6)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(14)</b>	<b>(2)</b>
<b>Not</b>	27%	36%	25%	40%	27%	50%	0%	33%	41%	72%	5%	5%	42%	80%
	(7)	(25)	(1)	(4)	(3)	(3)	(0)	(7)	(21)	(13)	(11)	(6)	(10)	(8)
<b>Total Pledges</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(26)	(70)	(4)	(10)	(11)	(6)	(8)	(21)	(51)	(18)	(17)	(11)	(24)	(10)

<sup>11</sup> Eco = Economic Pledges, SW = Social Welfare Pledges, CR = Civil Rights Pledges, C = Crime Pledges, FP = Foreign Policy Pledges, Env = Environmental Pledges, and Gen = General Pledges

**Table 6: Breakdown of Opposition Parties' Pledges by Policy Areas, Schröder II<sup>12</sup>**

	CDU/CSU							FDP						
	ECO	SW	CR	C	FP	ENV	Gen	ECO	SW	CR	C	FP	ENV	Gen
<b>Fully</b>	22%	45%	67%	60%	50%	0%	55%	14%	30%	0%	33%	33%	0%	14.3%
	(5)	(9)	(2)	(12)	(3)	(0)	(6)	(4)	(9)	(0)	(1)	(3)	(0)	(3)
<b>Partial</b>	22%	5%	0%	15%	17%	50%	0%	14%	17%	0%	0%	0%	0%	14.3%
	(5)	(1)	(0)	(3)	(1)	(4)	(0)	(4)	(5)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(3)
<b>At least Partially</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>28.6%</b>
	<b>(10)</b>	<b>(10)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(15)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(6)</b>	<b>(8)</b>	<b>(14)</b>	<b>(0)</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(0)</b>	<b>(6)</b>
<b>Not</b>	56%	50%	33%	25%	33%	50%	45%	72%	53%	100%	67%	67%	100%	71.4%
	(13)	(10)	(1)	(5)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(21)	(16)	(2)	(2)	(6)	(3)	(15)
<b>Total Pledges</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(23)	(20)	(3)	(20)	(6)	(8)	(11)	(29)	(30)	(2)	(3)	(9)	(3)	(21)

<sup>12</sup> Eco = Economic Pledges, SW = Social Welfare Pledges, CR = Civil Rights Pledges, C = Crime Pledges, FP = Foreign Policy Pledges, Env = Environmental Pledges, and Gen = General Pledges

**Table 6: Breakdown of Opposition Parties' Pledges by Policy Areas, Schröder II, Cont.<sup>13</sup>**

	PDS					
	ECO	SW	CR	C	FP	Gen
<b>Fully</b>	0% (0)	7% (1)	25% (1)	33.3% (1)	0% (0)	50% (4)
<b>Partial</b>	25% (2)	29% (4)	0% (0)	33.3% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)
<b>At least Partially</b>	<b>25%</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>36%</b> <b>(5)</b>	<b>25%</b> <b>(1)</b>	<b>67%</b> <b>(2)</b>	<b>0%</b> <b>(0)</b>	<b>50%</b> <b>(0)</b>
<b>Not</b>	75% (6)	64% (9)	75% (3)	33% (1)	100% (2)	50% (4)
<b>Total Pledges</b>	100% (8)	100% (14)	100% (4)	100% (3)	100% (2)	100% (8)

<sup>13</sup> Eco = Economic Pledges, SW = Social Welfare Pledges, CR = Civil Rights Pledges, C = Crime Pledges, FP = Foreign Policy Pledges, Env = Environmental Pledges, and Gen = General Pledges

**Table 7: Pledge Fulfillment in Germany, Merkel I**

	Governing Parties			Opposition Parties		
	SPD	CDU/CSU	Government	Greens	FDP	PDS
<b>Fully</b>	39% (45)	46% (54)	<b>42.3%</b> <b>(99)</b>	38.2% (34)	28% (23)	16% (11)
<b>Partial</b>	27% (31)	23% (27)	<b>24.8%</b> <b>(58)</b>	13.5% (12)	18% (15)	24% (17)
<b>At least Partially</b>	66% (76)	69% (81)	<b>67.1%</b> <b>(157)</b>	51.7% (46)	46% (38)	40% (28)
<b>Not</b>	34% (40)	31% (37)	<b>32.9%</b> <b>(77)</b>	48.3% (43)	54% (44)	60% (42)
<b>Total</b>	100% (116)	100% (118)	<b>100%</b> <b>(234)</b>	100% (89)	100% (82)	100% (70)

**Table 8: Breakdown of Government Parties' Pledges by Policy Areas, Merkel I<sup>14</sup>**

	CDU/CSU							SPD						
	ECO	SW	CR	C	FP	ENV	Gen	ECO	SW	CR	C	FP	ENV	Gen
<b>Fully</b>	35%	39%	100%	92%	71%	25%	27%	29%	39%	50%	71%	50%	33%	31%
	(16)	(11)	(5)	(12)	(5)	(2)	(3)	(7)	(20)	(2)	(5)	(4)	(3)	(4)
<b>Partial</b>	22%	39%	0%	8%	14.5%	25%	18%	38%	28%	0%	15%	38%	22%	15%
	(10)	(11)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(9)	(14)	(0)	(1)	(3)	(2)	(2)
<b>At least Partially</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>78%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>86%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>86%</b>	<b>88%</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>46%</b>
	<b>(26)</b>	<b>(22)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(13)</b>	<b>(6)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(16)</b>	<b>(34)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(6)</b>	<b>(7)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(6)</b>
<b>Not</b>	43%	22%	0%	0%	14.5%	50%	55%	33%	33%	50%	14%	12%	44%	54%
	(20)	(6)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(4)	(6)	(8)	(17)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(4)	(7)
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(46)	(28)	(5)	(13)	(7)	(8)	(11)	(24)	(51)	(4)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(13)

<sup>14</sup> Eco = Economic Pledges, SW = Social Welfare Pledges, CR = Civil Rights Pledges, C = Crime Pledges, FP = Foreign Policy Pledges, Env = Environmental Pledges, and Gen = General Pledges

**Table 9: Breakdown of Opposition Parties' Pledges by Policy Areas, Merkel I<sup>15</sup>**

	Greens							FDP						
	ECO	SW	CR	C	FP	ENV	Gen	ECO	SW	CR	C	FP	ENV	Gen
<b>Fully</b>	22%	44%	44%	50%	23%	16%	73%	16%	18%	100%	43%	25%	25%	38%
	(4)	(8)	(4)	(2)	(3)	(2)	(11)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(3)	(1)	(1)	(6)
<b>Partial</b>	22%	6%	0%	25%	8%	42%	0%	28%	18%	0%	14%	0%	25%	12%
	(4)	(1)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(5)	(0)	(7)	(4)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(1)	(2)
<b>At least Partially</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>31%</b>	<b>58%</b>	<b>73%</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>50%</b>
	<b>(8)</b>	<b>(9)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(7)</b>	<b>(11)</b>	<b>(11)</b>	<b>(8)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(8)</b>
<b>Not</b>	56%	50%	56%	25%	69%	42%	27%	56%	64%	0%	43%	75%	50%	50%
	(10)	(9)	(5)	(1)	(9)	(5)	(4)	(14)	(14)	(0)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(8)
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(18)	(18)	(9)	(4)	(13)	(12)	(15)	(25)	(22)	(4)	(7)	(4)	(4)	(16)

<sup>15</sup> Eco = Economic Pledges, SW = Social Welfare Pledges, CR = Civil Rights Pledges, C = Crime Pledges, FP = Foreign Policy Pledges, Env = Environmental Pledges, Gen = General Pledges, and APA = All Policy Areas Combined

**Table 9: Breakdown of Opposition Parties' Pledges by Policy Areas, Merkel I, Cont.<sup>16</sup>**

	PDS.Linke						
	ECO	SW	CR	Crime	FP	ENV	Gen
<b>Fully</b>	8%	18%	0%	50%	0%	38%	14%
	(1)	(4)	(0)	(1)	(0)	(6)	(1)
<b>Partial</b>	14%	18%	0%	50%	20%	38%	29%
	(2)	(4)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(6)	(2)
<b>At least Partially</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>43%</b>
	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(8)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(12)</b>	<b>(3)</b>
<b>Not</b>	78%	64%	100%	0%	80%	24%	57%
	(11)	(14)	(2)	(0)	(4)	(4)	(4)
<b>Total Pledges</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(14)	(22)	(2)	(2)	(5)	(16)	(7)

<sup>16</sup> Eco = Economic Pledges, SW = Social Welfare Pledges, CR = Civil Rights Pledges, C = Crime Pledges, FP = Foreign Policy Pledges, Env = Environmental Pledges, and Gen = General Pledges

**Table 10: Combined Pledge Fulfillment German Results, 2002-2009**

	Overall Results			
	Government		Opposition	
<b>Fully</b>	46%	(241)	28.2%	(132)
<b>Partial</b>	16%	(85)	16.5%	(77)
<b>At least Partially</b>	<b>62%</b>	<b>(326)</b>	<b>44.7%</b>	<b>(209)</b>
<b>Not</b>	38%	(196)	55.3%	(259)
<b>Total</b>	100% (522)		100% (468)	

**Table 11: Relationship Among Pledges, 2002 and 2005**

	All Policy Areas		Economics		Social Welfare	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
<b>SPD-CDU/CSU</b>	40%	12%	42%	17%	36%	11%
<b>SPD-Greens</b>	48%	5%	35%	27%	47%	6%
<b>SPD-FDP</b>	33.2%	19.4%	30%	30%	32%	13%
<b>CDU/CSU-FDP</b>	41%	11%	45%	5%	42%	0%
<b>CDU/CSU-Greens</b>	24%	21%	19%	35%	33%	15%

**Table 12: Average of Government Parties' Election Promises Fulfilled**

<b>Country and Studied Period</b>	<b>Election Promises at least Partially Fulfilled</b>
U.K. 1974-1997 (Single-Party Majoritarian)	84%
U.K. 1970-1979 (Single-Party Majoritarian)	82%
Greece 1981-1985 (Single-Party Majoritarian)	74%
<u>Spain</u> 1989-1993 (Single-Party Majoritarian)	74%
U.K. 1945-1979 (Single-Party Majoritarian)	73%
New Zealand 1972-2005 (SPM & Coalitions)	73%
Canada 1945-1978 (Single-Party Majoritarian)	72%
<b><u>Germany</u> Merkel I (Grand Coalition)</b>	<b>67%</b>
U.S. 1944-1978 (Presidential)	67%
U.S. 1976-2000 (Presidential)	65%
<b><u>Germany</u> 2002-2009 (Average, Coalition/Grand Coalition)</b>	<b>62%</b>
Norway 2001-2005 (Minority Coalition Govt)	60%
France 1997-2007 (Semi-Presidential)	60%
<u>Italy</u> 1996 -2006 (Coalition Govts)	60%
<b><u>Germany</u> Schröder II (Normal Coalition Govt)</b>	<b>59%</b>
<u>Ireland</u> 1977-1981 (Single-Party Majoritarian)	58%
Netherlands 1986-1998 (Coalition Govts)	57%
Ireland 1977-2007 (Minority/Majority Govts)	52%
Czech Republic 1992-2006 (Coalition Govts)	45%
<b>Mean of these Pledge Studies</b>	<b>65%</b>